At the declaration of statehood, the Israeli government gave the Arabs living inside the borders of the state Israeli citizenship. In practice, they did not acquire the same citizenship as Jewish Israelis. Jews have dominated Arabs in their relative ability to exercise economic, social, and political power in Israel. Because Israeli law does not openly discriminate between "Arab" and "Jew," Arabs were not formally restricted in their ability to exercise rights. But Arab areas receive far fewer public services from the government, and their position in the economy is predominately dependent on the Israeli sector. Arabs have far fewer outlets for expressing group priorities, because the government restricts their freedom to organize. Several Israeli laws prevent the registration of organizations that sympathize with or participate in dissident activities, effectively preventing the emergence of an exclusively Arab political party. The Israeli government also denies Arabs entrance into the military, thereby restricting their access to the benefits dependent on military service. Overall, Israel takes a tough, distrustful posture toward the Arab minority without formally defining citizenship in terms of ethnicity. In practice, however, ethnicity plays the crucial role in the ability of "Israelis" to act within their political system.
The Israeli political system is an example of an ethnic democracy, a system that combines the extension of political and civil rights to individuals with an institutionalized dominance over the state by one ethnic group.1 The Israeli citizenship structure of exclusionary collective rights and universal individual rights manifests itself in an institutional arrangement in which the state treats Arabs and Jews differentially, resulting in fragmented, hierarchical levels of citizenship.
In this paper, I seek to define and to explain the informal network of Jewish dominance in Israel. After a brief background on the origins of Arab inequality, I will examine a number of land laws that legalized the expropriation of more than 90 percent of the land in Israel. These laws demonstrate a conscious effort to alienate Arabs from their land, to force their reliance on the Jewish economic sector, and to discourage any future claim to a Palestinian homeland. Second, I will discuss the "Military Administration," or martial law, which the state imposed on the Arab minority to keep it under close surveillance and to prevent the emergence of a dissident movement. Although the government argued that the imposition of martial law was necessary for security, the repression of the Arab minority lasted far beyond the first years of statehood. Prolonged repression allowed the state to consolidate power and to expropriate Arab land. Third, I will show how Israeli quasistatal institutions restrict Arab collective rights, because of their Jewish dominance and Zionist orientation. In conclusion, I will tie these three areas together by presenting the Israeli system as an example of an informal policy of ethnic preference that results in the withholding of Arab collective citizenship rights.
BACKGROUND
Policies of ethnic preference exist on many different levels including a formal level and a more informal level characterized by discriminatory state practices in areas of political, economic, and social life. The institution of ethnic preference clashes with modem ideals of democracy and equality. Almost everywhere, states consider these practices exceptional; they are "temporary" or "emergency" regulations, often accompanied by a specified time limit.2 Behind this "uniqueness" is the assumption of illegitimacy regarding policies of ethnic preference. This assumption of illegitimacy accounts for the fact that some governments have instituted informal policies of ethnic preference to avoid both domestic and international human-rights criticisms. In Israel, the government institutionalized informal policies of ethnic preference within the framework of a western-style democracy. In other words, although all individuals received formal equal rights, the Jewish majority dominated the Arab minority by restricting their informal collective rights. De facto policies of segregation in housing, land ownership, and education are examples of informal apartheid.3
The dual commitment of Israel to both democracy and Judaism forces it to distinguish between nationality and citizenship. Smooha argues that this arrangement emerged out of the structure of the sectarian character of the state.4 This Jewish character was inconsistent with universal collective, republican citizenship rights.5 Peled and Shafir argue that Arab collective rights would be incompatible with the Zionist nature of the state.6 The Arab minority can act in an individual, liberal manner through voting in elections, but the state strictly regulates the development of Arab organizations, particularly through the dominance of Jewish organizations in business and labor. Zureik concludes that Israel has an ethnically based state policy of long standing that renders universal citizenship unattainable by the Arab minority .7
The Jewish sectarian nature of the state also meant that the Arab minority has formal, recognized citizenship rights. The Jewish diaspora suffered discrimination as a minority in countless countries around the world. The socialist ambitions incorporated in Zionism required that the state provide some guarantees for its own minorities.8 Both the illegitimacy of formal apartheid and historical considerations contributed to the lack of a formal apartheid between Jewish and Arab Israelis. In 1948, Arabs in Israel received citizenship with religious and cultural freedom, and Arabic was accorded official status.
The most popular rationale for restricting the rights of the Arab minority is a security argument which runs as follows: During the Mandate, the Arabs adopted an attitude of absolute and total intransigence by continually rejecting partition. This forced the Jews to go to war against the Palestinians and the surrounding Arab countries.9 In 1948, Israel defeated the Arab states by force, and the new Israeli government assumed that the Palestinians were not loyal Israelis. The disloyalty of Arab Israelis represents a threat to the state, so the state should treat the Arab minority as a potential fifth column. Zureik relates two additional assumptions that have guided Israeli policy toward the Arab minority.10 First, the Arab minority need not subscribe to Zionist ideology to prove its Israeliness and state allegiance, because Zionism inherently excludes non-Jews. At the same time, Arabs could not expect to be active participants in Zionist institutions. Second, Arabs should be content to remain quiescent participants in Israeli democracy once their material position improved. The Arabs' reliance on the Israeli economy would enhance their loyalty to the state. Based on these premises, Israel maintained a tight system of control epitomized by the Military Administration which lasted until 1966. Under this system, the government put Arabs living in Israel under constant surveillance and prevented the emergence of dissident groups. The physical separation of the two peoples further allowed the state to consolidate its power and implement the informal policies of ethnic preference.
In order to establish this framework of control, the state took advantage of the position of the Arab minority after 1948 and exercised direct control over all parts of their lives. Most Arabs left Palestine during the 1948 war, including most traditional leaders, owners of capital, and members of the professions.11 Without their traditional leaders, the remaining Arabs experienced disorientation. Their lack of unity and organization made them easy prey for Israeli policies. Through this pattern of dominance, the government subordinated Arabs in all areas.1 2 The policy of national oppression included the detection of infiltrators who tried to return, the imposition of a harsh martial law, the expropriation of Arab land, and the suppression of Arab economic, social and cultural life.13 Arab economic dependency strengthened the institutional dominance of the Jewish majority.
Having established the basis for control of the Arab minority, Israel remained deeply divided, with the Arab minority physically and geographically separated from the Jewish majority during the first years of statehood. Zureik, Moughravi, and Sacco argue that in deeply divided societies, due to the duplication of societal institutions, civil society no longer fulfills its primary role of negotiating between different interest groups. It engages in direct forms of societal control to ensure compliance without necessarily incorporating these groups into the dominant ideological framework.14 In other words, the Israeli government does not exist separate from ethnicity, but retains a Zionist character. The state could not expect the Arab minority to embrace the tenets of Zionism, so the state coopted or coerced them into participation.
