The end of the Cold War has changed the nature of American foreign policy. As the sole superpower, we are free to intervene wherever and whenever we decide, constrained only by domestic considerations. New international forces have risen to the top of policy makers' concerns. Our European allies, no longer in need of a nuclear umbrella, do not follow America's lead as they once did. Trade is now as crucial to American ambassadors as it has been for our allies for years. In one of the most dramatic changes, the American approach toward Islam is reversing itself.
During most of the Cold War, Islam was our ally. Islamic regimes were, by definition, enemies of "godless communism," and the United States exploited it, most notably in Afghanistan, where the mujahidin received an estimated $3 billion from the CIA in the battle to expel the Russians.1 These "freedom fighters" also became American media heroes. The informal alliance with the mujahidin even weathered the wave of anti-Iranian sentiment that resulted from the overthrow of the shah and the taking of American hostages. How has it happened, then, that much of the media now portrays Islam as fanatical, antidemocratic and hostile to the West?
Logic suggests that, because Muslims comprise one-fifth of the world's population, Americans would wish to establish friendly relations with Muslim countries from Indonesia to Morocco. Instead, what we see is a campaign directed at Islamic resurgence movements throughout the Middle East. Most commentators ignore the distinctions among the many Islamic movements and assume that conflict between a resurgent Islam and the West is inevitable a classic self-fulfilling prophecy.
Law enforcement agencies should and do deal with violence against innocent people as criminal acts. There is no sound basis for making the religion of the perpetrators an issue. Christianity as a whole did not become the issue in the fiery disaster at Waco, Texas, nor in the Oklahoma City bombing. Judaism did not become the issue when Bernard Goldstein murdered 29 Palestinians at prayer in the Hebron mosque. Islam should not be the issue when an act of violence is committed by Muslims. Individual beliefs may, of course, in all cases, be relevant as regards motive.
As the Cold War disappeared, the view of some Cold Warriors toward Islam changed. Samuel Huntington of Harvard, in his often-cited "Clash of Civilizations" article, accepted that we in the West will "have to accommodate" civilizations "whose values and interests differ significantly" from ours. His "accommodation," however, was to prepare for conflict by maintaining "American military superiority, particularly in East and Southwest Asia" (the heartland of Islam).2 The Huntington world view is in marked contrast to that of one of modem Islam's leading intellectuals, Hasan Turabi, who said around the same time: "Those who enjoy an advantage under the present world order, in economic relations, in the United Nations, in technology, and in armaments, will see that Islam constitutes a challenge because it seeks justice....Muslims will not allow the world to be molded in one pattern, one form of democracy, one form of economic system....In the interest of humanity we should allow more plurality, freedom and diversity and through dialogue and interaction seek as much coherence and coexistence as possible."3
THE ORIGINS OF THE ANTI-ISLAM CAMPAIGN
Those leaders in the Middle East who feel threatened by indigenous Islamic movements, notably in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel, energetically promote the new Western concern with the "Islamic threat." The regime facing the starkest threat is Algeria because it canceled the country's first free elections in January 1992 to prevent the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) from coming to power. The Western democracies tacitly accepted this blatantly antidemocratic action. The result has been the bloodiest civil war in modem Arab history with over 30,000 killed as of May 1995. The common fear of radical Islamic movements has resulted in unprecedented state-to-state cooperation. In January 1995, 18 Arab League interior ministers met and, at the urging of Egypt-with strong backing from Algeria, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia-agreed to draw up a "code of conduct for combating terrorism."
Israeli leaders, threatened by the violent acts of Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, have sought to enlist the United States and Europe in the battle against Islamic fundamentalism in general. Haim Baram, writing from Jerusalem, described the position of Israeli leaders in late 1994 as follows:
The feared and respected enemy now is Islam: the demonization of Muslims is part of the same propagandist strategy reserved until recently for Palestinian nationalism. The Likud leader, Bibi Netanyahu, is currently touring the globe and spreading the new gospel. According to Netanyahu, Arafat has become completely unimportant, since he cannot possibly stem the tide of Islamic radicalism generated by Iran. It is an almost risible tactic, since the Likud leader himself described Arafat, until recently, as the principal threat not only to Israel, but also to the entire Western world.