Since their consolidation of power in Israel, Jewish Israelis have expected compliance from its Arab minority without the latter's having to share in the premises and goals of Zionism, the overarching political culture of the state.15 These expectations were consistent with the citizenship structure of universal individual rights and exclusive collective rights. A large section of the Arab population openly admitted that it accepted the existence of the state of Israel, while the remainder was not actively hostile.16 The Arab minority no longer challenged the existence of the state, and left the area of collective rights in the hands of the Jewish majority.
LAND LAW
Despite the attempts of the Zionist movement to purchase land from Arabs during the Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate, Jews had obtained very little land for Zionist settlements by the time of the establishment of the state of Israel.1 7 In 1947, Jews owned less than 7 percent of the land area in Palestine, or 750,000 dunums.18 By the end of 1949, however, Israel had obtained control over three fourths of Palestine, or 20 million dunums. According to Lustick, between 1948 and 1977, the Jewish National Fund's land increased from 942,000 dunums to 2,650,000 dunums. The ownership of land by the state and the JNF were theoretically separate, but the quasi-statal nature of the JNF meant that all these lands are under de facto Jewish control. Israel accomplished this through numerous laws that alienated Arabs from their lands and expropriated them as "abandoned" areas.
The Jewish state had several purposes in confiscating Arab land. First, Jewish ownership of the land undermined any future demands for a Palestinian homeland. Jewish settlement prevented areas of high Arab concentration, which made any partition of the state impossible.19 Second, landless Arabs became a source of cheap labor for Jewish landowners and other employers of manual laborers, perpetuating dependence on the Jewish sector.20 Finally, the land laws legitimized the state's existence by transferring the ownership of land to the new state. Jewish settlements and kibbutzim were established on these new state lands. Lustick argues that mass expropriation of land from the Arab sector was the single heaviest blow that government policy has dealt to the integrity of the Arab sector.21
The legal framework that allowed the expropriation of land from Arabs was complicated, interconnected and extensive. Many expropriations were based on laws established during the British Mandate which were re-adopted after the founding of-the state. Initially, most of these laws were Emergency Regulations of the British authorities to deal with both Jews and Arabs involved in civil unrest during the late 1930s. Like later laws, these would be justified as "temporary," which meant they were openly discriminatory and represented more formal methods of control. These laws formed the basis of an informal network for controlling the Arab minority.
The Land Acquisition Law {for Public Purposes) of 1943 was initiated during the British Mandate and enabled the state to expropriate private land for public use.22 This law provided the basis for several security laws designed to acquire Arab land for Jewish purposes. The Defense Regulations of 1945 provided the basis for so-called "closed areas," which Israel used to dispossess Arabs from their land.23 Under Section 125 of the Regulations, the military commander could declare any area closed, and no one could enter or leave the area without an official permit. Whereas the Mandate authorities had used these regulations to protect sensitive military camps and British residencies from terrorist activities, the Israeli stat employed this law to immobilize the Arab population while the state seized their lands.24
Other emergency regulations were aimed at similar expropriations and began during the first years of statehood. The Emergency Land Requisition (Regulation Law) of 1949 provided accommodation for new Jewish immigrants arriving in Israel and served to secure the evacuation of buildings once occupied by Arabs. Paragraph Three, Section B, stated that the competent authority making a land requisition must be "satisfied that the making of the order is necessary for defense of the state, public security, the maintenance of essential supplies or essential public services, the absorption of immigrants or rehabilitation of ex-soldiers or war invalids."25 The Israeli government later extended this law for six years. A similar law, the Emergency Regulations (Security Zones) of 1949 empowered the minister of defense to declare any area a security zone. Under Section Six, no one except a permanent resident, soldier, or police officer could enter a security zone.2 6 In addition, the punishment for violating the law entailed imprisonment for up to one year. Although justified by security precautions, the government utilized this law to keep former Arab residents off their land. It served the dual purpose of restricting Arab movement and allowing certain Arab agricultural areas to fall into disuse, which later would justify seizure of the land.
The Emergency Regulations of 1945 also supported land laws by declaring whole villages "closed" and preventing Arabs from leaving or entering these areas. The military commander declared whole villages in fertile areas closed to prevent Arab peasants from reaching and cultivating these lands. Then, when Arabs no longer cultivated their lands, they fell under the Emergency Regulation (Cultivation of Waste Lands) of 1948, under which Israel demanded that all owners cultivate their land for security reasons. Under this law, the minister of agriculture could warn the owner to cultivate the land. If the owner of the land was not present, the minister delivered this warning:
By posting it up at the place of residence or, if his residence is unknown, at or near the place where he was last known to reside; or by posting it up in a conspicuous position upon the land or at the entrance thereto; this form of publication shall also be valid in the event of the owner of the land being unknown.27
With this wording, it fell to the owner, rather than the state, to justify his ownership and the cultivation of his land. The minister of agriculture, under Paragraph Four of this law, assumed control of the land to ensure its cultivation. He could farm the land himself or transfer the land to another person for cultivation. Regarding compensation, Section Eleven provided that "all crops obtained from waste land as a result of its cultivation by a cultivator shall be the property of the cultivator, and no other person shall have any right therein." In addition, the law empowered the minister of agriculture to take control of water resources, animals, machines, tools and other cultivating equipment for up to five years. Theoretically, the state would return the land to the owner after five years, although the state often renewed the law and eventually claimed the land under the Land Acquisition Law. These allegedly innocent statutes made the land easy pickings for expropriation. Jiyris estimates that approximately 25,000 dunums of land were expropriated based on the Emergency Regulation (Cultivation of Waste Lands).28
The Development Authority (Transfer of Property Law) of 1950 established the Development Authority as a corporate body empowered to possess and acquire property. The key part of its charter was found in Paragraph Three, Section Four B, which limited the Development Authority's power to sell land unless it is first offered to the Jewish National Fund. The JNF has a semi-statal, semi-independent character as a Zionist organization. This law illustrated the intimate connection between JNF properties and the expropriation of Arab land. In reality, the Development Authority was an intermediary between the state and the JNF, and served to protect the JNF from legal proceedings.
The government subsequently implemented a series of laws setting down the legal foundation for the expropriation of abandoned areas and absentee properties. These laws resulted in the transfer of about 4,500,000 dunums of cultivatable lands and a total of 16,324,000 dunums of Arab properties to the Development Authority.29 The Abandoned Areas Ordinance of 1948 defined an abandoned area as "any area or place conquered by or surrendered to armed forces or deserted by all or part of its inhabitants, and which has been declared by order to be an abandoned area."30 In 1950, the state passed a law applying to lands owned by any Arab landowners who were not living in their place of residence at the time of the establishment of the state. This law, the Absentees Property Law, functioned to define the legal status of the property of absentees who had left the country, and resulted in the transfer of their property to the "custodian of absentees' property," which the law created.31 It defined an absentee as someone who became a national or citizen of Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Iraq or Yemen or resided in one of these countries or in any part of Palestine outside the area of Israel. A Palestinian citizen who left his place of residence before September 1, 1948, or who sought to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel also became an absentee under this law. Under Paragraph 28, the Custodian could simply decide "in writing that a person or group of persons are absentees." In practice, the testimony of a collaborator provided all the necessary proof.32 This law enabled the custodian to sell abandoned property to the Development Authority. The government applied the law most widely to Arabs who had left the state entirely, yet "present absentees" could also have their land confiscated. Lustick notes that half the Arab inhabitants living in Israel fell into this latter category.33 The Absentee Property Law was adopted retroactively. Justifying earlier seizures of Arab land.34 The custodian of absentees' property appropriated some 350 completely abandoned or semi abandoned villages equaling about 750,000 dunums, of which 80,000 dunums were abandoned groves and more than 200,000 dunums were plantations. In addition, urban properties including 25,416 buildings with almost 60,000 dwellings were claimed under this law.35
The State Property Law of 1951 declared all ownerless land to be the property of the state and provided that the government could sell or lease property to the JNF, the Development Authority or a local authority.36 It also declared land that had been the property of the Palestine Mandate authorities to be state land, although much of it was not arable. This law ended once and for all the private acquisition of land within Israel.37 It applied to an area of 15,025,000 dunums of public land in Israel that became "state property."38
Many laws passed until 1953 allowed the government only to "assume control" over lands previously owned by Arabs.39 Generally, the Arabs retained legal title, even if the land was under the possession of the state, thus having ownership without possession. Israel took formal ownership of these possessed lands under the Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law of 1953. Under Paragraph Two, any property certified by the minister as required for the purposes of "essential development," "settlement" or "security" became the property of the Development Authority.40 Central to the expropriation of Arab land, this law allowed Israel to take legal ownership of the lands that were "waste land" or "absentee land." The potential return of the land to its former Arab owners became impossible; the likelihood of any court demanding the return of land was virtually nil. Jiyris calls it the "epitome of its five predecessors." Under this law, the government issued 465 certificates confiscating 1,225,174 dunums of land in 291 Arab villages.41 This illustrated the consolidation of government control over most of the land of Israel.
The scenario of expropriation went something like this. When areas fell into disuse, either because the owner could not get to the land or because he was unaware of a government warning, the Development Authority took control of the "waste land" free of charge. Although the government supposedly paid compensation, the law stated that the compensation price should equal the price of the land as of January 1, 1950. At that time, no market prices for land existed, because no free sellers or buyers existed; Arabs could sell land exclusively to the JNF at 25 pounds per dunum or less. By 1953, the market price of land was around 350 pounds per dunum.42 The state clearly avoided paying sufficient compensation for confiscated lands, thereby limiting the transfer of resources to the Arab sector.43
Although the Land Acquisition Law . provided for the transfer of ownership of most Arab land, the government enacted several other laws after this date to transfer further properties to Jewish ownership. In addition, the Basic Law: Israeli lands, the Israel Land Law, the Israel Lands Administration Law (1960) provided for the adoption of the JNF guidelines for all publicly owned lands, which encompassed about 90 percent of the area of Israel. These JNF guidelines provided for the exclusive leasing of land to Jews and the use of Jewish labor. Clearly this law preferentially treated Jews in the use of public land and further alienated Arabs from their lands. While still under draft, this law might have called the state land "the people's land," etc., but the Knesset adopted the language as "Israeli lands." Davis and Lehn maintain that this difference in wording is a manipulation of Zionist usage, because "Israeli" implies "Jewishness."44 Again the differences in citizenship rights existed on an informal level. Further, this implied the Jewish character of the land, further discrediting any future Arab claim.
Because of the complexity of the framework of land laws, exactly how much land the state expropriated from Arabs is not known. The 1961-1962 Report of the Israel Lands Administration estimated that 92.6 percent of the total state area was considered "National Lands." These lands were in the possession of the state and quasi-statal entities like the JNF.45 Privately owned lands represent only the remaining 7.4 percent of Israel-proper. Jiyris estimates that the state expropriated approximately one million dunums of land from Arabs still living in Israel.46 In 1963, the minister of agriculture revealed that the government owned 55 percent of the total area within Arab villages, only 11 percent of which was cultivatable.47 Located inside the Negev Desert, half of the remaining Arab lands could not be cultivated more than once every two or three years.48 The Jewish state excluded the Arab minority from the 92.6 percent of designated "national lands" through informal policies that will be discussed below
The flow of expropriated land from the state and to the JNF also illustrated the extent of the expropriations. Between 1948 and 1977, JNF land increased from 942,000 dunums to 2,650,000 dunums. Arab-Israelis have no access to this land, because of the restrictions on leasing to non-Jews and employing non-Jewish labor.49 By transferring land from the Development Authority to the JNF, the state avoided accusations of racial discrimination against Arabs, although clearly the state was involved in determining these policies.
The Arabs' loss of land forced them to become economically dependent on the Jewish sector. Housing densities also illustrate the Arab land shortage and present a striking contrast to Jewish housing. Whereas 62 percent of Jews lived in houses averaging one person or less per room, only 22 percent of Arabs lived in houses having this ratio.50 Likewise, over time, the ratio of dunums per capita among the Arab community decreased notably. In 1945, an average of nineteen dunums per capita existed. By 1950, this ratio had decreased to 3.4 dunums and, by 1981 to a paltry 0.84 dunums per capita.51 As of 1981, Arabs owned 7,999,567 dunums of land within Israel's borders while Jews owned 5,040,713 dunums. The average size of a farm was 55.7 dunums for Arabs and 173,608 for Jews.52
Regarding legal recourse, the High Court declined to entertain a petition brought before it for the cancellation of a certificate issued under the Land Acquisition Law. Mohammad Ali-Abdullah Haj Mohommad Younis v. Minister of Finance (1954) is the leading case. The Court upheld the certificate as conclusive and refused to transfer the land back to the Arab owner. The court decided that the minister of finance was under no obligation to notify the petitioner of his intention to requisition his property. In addition, the certificate of the law was not a judicial act, but was considered to be the testimony of the minister. Based on this, Arabs could not contest the contents of the certificate in any court of law. This ruling has significant implications for the legal status of the Arab minority. The state effectively undermined any legal recourse the Arabs had to contest the transfer of hundreds of thousands of dunums of expropriated Arab land in any court in Israel.53 By denying Arabs the ability to appeal land confiscations, Israel reduced the chances Arabs would reclaim their land. In addition, this ruling upheld the argument that the government has the clear intention of using its authority to prevent Arab citizens from regaining this public land.