Netanyahu has found a new line of reasoning for his ancient rejectionist stance. Arafat does not matter, the Islamists are going to take over from him and rule the Palestinian people, and therefore any territorial concessions are absolutely pointless. Iran, ironically, is portrayed as the Great Satan, capable of threatening the West with nuclear bombs. Lebanon and even Syria will undergo an Islamic revolution pretty soon, their uneasy flirtation with the Americans will end, and Israel will regain its status as a main strategic asset of the West. Therefore, the pressure on Israel to make territorial concessions will also cease. The number of Israelis who are ready to inhale this nonsense is unbelievable....Unfortunately, Rabin himself has adopted a similar line of reasoning, especially in his frequent visits to Washington. The "Islamic peril" is one of Rabin's most tiresome themes, and the aim of his campaign is obvious. An ardent Cold War anticommunist all his adult life, he hopes to convince the Americans that Iran is posing the same threat as Moscow in the good old days.4
THE CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA
The momentum of the anti-Islam campaign in the United States suggests that the purported views of Israeli leaders have been increasingly adopted by their supporters and others. The campaign appears aimed at both public opinion and policy makers. Mortimer Zuckerman, editor-in-chief of U.S. News & World Report, enthusiastically adopted the main theme: "Islam's militant strain is on the verge of replacing communism as the principal opponent of Western liberal democracy and the values it enshrines."5 Fergus M. Bordewich, in a sensationalist article in the Reader's Digest entitled "A Holy War Heads Our Way," uses the violent excesses of Muslim extremists in the civil war in Algeria to make the case against Islamic fundamentalism. In doing so, he relies on two of Israel's most prominent American supporters; Robert Satloff, the executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Daniel Pipes, former director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. He quotes Pipes as saying:
Fundamentalists are in no sense just "traditional'' Muslims-and extremists are not just "criminals." They are fervent believers. When the radicals hear they are acceptable as long as they're not violent, they will simply split up their political and military wings. That way they can publicly disclaim responsibility for the violence committed by their underground forces.6
Amos Perlmutter, a professor of political science at American University and editor of the Journal of Strategic Studies, wrote in 1995:
The post-Cold-War era does not amount to a new world order, but rather a world full of radical and secessionist nationalists. The ideology of fascism and Nazism of the 1930s has its counterpart in some places in Islamic radicalism, a totalitarian, anti-Western and popular movement hoping to teach the modern-style Christian "crusaders" some lessons in ultraviolence. It is no coincidence that the principal and consistently violent crisis areas in the world today are instigated by fundamentalists and radical and pan-Islamic nationalists....The Western world...cannot permit the replacement of one form of totalitarianism with another; the Soviet model with an Islamic one.7
Steven Emerson, an author well-known for his pro-Israeli views, produced the PBS program Jihad in America, aired on November 21, 1994. The World Trade Center bombing was its centerpiece, and, while disclaimers were made that Islamic extremists are only a small minority of Muslims, the import of the program was, in the words of Walter Goodman, TV critic for The New York Times, "that seemingly respectable Muslim organizations have ties to militants who preach violence."8 Muslims and others throughout the country protested this portrayal of Islam, and the program is the subject of lawsuits. In a particularly egregious case, Emerson used an answer given by an interviewee (Dr. Sarni al-Arian of Tampa, FL) to one question as the answer to another question, thereby changing its meaning to suit the anti-Islam theme.9 Emerson's two main themes were that an "Islamic Internationale" exists and is directing an anti-Western terror campaign and that a network of Islamic terrorist cells exists throughout the United States. He failed to provide any hard evidence for either allegation. Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., State Department coordinator for counterterrorism, stated in 1995: "While there are informal contacts among Islamists-especially abroad, where their leaders often find safe havens and fund-raising opportunities there is little hard evidence of a coordinated international network or command and control apparatus among these groups."10 Likewise, domestic law enforcement agencies have given no public credence to Emerson's allegations about an Islamic terrorist network in the United States.
In a long article in The New Republic (June 12, 1995), Emerson reiterates his allegations that radical Islamist groups "have established elaborate political, financial and, in some cases, operational infrastructures in the United States" and that "the FBI has made this network a top priority." However, he relies on Israeli sources and anonymous or "former" officials. He does not cite a single active U.S. federal or state law-enforcement official to substantiate his charges.
Emerson revealed his determination to spread these allegations in the immediate aftermath of the tragic Oklahoma City bombing of April 19, 1995. On April 19 and 20, he appeared frequently on nationwide TV implying Islamic terrorists were the perpetrators with such statements as these:
The bombing in Oklahoma had all the hallmarks of the bombing in Buenos Aires or in the World Trade Center....lt was a car bomb, and it was designed to explode and kill as many people as possible. That is not a type of activity that has been seen on American soil prior to the Islamic terrorist activity period....The fact is that certain Muslim groups are trying to hide under the politically correct label that somehow they're being goaded into concentration camps.11
Such irresponsible statements, which The Progressive called "vicious, bigoted rumor-mongering" certainly contributed to the rash of harassment incidents Muslim Americans faced in the following days.12
On a more elevated level, Leslie Gelb, writing in The New York Times, shared the views of his Israeli interlocutors, Rabbi David Hartman and Yehoshafat Harkabi, that "Islam doesn't recognize coexistence as a basic doctrine. Coexistence goes against Islam's sense of world order."13 Other writers, who seem to rely primarily on Middle Eastern governments, consistently go after Iran and the Sudan. Steven A. Holmes, writing from Washington on how "fundamentalism is altering the power relationships" in the Middle East, reiterated the allegations of Iranian-manned training bases in the Sudan and close Iranian-Sudanese military and economic ties, but offered neither specific evidence nor any reason why two like-minded Muslim states should not have close relations.14 Many journalists adopt uncritically the official U.S. view that the "rogue states" (a new category of nation) are "exporting revolution" (never defined) and usually ignore why the Israeli government and certain Arab regimes have provoked such widespread popular discontent. In addition, they rarely interview the leaders of the Islamic movements, most of whom are easily accessible and often Western educated. A notable exception is Robin Wright of The Los Angeles Times, who has traveled widely and interviewed many Muslim leaders. Her writings attest to the diversity of their views.
Judith Miller, a writer for The New York Times on leave of absence, has interviewed Hasan Turabi and others. She has nevertheless written the mother of all generalizations in Foreign Affairs: "...virtually all militant Islamists oppose both [democracy and pluralism]. They are, and are likely to remain, anti-Western, anti-American and anti-Israeli." A scholar of Islam, H. R. Dekmejian, has on the other hand identified and categorized over 175 "Islamist" societies in the Arab world in terms of gradualist pragmatic, revolutionary Shiite, messianic-puritanical and revolutionary Sunni.15 In an expression of cultural superiority at its most arrogant, Ms. Miller wrote: "An Islamic state as espoused by most of its proponents is simply incompatible with values and truths that Americans and most Westerners today hold to be self-evident." She concludes that an American dialogue with such Islamic forces is a waste of time.16
Prominent among the think tanks contributing to the debate on the Islamic threat is the conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington, which on July 21, 1994, discussed the "Islamic threat to North Africa." Speakers included Khalid Duran, a colleague of Daniel Pipes, and Steven Emerson (whom Duran assisted in producing Jihad in America). Pipes, who opposes a dialogue with "good" or "bad" fundamentalists, made four recommendations for U.S. policy to combat the new "red menace": (a) confront the fundamentalists; (b) pressure Iran and Sudan to moderate their policies; (c) assist those Muslims who stand up to the fundamentalists; and (d) back governments in the region who are combating fundamentalism, like Algeria. Pipes also likened the struggle to the Cold War, saying it was the American Right who won the Cold War by standing up to the USSR, and it can do the same against Islam.17 Pipes apparently did not elucidate on how the totalitarian Soviet regime equated with the Islamic movements that are opposing authoritarian regimes. In any case, his position is indistinguishable from that of Martin Sherman, an Israeli political scientist who has written about "the global battle of cultures taking place between Islam and Western liberalism, a struggle as powerful as the one against...communism and Nazism."18
There are interesting coincidences that tie some of these individuals and groups together. Steven Emerson told The Washington Post that he had received a large share of the $325,000 financing for Jihad in America from the Bradley Foundation of Milwaukee.19 Robert D. Kaplan, the author of The Arabists, a pro-Israeli account of State Department Middle East specialists, notes in his preface that the "book could not have been written without the financial assistance of The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation in Milwaukee, whose funds were administered by the [Daniel Pipes's] Foreign Policy Research Institute."20 And as if to make official the link between the anti-Islamic message of Israeli leaders and their American friends, Daniel Pipes's new publication, Middle East Quarterly, is being distributed free of charge by Israeli consulates in the United States.