By expropriating Arab land, the Israeli government caused the disintegration of the traditional Arab economic base and forced Arabs to depend on the Jewish sector for work. This economic dependence restricted the Arabs' ability to act independently of the Jewish state or to exercise their collective rights. Because these laws never mentioned ethnic distinctions like "Arab land," they were not formal policies of ethnic preference. In practice, the massive transfer of land from Arab control to Jewish control formed the basis of Jewish predominance in Israel.
MILITARY GOVERNMENT
In 1962, Shimon Peres, then deputy minister of defense, wrote that "it is in the making use of Article 125, on which the Military Government is to a great extent based, that we can directly continue the struggle for Jewish settlement and Jewish immigration." Former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion reiterated this viewpoint in 1963, stating "the Military Government came into existence to protect the right of Jewish settlement in all parts of the State."54 Clearly, leading Zionist politicians viewed the Military Government to be necessary for the consolidation of power during the first years of statehood. Although justified by security reasons, the administration entailed other considerations as well. Because of the Zionist ideological basis of the state, full citizenship for Arabs was denied. Peled argues that emergency decrees and administrative regulations bridged the gap between Arabs' formal citizenship status and their actual treatment as an occupied enemy population.55 Arabs received formal citizenship, although "emergency" regulations restricted their ability to exercise these rights.
Until 1966, the Military Government entailed an all-encompassing Israeli occupation and imposition of martial law in areas of high Arab concentration. The primary areas of occupation encompassed three-fourths of the Arabs in Israel in 1948 and centered around Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev.56 Lustick estimates that in 1949, 90 percent of the Arab population lived in areas under Military Administration, and in 1958 the number had only decreased to 85 percent.57 Determining the precise frontiers was difficult, because the government did not require military officials to publish a "declaration of an emergency" or anything else about its actions.58
The state of Israel inherited many emergency regulations passed during the Mandate that are similar to land laws. They provided the legal basis on which Israel could suppress Arab opposition: arrest, exile, confiscation, destruction of houses, collective punishment, and suspension of newspapers. It also provided for the prohibition of political activity and the imposition of many restrictions, including the prevention of Arabs living in mixed areas from entering areas under Military Administration. 59 The Military Administration epitomized the informal apartheid in Israel.
The legal sanction of the Military Government was derived from the Defense Laws (State of Emergency) (1945) and Emergency Laws (Security Areas) (1949). Based on Article 125 of the Defense Laws (1945) the declaration of a closed area led to the total isolation of the population within that area from the rest of Israel. In addition, this law provided for police supervision of anyone suspected of dissident activities. Article Eight provided for the establishment of military courts through which Israel deprived Arab citizens of the right to civil trial.60 The additional articles are outlined in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Articles of Defense Laws (State of Emergency), 194561 |
||
ARTICLE# |
Empowers Military Government to ... |
|
109 and 110 |
administer police supervision/ restrict freedom of movement |
|
111 |
detain anyone whom Military Government may designate, for an unlimited time, without trial or charge |
|
112 |
confiscate or expel a person from the country permanently |
|
119 |
confiscate or destroy a person's property if suspected of firing gun shots or throwing bombs from said property. |
|
120 |
confiscate property if minister of defense is convinced this person has broken laws which he will be tried for in military court |
|
124 |
impose partial or total curfew on the village |
|
126 and 132 |
restrict movements of persons |
|
137 |
control the sale, possession and use of arms, to forbid, restrict and regulate the purchase or sale of arms, ammunition and explosives |
|
The Emergency Laws provided the second legal foundation of the Military Administration (Security Areas) (1949). According to Paragraph Six, "a person other than a permanent resident or a soldier or a police officer on duty shall not be in or enter a security zone save under and in accordance with the terms of a written permit from a competent authority."62 The punishment for violating this provision was provided in Paragraph Seven, which was "imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or of a fine not exceeding three hundred pounds, or to both such penalties." In addition, the punishment could include an order to leave, which meant that the permanent resident must evacuate the security zone within fourteen days or be subject to the imprisonment and fines. The Military Government was an invasive occupation of Arab areas, although formally Arabs had equal citizenship rights.
These laws, justified by security arguments, were also used to evacuate and expel Arabs living on their lands near the border.63 The Israeli state did not want these Arabs to be able to mount any counterattack. The state also had a major interest in dislocating and disorienting the minority who remained after the 1948 war. Arabs living in areas of Military Government were forbidden to leave, had a permanent night curfew, and lost most of their land.64
Besides these formal powers, critics have accused the Military Government of using economic and administrative authority to pressure the inhabitants in favor of certain political parties, particularly the Mapai, who managed to secure 75 percent of the Arab vote during the Military Administration.65 In addition, the Supreme Court did not interfere with the occupation, on the grounds of state security. This in turn became embedded as customary law, negating future legal recourse by the Arab residents.66
The Israeli government enforced these laws only on Arabs and not on Jews, illustrating another informal policy of ethnic preference. Although the laws contained no specific ethnic distinction, in practice, the state enforced them with great vigor only against the Arab minority. Jiyris notes that the government enforced the Defense Laws (State of Emergency) (1945) in their full force against the Arabs, whether or not they lived in Military Government areas.67 Similarly, Nakkara notes that, although seemingly justified by security, these laws aided in the expelling of Arabs living on their lands and were never applied against Jews.68