The most convincing voices countering the generalizations and over-simplifications about modern Islamic movements belong to academics who themselves have criticized many aspects of Islam over the years. They include the French scholar, Dr. Francois Burgat, who has said: "Islamists are nothing more than people who connect Islam to political dialogue; so they include the entire range from neo-fascists to ultra-liberals." American scholars who have written and spoken widely on the subject include John Voll (University of New Hampshire), John Esposito (Georgetown), James Bill (William and Mary), John Entelis (Fordham), Richard Bulliet (Columbia), Charles Butterworth (University of Maryland) and Augustus Richard Norton (Boston University). They assert that the failure to make distinctions among the many Islamic movements and the stereotyping of Muslims as violence-prone radicals will strengthen the extremists at the expense of the vast majority of moderate and responsible Muslims. Furthermore, distortions and misrepresentations of the true nature of the Islamic movements complicate the ability of the country to carry out a constructive foreign policy. This is evidenced by the recent statements of such prominent leaders as House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA), who has urged that the United States adopt a "coherent U.S. strategy for fighting Islamic totalitarianism,"21 and Secretary General of NATO Willie Claes, who claimed, "Islamic fundamentalism now poses as great a threat to the West as communism once did."22
IMPACT ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
The ferocity and pervasiveness of the anti-Islam campaign are taking a toll on the U.S. government's ability to pursue a flexible and constructive policy toward Islamic movements. Policy statements by U.S. officials have derided the idea of a monolithic Islam confronting the West, but have left little doubt that the United States will oppose Islamic movements coming to power, even through the ballot box. In the words of former Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian: "We do not support one person, one vote, one time" (as if the existing regimes permitted free elections).23 The policy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran has recently been reinforced with the extension of sanctions against Iraq and the cancellation of the Conoco deal with Iran. The complete trade embargo on Iran that President Clinton announced on April 30, 1995, was imposed following a vigorous campaign by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).24 The United States is fully backing Egypt and Tunisia in their struggle against indigenous Islamic movements, overlooking significant human rights violations in the process. Only in Algeria, where the United States tacitly accepted the Algerian military's cancellation of elections and where we are a marginal player, is the United States belatedly engaged in a behind-the-scenes effort to seek common ground between the government and non-violent Islamic leaders.
President Clinton found it useful when visiting Indonesia last year to make his major public appearance at the main mosque in Jakarta and to declare that "even though we have had problems with terrorism coming out of the Middle East, it is not inherently related to Islam-not to the religion, not to the culture." In visiting Jordan shortly before, he had said "America refuses to accept that our civilizations must collide. We respect Islam."25 The administration also made laudable efforts, unlike many of the Islam bashers, to scrupulously avoid implicating Muslims in the Oklahoma City bombing.
Despite the fine sentiments expressed by the Clinton administration, its actions and its search for mutual comprehension leave much to be desired. The intimidation of the Department of State by the incessant anti-Islamic voices has reached the point that even such mundane matters as issuing visas is affected. Shaikh Rashid Ghanoushi, the exiled leader of the Tunisian An-Nahda (Renaissance) party and one of the leading moderates of the Islamic resurgence, was invited in January 1994 to attend the third annual roundtable on modern Islam sponsored by the University of South Florida's Committee on Middle Eastern Studies and the World and Islam Studies Enterprise, a Tampa-based research center. These roundtables, the first with. Hasan Turabi of the Sudan in 1992 and the second with Khurshid Ahmad of Pakistan in 1993, give American scholars an opportunity to engage Islamic intellectuals in debate, and in both cases there were vigorous differences of opinion. The roundtables received very high marks from the participants, who included many leading American academics. The full texts of the day-long discussions were published and made available to the public.26
Rashid Ghanoushi was an obvious choice for the May 1994 roundtable in view of events in North Africa. Although Tunisia sentenced him to life imprisonment in absentia in 1992 (in a trial even the State Department's Human Rights Report viewed with great skepticism), the British government granted Ghanoushi political asylum in 1993. The State Department failed to act on his request for a visa, and the May 1994 roundtable was postponed. It also failed to take action in time for the conference to be held in December 1994. And, despite repeated requests, it has not acted on the visa as of June 1995. Why the hesitancy? The Tunisian government has reportedly objected, as it did to South Africa, where Ghanoushi was invited in the summer of 1994. The Mandela government rejected the Tunisian objection in the name of free speech and Ghanoushi attended an academic conference there in the summer of 1994.