Beginning in the 1950s, the state slowly relaxed the Military Government, loosening up travel permits as early as 1958.69 By the summer of 1959, the minister of defense had granted collective permission to move about freely during daylight hours and to go to work. The Israeli state had a high demand for cheap labor and the Arabs could supply it.70 Peled notes that the date of abolishment, 1966, coincided with shortages in the Jewish labor market.71 In November 1963, after the resignation of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, the state reorganized the Military Government, banning or annexing large areas. Residents no longer needed permits to leave or enter, so freedom of movement increased. Ironically, Arabs still could not travel between closed areas.72 The government based this policy on the presumption that Arabs would form a more cohesive opposition if they were not physically separated. Finally, the government officially dismantled the Military Administration in 1966, marking a major change in Israeli policy toward the Arab minority. Israel began to take the position both domestically and internationally that Arab-Israelis constituted normal Israeli citizens. This allowed a perpetuation of the Israeli stance that no separate Palestinian people exists, which is consistent with Israeli posture toward the Arab world.73
The Military Administration lasted eighteen years after the creation of Israel. The longevity of the institution reflected internal disagreement about its nature and goals, as well as about security issues. Wishing to preserve their nationalist image, neither the Mapai nor Herut party had a major incentive to dismantle the Military Government. The Mapai had benefited for many years from their close association and potentially co-opting influence on the Arab minority. The Herut party, on the other hand, did not want to blemish its nationalistic platform by advocating concessions to the Arabs. Both parties realized the need to end these restrictions on Arab Israelis, because they clearly undermined Israel's reputation as a democracy. Sharfman concludes that security problems, along with the desire of the ruling party to consolidate its power with the aid of Arab votes, resulted in the extensive continuation of the Military Government.74
The abolition of the military administration represented a change in Israeli policy toward incorporating Arabs into the life of the state.75 This change marked a move from coercion to co-option. The 1956 war had provoked international criticism of Israel and had increased liberalizing pressures. The Progressive bloc had begun to demand that Israel abolish the Military Government.76 The repression of Arabs had denied Israel the legitimacy it sought. Israel began to look beyond its immediate Arab neighbors and toward the world environment. Lustick notes several major arguments put forward within the Israeli establishment to retain the Military Administration in 1959: to prevent military organization among the Arab minority, to keep Arabs from moving into sensitive areas like Jerusalem, and to retain a separation between Arabs and new Jewish settlements.77 It was assumed that Arab loyalties would lie with the enemy Arab states. Israel was acting on the premise that repressing the Arabs was easier than incorporating them into the state-building process, since Arabs do not share in the ideological norms embodied in Zionism. Starting in the 1950s, however, domestic considerations caused the state to rethink the status of the Arabs in Israel. In particular, the poor economic condition of the Arab citizens led to higher levels of civil discontent among this minority. Lost land and high population growth also contributed to Arab discontent.78 Moreover, the Military Administration had fulfilled its original goal of expropriation of the vast majority of Arab land.
Although the Military Government no longer enforced the emergency laws against most of the Arabs in Israel, the Knesset never formally repealed them. They continued to exist and give the government the authority to use repressive and discriminatory measures against Israel's Arab population without the Arabs having the chance for legal recourse.79 The government has used these regulations to target Arabs considered disloyal to the state. So, although the Military Government no longer enforces its laws against most Arab-Israelis, whom it regards as unlikely to engage in activity against it, the laws still exist as a deterrent. Until 1979, the government could arbitrarily administer detention and exile for up to a year.80 In 1979, the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law transferred this power of detention to the minister of defense and reduced the maximum imprisonment to six months. Renewable at regular intervals, this law resembled its predecessor. In addition, the new law allowed testimony to be taken in the absence of the detainee and counsel for, "security reasons." Israeli police also had the power to restrict movement and to place persons under house arrest. The state applied this law to political activists behaving in an anti-Israeli or pro-Arab manner. In 1980, a law entered into force that restricted the freedom of organization among the Arab minority. The Associations Law (1980) prevented the registration of groups if their goals condemned the establishment of the state of Israel or questioned its democratic character. In addition, if the police felt that the organization was a screen for illegal activities, it also prevents the group from becoming registered as a legal organization.81 Another related law, the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (1948) and its amendment (1980) imposed imprisonment of up to three years for anyone who engaged or even openly sympathized with a terrorist organization. Called "the PLO Law," it was aimed specifically at preventing the display of the PLO flag in public places. within Israel.82
The Military Administration and additional laws that Israel applied to Arabs rather than Jews represented a problem for the fulfillment of Arab-Israeli citizenship. Although in the first years of statehood the existence of a military occupation in Arab areas might have been acceptable based on security risks, the longevity of the institution revealed alternative goals within the Israeli establishment. The concurrent massive expropriation of land resulted in Arab economic dependency. In addition, the administration prolonged the disorientation of the Arab minority following the 1948 war. It also prevented the emergence of an independent organizations, restricting Arab's ability to act collectively. The Military Administration allowed the Jewish government to formally and directly restrict the citizenship rights of the Arab minority. Although the Military Administration was abolished in 1966, the government did not abolish many of the "emergency" regulations that had established it. The Military Administration continued to serve as a reminder that the Jewish majority perceived the Arab minority as a potential fifth column.
After the 1967 war, Israel applied the same martial law to Arabs in the occupied territories, instituting similar curfews and restrictions on civil rights. Just as in pre-1966 Israel, the Israeli government has not applied these laws to Jews living in the West Bank and Gaza. Unlike the Arab Israelis, the Arabs living in Gaza and the West Bank organized collectively to protest their situation during the 1987 intifada (issues involving the occupied territories are outside the scope of this paper).