If only Tunisia had objected to the State Department, Ghanoushi might have received his visa, as had Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams over the objection of the British government. However, opposition to Ghanoushi surfaced publicly in May 1994 in the New York Jewish paper Forward. Lucette Lagnado's front page article was headlined "Tunisian Terror Sheikh Sparks Furor on Hill. Would-Be Ayatollah Seeks Entry to U.S." The paper alleged that Ghanoushi "has sponsored and supported violent action against Americans, American allies and wholesale disruption of the Middle East peace process." The article quotes the ubiquitous Daniel Pipes, saying that Ghanoushi had attended conferences in Iran and the Sudan that were "also attended by other radical clerics." Pipes likened these conferences to "a sort of 'Islamic Internationale' where the leaders are united in their staunch hatred of America, the West and Israel."27 On June 24, 1994, Representative [now Senator] Olympia Snowe (R-ME), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, issued a press release urging Secretary of State Christopher to refuse a visa to Ghanoushi because of his "extensive record of terrorist activity."
The most serious opposition to Ghanoushi, however, came on June 29, 1994, when the powerful AIPAC-spawned Washington Institute for Near East Policy issued a "Policywatch" written by Martin Kramer, associate director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University and a visiting professor at Georgetown. Kramer dropped the "terrorist" allegations against Ghanoushi (apparently recognizing that they had no substance since the British had granted him political asylum) and concentrated on Ghanoushi's anti-Saudi and anti-American position on the Gulf War as well as his opposition to the Israel-PLO accord, which he reportedly called "a Jewish-American plan encompassing the entire region, which would cleanse it of all resistance and open it to Jewish economic and cultural activity, culminating in complete Jewish hegemony from Marrakesh to Kazakhstan." Kramer concluded that "a visa for Ghanoushi would signal that the United States has become so confused by Islamist artifice that it can no longer tell friend from foe-and not just in Tunisia."28 An Israeli professor is thus in the anomalous position of telling the U.S. government, on behalf of one of the most powerful institutions in Washington, that it should not grant visas to foreigners who do not agree with American and Israeli foreign policies.
The anti-Islam campaign has succeeded in preventing a dialogue between one leading Islamic intellectual and American scholars, but there are much larger issues at stake. Muslims in America are concerned that they are being singled out as disloyal and potential enemies of America, especially since the issuance of President Clinton's executive order of January 24, 1995, "Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists who threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process." This fear was proven valid in the immediate aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, as noted above. In a more recent example, on May 28 and 29, 1995, The Tampa Tribune ran front page articles by a young journalist, Michael Fechter, the first entitled "Ties to Terrorists." It pictured the above-mentioned Dr. Sarni al-Arian with a photo of the October 19, 1994, Tel Aviv bus bombing that killed 23 Israelis, under the heading: "A Tampa-based group sympathizes with and some say financially supports-the (Islamic Jihad and Hamas) militants. It is led by University of South Florida (USF) professor Sarni Al-Arian." The "investigative" articles were for the most part a rehash of the unsubstantiated allegations of Jihad in America and contained numerous factual errors and innuendoes in an effort to implicate USF. The principal sources quoted were Steven Emerson, Israeli journalist Ronni Shaked, an anonymous Simon Wiesenthal Center researcher and Martin Kramer. The most irresponsible charge was that there was a connection between a local mosque (which houses an elementary school) and Hamas because the mosque was named after Izzedine al-Qassam (a revered Muslim leader killed by the British in Palestine in 1935). The paper printed a picture of the mosque with its address, which engendered fear in the children and teachers and forced the Islamic community to hire security guards. The articles also stirred up local Jewish activists. After a thorough examination of the allegations, USF President Betty Castor stated that "no illegal activities were taking place" on campus, and in response to the concerns of the Jewish community, "We need to make people understand that the university welcomes them, but at the same time we welcome others."29