During the Mandate, the high level of organization needed to incorporate new settlers into the Holy Land resulted in the existence of several exclusively Jewish organizations dealing with labor, financial matters and relations with the British. For example, Jewish farmers received assistance from the agricultural research center run by the World Zionist Organization (WZO).83 This high level of organization and access to abundant resources contributed to the Zionists' success during the 1948 war. While the Arabs lacked a collective identity, the Jews were a cohesive, politically active, and highly motivated minority during the Mandate. The Jewish Agency (JA) had more power than any Arab organization, and no comparable "Arab agency" existed. The JA carried on all negotiations with the British, undertook colonization and settlement, and selected and trained immigrants. The Agency also established the demand for labor that set the basis for government immigration schedules, as well as founding schools and hospitals. 84
After independence, such organizations became the backbone of the new Jewish state. The government did not directly incorporate them into the state, and they formally retained their Zionist character. Because of this, such organizations could continue their exclusionary policies without attracting criticism. Lustick states that institutions of the Zionist movement, including the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut (Jewish labor organization), the Haganah, the Jewish National Fund (JNF), the Basic Fund, and the various political parties and their associated school systems and kibbutzim, constituted a kind of protostate.85 Davis and Lehn note that the Zionists declared Israel a Jewish state rather than a sovereign, independent state.86 This sectarian nature of the state informally connected Israel to these organizations, although they appeared to be separate entities. As a state founded on the tenets of Zionism, Israel could not be embraced by the Arab minority. Through parallel policies, Israel has prevented that minority from organizing separate institutions, forcing it to rely on Zionist organizations economically, socially and politically. Although some of these organizations, like the Histadrut, have allowed Arab membership, they conduct Arab business through separate departments, which continues longstanding exclusionary practices on a more informal basis. Moreover, Zureik argues that these Zionist institutions operate outside the formal political system in Israel, giving them extra-statal immunity.87
While quasi-statal institutions such as the JA, the JNF, and the Zionist settlement organization cooperated in the planning of Jewish communities, the state administered the Arab communities without any master plan. Moreover, Zureik notes that a major difference between government services in Arab and Jewish communities reflects this inequality of planning.88 Besides dominating government, the Jewish organizations also controlled the commercial sector - financial institutions, branches of banks, and insurance agencies. In cooperation with the Histadrut, the government owned most quarries, electricity distribution centers, water works, and all aerial and marine transportation.89
In the first years of statehood, the Israeli government needed to consolidate its power quickly before the Arab states could mount an effective counterattack. This made the position of the Jewish organizations within the state crucial. From the beginning, the JNF refused to transfer its lands to state title.90 Whether this was to protect the land from ever falling into Arab hands or for other reasons, it posed a dilemma for the state. The government could not really confiscate the lands from such a powerful Jewish organization, but it could not allow these organizations complete autonomy. The World Zionist Organization-Jewish Agency (Status) Law (1952) established the basis of regularizing the legal status of the various Zionist institutions. The WZO was the central organization comprising the other institutions like the JA, various paramilitary groups, the Histadrut, and the JNF. Under Paragraph Three, the law regards the WZO and the JA as one and the same organization. The WZO would continue to act as the primary body of immigration by directing immigrant absorption and settlement projects in the state.91 It called for the drafting of a covenant that defined the specific relationship between the state and the organization and exempted the WZO from taxes and other compulsory government charges. This covenant emerged in 1954 with fourteen articles establishing the basis of the relationship between the state and the WZO. Article One defines the duties of the executive: organizing Jewish immigration, participating in the absorption of the immigrants, and overseeing agricultural settlement and the purchase of land. The WZO, the JNF and the Foundation Fund would also develop the land.92 Article Two subjects the activities of the executive to the laws of Israel. Article Seven specifies that the government would consult the executive on issues that pertain to its functions before they came before the Knesset. Whereas the JNF has had primary power concerning land development, the Jewish Agency specialized in immigration and absorption of Jewish immigrants into the state. Although retaining many autonomous powers, the state has rigorously supported these institutions and has at times transferred public monies to finance their projects.93
The Zionist character of the Jewish organizations during the British Mandate allowed them to undertake tasks that the state could not. These organizations were less vulnerable to charges of ethnic preference because of their informal connection to the state. In other words, the ideological roots of these organizations were inconsistent with Arab equality in Israel. Moreover, their dominance in areas of the economy constituted another informal policy of ethnic preference that restricted the Arab minority's ability to act independently of the state. For instance, the JNF's land-development policies illustrate the informal network of Jewish dominance within the state.
The history of the JNF began in 1898, when the Second Zionist Congress created the Jewish Colonial Trust Limited, out of which the Zionists created the JNF in 1901. The Zionists empowered the JNF to buy land and hold it for the Jewish people in the diaspora. The JNF was always under the control of the WZO and began to make land purchases in 1905.94 It stressed normalizing the inverted Jewish occupational structure during the diaspora, where most Jews worked in urban environments rather than directly on the land. This basic Zionist concept allowed the JNF to justify land seizure and the alienation of Arabs from their land during the Mandate and in the first years following independence. Rather than holding land for the Yishuv specifically, the Zionists empowered the JNF to hold land for the entire Jewish people, including those in the diaspora. Ironically, before the creation of the state, the JNF had acquired only 936,000 dunums of land in Palestine, a paltry number for almost a half-century of existence.95 From 1932 to 1965, Joseph Weitz headed the JNF. His diaries reveal the basic attitude of the JNF toward the Arab minority. He wrote in 1940, "It must be understood that there is not room for both peoples in this country."96 Clearly, the idea of compromising in any fashion was not an option open to the JNF. Ideologically, a Jewish state had no place for Arabs. After visiting an Arab village in 1948, Weitz wrote that he did not feel hate toward the Arabs whom the Jews removed, but' justified Israeli actions by accusing Arabs of wanting to exterminate the Jews. 97
The state clarified the position of the JNF in its Basic Law: Israel Lands, Land Law, and Israel Lands Administration Law (1960). According to this law, the state adopted JNF guidelines for all state-held lands, which represented more than 90 percent of the land within Israel, as discussed earlier. These guidelines reflected the agrarian principles of public ownership, inalienability of land tenure, hereditary leaseholds, and the stipulation of Jewish labor on JNF land. Davis and Lehn note a fifth tenet that is rarely mentioned in Zionist literature, which demanded that the lessee be Jewish.98 A standard clause in a JNF leasehold around 1953 reflected these tenets. Clause Ten stated that the lessee must contract exclusively with Jewish laborers.99 Because of these stipulations, Arabs could not use JNF properties, nor did the JNF allow them to rent properties. Jewish-owned land is legally considered the inalienable property of the Jewish people. The state cannot transfer any land to Arab ownership, and leasing arrangements are hard to come by, due to hereditary leaseholds.100 In 1961, a "land covenant" was signed vesting the JNF with exclusive responsibility for land development in Israel.101 Although the government did not make the JNF a branch of the government, these laws illustrated their informal prominence in Israeli land development.
The JNF's ideological norms, in combination with its control of development money, have made it possible for the Jewish settlements in outlying areas to enjoy piped water, high-tension power lines, paved roads, and industrial growth, while Arab villages remain underdeveloped.1 02 The semi-statal status of these organizations insulated the government of Israel from direct responsibility for the inequality of government services. The state did not transfer development money directly from the state to the Jewish settlements, but to the JNF. This arrangement sheltered the organization from lawsuits and the state from charges of racism.103 Zureik notes that although the practice of using exclusively Jewish labor was effective on only certain agricultural settlements, the inalienability of the soil was a cornerstone of Israeli policy.104 A lack of Jewish labor could force the JNF to allow the hiring of Arab labor, but the ownership of the land exclusively by Jews left the Arab minority at the mercy of the Jewish majority.
The Jewish Agency
Since 1948, the Jewish Agency has had primary responsibility for Jewish immigrants and their absorption into Israeli society. During the formative years of the state, the JA acted in place of nonexistent government agencies. Much like the JNF, the JA began as a semi-governmental institution and received large amounts of autonomous responsibility, although it maintained close relations with the government. The WZO-JA Law, mentioned earlier, empowered the JA to encourage and organize immigration and to assist in the absorption of the immigrants in close cooperation with the government of Israel. From 1948 to 1972, the JA oversaw the absorption of 1,400,000 Jews, more than twice the population of the Yishuv during the Mandate. By the end of 1973, the Land Settlement Department of the JA had established 564 settlements of all types.105 The size of the JA's budget reflected its importance and scope. In 1972-1973, while the entire Israeli government's development budget was $604 million, the JA's budget alone constituted $465 million.106 Between 1948 and 1977, the income of the JA exceeded $5 billion, with most of the money coming from American Jews, loans and grants from Israel, and German reparations.107 The government did contribute to the organization, but through informal channels rather than direct transfers. In the realm of economic policy, the JA controlled a good portion of the Israeli economy.108 Along with the other quasi-governmental organizations, the JA owned parts of the Israel Land Development Company, Mekorot, which controlled water in Israel, and Amidar, a company that administered and maintained housing units. The economic hegemony of this Zionist institution and its exclusionary policies forced the Arab minority into a secondary position in receiving government services.