On an international scale, the United States is being seen around the world as an enemy of Islam. Israel, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and other governments justifiably fear the rise of Islamic resurgent movements. These governments are friends of the United States, and we have to take account of their legitimate concerns. One highly respected former American ambassador believes we should overlook Egypt's harsh measures against Egyptians in Upper Egypt - documented in graphic detail by Robert Fisk30 - because it is the only way to deal with zealots.31
However much one might agree with that view in a particular country, the policy of the world's only superpower toward one fifth of the world's population should not be determined by the threats other governments face from their own disgruntled or oppressed citizens, any more than our policy should be affected by the actions of terrorists. The seeming indifference of the U.S. government to the killing of 200,000 Muslims in Bosnia, the assault on Chechnya, events in Kashmir, India, the West Bank and Gaza, and the unprecedented economic measures against Iran, have convinced many Muslims that the United States is anti-Islam. Professor James Bill has added: "The situation is exacerbated when Muslims incredulously find themselves labeled as terrorists and when Western governments encourage their secular Middle Eastern allies to confront Muslim populist movements with brute force."32 President Clinton has insisted that the United States is not anti-Islam, but our actions or inactions and the reluctance to allow serious dialogue with Islamic intellectuals indicate otherwise. At a minimum, the U.S. government should energetically promote dialogue with Islamic intellectuals throughout the entire Muslim World. These thinkers will, in tum, have to speak out against terrorism and injustices perpetrated by Islamic as well as non-Islamic regimes if such a dialogue is to flourish.
For those who insist on the new Cold War analogy, an Irish journalist has written: "At the height of the Cold War, the West invested considerable energy in trying to understand the communist system and Marxist thought. But similar efforts are not being made to understand or come to grips with Islam....Without dialogue there can only be confrontation."33
1 Mary Anne Weaver, "Children of the Jihad," The New Yorker, June 12, 1995.
2 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 3, 1993.
3 Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table with Dr. Hasan Turabi, ed. Arthur L. Lowrie. Tampa, World & Islam Studies Enterprise, 1993.
4 Middle East International, December 2, 1994.
5 U.S. News & World Report, March 22, 1993.
6 Reader's Digest, January 1995.
7 Washington Times, January 17, 1995.
8 The New York Times (NYT), November 21, 1994.
9 Author interview with Dr. al-Arian, April 8, 1995.
10 The Los Angeles Times, February 7, 1995.
11 CNN Crossfire, Transcript #1335, Air Date: April 20, 1995.
12 The Progressive, June 1995, p 8.
13 NYT, June 22, 1992.
14 NYT, August 22, 1993.
15 Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World by H.R. Dekmejian. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995. See Michael Dunn's review in this issue.
16 Judith Miller, "The Challenge of Radical Islam," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993, vol. 72, no. 2.
17 Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September/October 1994.
18 The Jerusalem Post, January 11, 1995.
19 The Washington Post (WP), November 17, 1994.
20 Robert D. Kaplan, The Arabists. New York: Free Press,1993.
21 Inter Press Service, Washington DC, February 21, 1995.
22 The Scotsman, February 27, 1995.
23 New Perspectives Quarterly, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, June 22, 1993.
24 Neal M. Sher, Comprehensive U.S. Sanctions Against Iran: A Plan for Action, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, April 2, 1995.
25 Thomas Lippman, WP, December 28, 1994.
26 Available from The World and Islam Studies Enterprise, PO Box 16648, Tampa, FL 33687. The Turabi roundtable was published in Middle East Policy, vol. I, no. 3, 1992.
27 Forward, May 13, 1994.
28 Martin Kramer, "Policywatch: A U.S. Visa for an Islamic Extremist?" The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 29, 1994.
29 St. Petersburg Times, June 24, 1995, plB.
30 The Independent, London, February 9 and I 0, 1995.
31 Ambassador Hermann Fr. Eilts, Occasional Paper, University of South Florida, Committee on Middle Eastern Studies, February 1995.
32 The San Francisco Examiner; April 29, 1994.
33 Patrick Comerford, The Irish Times, January 7, 1995.