The Histadrut
The Histadrut, the Jewish Federation of Labor, was established in 1920, and was geared toward organizing Jewish workers and excluding Arabs from the Jewish controlled labor market.109 Like the other Zionist organizations, the Histadrut acted as a major organization during the Mandate. It managed many Jewish cooperative societies, and controlled labor and industry in the Jewish community. After 1927, it supplied the religious sector with health services and employment offices. Members included farmers and even professionals. It also ran its own schools and provided workers with two hospitals and clinics.110
After the establishment of the state, the functions of the Histadrut exceeded those of trade unions and it occupied a central place in the field of professional organizations. Its prominent standing in economic life reflected significant political implications.111 With the goal of building a Jewish nation, the very essence of the Histadrut was Zionist. After 1948, it employed the second largest number of workers after the government and continued the effort to consolidate the position of the Jewish working class during the massive waves of immigration in the mid 1950s.112 Since Israeli independence, the Histadrut, the Industrialists' Union, and the Israeli government have negotiated wages and working conditions on a national basis.113
The Histadrut began to allow entry of Arab workers into the organization in 1952, although Arab-Israelis were only admitted as full members of the Histadrut in 1966 upon the lifting of the Military Administration. In 1965, the Histadrut changed its name from the Jewish Federation of Labor to simply the General Federation of Labor as a symbolic gesture toward the incoming Arab members, although it continued to go by the Zionist name "Histadrut."· Between 1959 and 1965, 38,000 Arabs joined the Histadrut, which amounted to 5 percent of its total membership. Including their families, 30 percent of Arabs in Israel were members of the Histadrut by December 1965.114 By 1978, Arab membership rose to 130,000 or about 10 percent of the membership.115 Clearly Arabs represented a small proportion of the total, reducing their ability to change any existing policies. In comparison, 95 percent of Jews belonged to unions and three-fifths are members of the Histadrut.116
When the Histadrut opened its doors to Arab members, the organization claimed that all members have equal rights and obligations, as stated in Resolutions of the Tenth Congress of the Histadrut (1965).117 The Histadrut dealt with Arab affairs exclusively through an "Arab Department." This Arab Department illustrates how Arabs were differentially incorporated into Israeli society, because of the Zionist ideological basis of the state. The Israeli commitment to democracy encouraged Arab membership, but their ethnic distinction forced them to remain second-class members of the organization. Zureik notes that Arab hospitals were below standard, with 15 Arab family-health stations without electricity, fifty-three without telephones, and three without water.118 The Histadrut has some positive achievements to its credit in the Arab sector. The reasonably priced comprehensive health-insurance program (Kupat Halim) drew many Arab workers into the organization.119 By 1969, the Histadrut had established 40 Arab sports organizations, trained 100 Arab Youth Leaders, and recruited more than 6,000 Arab youth into scout organizations. Seventeen Arab secretaries are members of its labor councils, and the Histadrut has granted 200 scholarships to Arab high school and university students.
On the other hand, the Histadrut has been ineffective as a vehicle of integration of Arab and Jewish sectors. By 1975, the Histadrut had established none of its thousands of firms in Arab villages, and only five Arabs were members of the 168- member Histadrut Executive.120 These numbers were not even proportional to their membership. As for jobs, Arabs earned equal wages because of Histadrut union protection; however, Arabs have less of a chance to obtain a good job or gain promotion.121 Individually, Arabs have received equal treatment to Jews, but taken as a group, they have been victims of policies of ethnic preference. Lustick concludes that although the Histadrut has served as a channel for Arab access to certain resources, the concentration of resources within the Jewish sector contributed to the segregation of Israeli society.122 The Zionist nature of these organizations was inconsistent with equality of membership, much as the Jewish sectarian nature of the state was inconsistent with universal rights.
CONCLUSION
The Israeli government has institutionalized informal policies of ethnic preference within the framework of an otherwise Western-style democracy. Although Arab Israelis retain formal citizenship, only the Jewish majority can express their version of the common good as embodied in Zionism. The absence of shared core values in Israeli society separates Arabs' and Jews' perceptions of that common good.123 Today, the Arab minority no longer challenges the existence of the state, leaving the area of collective rights in the hands of the Jewish majority. The dual commitment of Israel to democracy and Judaism causes the discrepancy between formal and informal rights. While Zionism is inconsistent with universal collective rights, it is also inconsistent with exclusive individual rights, because of historical considerations and the illegitimacy of formal apartheid. The second-class status of Arabs manifests itself through informal restrictions on their formally expressed equal rights.
Political discrimination and institutional obstacles, primarily as they relate to land ownership, force Arab economic development into a subordinate position. The alienation of the Arabs from their land lessens family, clan, and tribal links and erodes traditional values.124 This has also resulted in the destruction of the traditional peasant-based Arab economy in most areas and severely threatened it in others.125 If the Israeli government had wanted to integrate or at least improve the economic position of the Arab minority, it would have taken more initiative in developing the Arab sector, but rather the government has exploited Arab dependence. While Arabs have retained full individual rights to religion, their language and the franchise, they have been deprived of collective rights to their version of a good society.
1 Yoav Peled, "Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State," American Political Science Review 86. 2 (1992):p. 432, citing Sammy Smooha, "Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel," Ethnic and Racial Studies 13 (1990): pp. 389-413. See also Roselli Tekiner, "Jewish Nationality Status as One Basis for Institutionalized Racial Discrimination in Israel," American-Arab Affairs 17 (1986): pp. 79-98. The style of documentation used in this paper is the Modem Language Association (MLA).
2 Donald L Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 657.
3 Elia Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel: A study in internal colonialism ( London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 16.
4 Sammy Smooha, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict ( Berkeley: Univ. of Cal. Press, l 978), p. 197.
5 Yoav Peled and Gershon Shafir, "The Roots of Peacemaking: The Dynamics of Citizenship in Israel: 1948-93," International Journal of Middle East Studies 28 (1996): p. 392; Smooha, Pluralism, 46; Elia Zureik, "Prospects of the Palestinians in Israel: II," Journal of Palestine Studies 22.4 (1993): 73-93; Peled, "Ethnic," p. 432.
6 Peled and Shafir, "Roots," p. 403.
7 Zureik, "Prospects," p. 74.
8 Milton Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 138.
9 Amos Elon, "Israel and the End of Zionism," The New York Review, December 19, 1996, p. 22.
10 Zureik. "Prospects," p. 91.
11 Sabri Jiyris, The Arabs in Israel: 1948-1966 (Beirut: The Institute for Palestinian Studies, 1969), p. 121.
12 Sammy Smooha, Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance, Volume 2. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 7-8.
13 Emile Touma, "The Political Coming of age of the 'National Minority,"' Journal of Palestine Studies 14.2 (1985): pp. 74-75.
14 Zureik, et al, p. 439.
15 Zureik, et al, p. 439.
16 Jiyris, Arabs, pp. 40-41.
17 Sabri Jiyris, "Domination by the Law," Journal of Palestine Studies 11.l (1981): p. 83.
18 4 dunums = I acre
19 Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), p. 129.
20 Bakir Abu Kshik, "Arab Land and Israeli Policy," Journal of Palestine Studies 11. l ( 1981), p. 128.
21 Ibid., 123.
22 Ariel Bin-nun, laws of the State of Israel (Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, Ltd, 1990), p. 165.
23 Hanna Did Nakkara, "Israeli Land Seizure Under Various Defense and Emergency Regulations," Journal of Palestine Studies 14.2 (1985), p. 15.
24 Ibid., 15.
25 Laws of the State of Israel, (Israel: Government Publisher, 1948-present) 1949, p. 3.
26 Ibid., 57.
27 Ibid., 70-77 (paragraph two, Section B, Articles Two and Three).
28 Jiyris, Domination," p. 90.
29 Nakkara, p. 18.
30 Laws, 1948, pp. 25-26.
31 Jiyris, Arabs, p. 59.
32 Ibid., 61.
33 Lustick, p. 174.
34 Ibid.
35 Jiyris, Arabs, p. 84.
36 Laws, 1951, p. 175.
37 Bin-nun, p. 160.
38 Jiyris, "Domination," pp. 86-87.
39 Lustick, p. 174.
40 Laws, 1953, p. 43.
41 Jiyris, "Domination" p. 91.
42 Nakkara. p. 22.
43 Ibid., She further notes that in 1955 the Communist party of Israel attempted to pass an amendment allowing an owner whose land had been unjustly seized to have legal redress. The Knesset failed to pass the amendment.
44 Uri Davis and Walter Lehn, "And the Fund Still Lives: The Role of the Jewish National Fund in the Determination of Israel's Land Policies," Journal of Palestine Studies 1.4 ( J 978), pp. 17-19.
45 Davis and Lehn, p. 23.
46 Jiyris, Arabs, p. 81.
47 Bakir Abu Kishk, "Israel's Land Policy" Journal of Palestine Studies 11.1 (1981), p. 127.
48 Raja Khalidi, "The Arab Economy in Israel: Dependency or Development?," Journal of Palestine Studies 13.3 (1984), pp. 70-1.
49 Lustick, p. 167.
50 Zureik, et al, p. 427.
51 Zureik, "Prospects," p. 81.
52 Zureik, "Prospects," p. 81.
53 Nakkara, pp. 20- 21.
54 Jiyris, Arabs, p. 46.
55 Peled, p. 436.
56 Jiyris, "Domination," pp. 68-69.
57 Lustick, p. 123.
58 Jiyris, Arabs, p. 15.
59 Jiyris, "Domination," p. 68. And Lustick p. 123.
60 Jiyris, Arabs, pp. 7-9.
61 Jiyris , Arab, pp. 7-9.
62 Laws, 1949, p. 57.
63 Nakkara, pp. 26-27.
64 Jiyris, "Domination," pp. 68-69. ·
65 Touma, p. 79.
66 Jiyris, Arab, p. 11.
67 Ibid., p.19.
68 Nakkara, pp. 26-27.
69 Lustick, p. 123.
70 Jiyris, "Domination," p. 69.
71 Peled, p. 436.
72 Jiyris, Arabs, p. 22.
73 Ibid., p. 55.
74 Daphna Sharfman,. Living Without a Constitution: Civil Rights in Israel ( Annonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp.53-54.
75 Jiyris, "Arabs" p. 32.
76 Sharfman, p. 51.
77 Lustick, p. 67.
78 Jiyris, "Domination," p. 69.
79 Ibid., p. 67.
80 Ibid., pp. 70-71. Israeli courts have declared this power as absolute and at the sole discretion of the military commander.
81 Ibid., pp. 70-74.
82 Ibid ., p. 74.
83 Great Britain and Palestine: 1915-1945: Information Papers No. 20 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946), pp. 34-35.
84Great, pp. 20-21.
85 Lustick, p. 89.
86 Davis and Lehn, p. 6.
87 Zureik, Palestinians, p. 200.
88 Zureik, "Prospects," p. 86.
89 Ibid., pp. 80-82.
90 Davis and Lehn, p. 21.
91 Laws, 1952, p. 285.
92 Davis and Lehn, pp. 13-14.
93 Lustick, p. 109.
94 Edward Said, The Question of Palestine (New York: Vintage Books, 1979 & 1992), p. 97.
95 Said, p. 98.
96 Ibid., p. 100.
97 Ibid., p. 102.
98 Davis and Lehn, p. 21.
99 Ibid., p. 22.
100 Khalidi, p. 71.
101 Lustick, p. 99.
102 Smooha, Israel, p. 163.
103 Jiyris, "Domination," p. 86.
104 Zureik, Palestinians, p. 119.
105 Lust ick, pp. 99-100.
106 Ibid., p. 102.
107 Ibid., p. 105.
108 Ibid., p. I 03.
109 Zureik, Palestinians, p. 34.
110 Great, p. 36.
111 Jacob Landau, The Arabs in Israel: A Political Study ( London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 178.
112 Lustick, p. 90.
113 Smooha, Israel, p. 106.
114 Landau, p. 178.
115 Lustick, p. 96.
116 Smooha, Israel, p. 106.
117 Landau, p. 249.
118 Zureik, "Prospects," p. 85.
119 Lustick, p. 96.
120 Lustick, p. 96.
121 Smooha, Israel, p. 201.
122 Lustick, p. 97.
123 Zureik, et al, p. 428.
124Jiyris, "Arabs," p. 50.
125 Khalidi, p. 63.
Middle East Policy is fully accessible through the Wiley Online Library
Click below to subscribe to the online or print edition of Middle East Policy and gain access to all journal content.