

## BOOK REVIEWS

**Burning Issues: Understanding and Misunderstanding the Middle East, A 40-Year Chronicle**, by John Mahoney, Jane Adas and Robert Norberg, editors. Americans for Middle East Understanding, 2007. viii and 439 pages, 5 maps. \$16.95, paperback.

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Americans for Middle East Understanding (AMEU) was founded by a group of Americans hoping "to create a deeper understanding of the history, culture and current events in the Middle East." Co-founders Jack B. Sunderland and Henry G. Fischer, president and vice president respectively (who died recently, in 2005 and 2006), initiated a project to publish an anthology of articles that have appeared in the organization's publication, *The Link*, over the past 40 years. It is dedicated to their memory. Editor Jane Adas, in her introductory article "Lest We Forget," begins by questioning the logic behind the "billions of non-repayable dollars" given to Israel "on the premise that Israel's loyalty and strategic importance to the United States make it an ally worthy of such unprecedented consideration." "Is it?" she asks. The answer provided by the chronology of events from 1948-2006 listed in her article and the succeeding articles and epilogue clearly support an unequivocal "No."

Divided into five parts — A Historical Survey, Individuals of Courage, The Media, Religion, and Warfare — the 19 articles are a damning, shaming catalogue of Israeli mistreatment of the Palestinian people, whose land they have illegally seized and whose population they have dispersed and abused, as well as of the misuse of those billions of dollars that Americans have willingly provided for such inhuman behavior. As Adas, a professor at Rutgers University, notes, "Israeli actions over the past 53 years involving U.S. interests in the Middle East seriously challenge the 'strategic asset' premise of the Israel Lobby" (p. 3).

From the very beginning of the Israeli-American relationship, it is shown without doubt that the root of it was money and votes. As John F. Mahoney notes in his article on "Political Zionism: Its Historical Origins and Growth," President Harry Truman, who recognized Israel ten minutes after it declared its independence on May 14, 1948, frankly declared why he did it: "I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents" (p. 25), but he certainly had that number of Jews, most of them then, and now, Democrats. He won reelection six months later. The same combination of money and votes that has effectively kept Congress firmly in the Zionist fold has continued to this day. No matter what Israel does, the United States supports it, sometimes wringing its hands in mock despair but never showing the resolve necessary to prevent further abuse of the Palestinian people.

"In the beginning there was terror," as Ronald Bleier entitles his article, and the terror that began with the King David Hotel bombing and the Deir Yassin massacre continues to this day. Yet Congress and the president continue to keep the money flowing. The wake-up calls provided by Jimmy Carter's recent book, *Palestine: Peace, Not Apartheid*, and the

damning report by John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israeli Lobby and U. S. Foreign Policy*, on the insidious and corrupting influence of the lobby for Israel, expose the hypocrisy of it all, but without result. Christian fundamentalists provide massive support for a state that is effectively emptying the Holy Land of its Christian inhabitants, whose ancestors go back to the time of Christ, replacing them with anyone with the slightest claim to a Jewish grandparent. Donald Neff in his article "Epiphany at Beit Jalla" recounts one of the many attempts by the Israelis to frighten Christian Palestinian villagers into fleeing their homes. His honest journalism nearly cost him his life (p. 195) and his job.

The most deeply despicable event in the whole history of blind American support for Israel is, of course, the USS *Liberty* massacre in 1967. In his article, published in *The Link* in 1982, James Ennes, who was a lieutenant on watch at the time of the deliberate and unprovoked Israeli attack on the ship, recounts the shameful role played by then-President Lyndon Johnson and succeeding Congresses in refusing to reveal the truth behind the events that resulted in the death of dozens of U.S. sailors by people who are on the receiving end of billions of dollars in American aid. Recently, in yet another insult to the memory of these dead servicemen, attempts to name a new amphibious ship the USS *Liberty* LCS-2 have been rejected (p. 350). No reason has been given, but it doesn't take a genius to work out who is behind it.

It takes a strong stomach to read *Burning Issues*. The information it contains makes you desperately ashamed of the U.S. government and its role in supporting a country that has denied basic justice to millions of people while claiming to be a valuable ally and a "democracy" — if you happen to belong to the right religion. But read it one should, with the hope that in the end justice will prevail, before both the United States and Israel reap the whirlwind for their perfidy in bringing the Middle East to the dangerous crisis point it faces today.

**Journey into Islam: The Crisis of Globalization**, by Akbar Ahmed. Brookings Institution Press, 2007. 301 pages. \$28.95, hardcover.

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Ambassador Akbar Ahmed, holder of the Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies at American University, has written a profoundly personal and moving analysis of the anguish and ideological deformations through which the Islamic world is currently passing. *Journey into Islam* is a spiritual odyssey reaching far back into Professor Ahmed's own past while detailing his dreams for the Muslim world of today and tomorrow. Professor Ahmed's vision, unrealizable as he himself realizes it probably now is, is one of a reborn, pluralistic, tolerant and cosmopolitan Muslim world, rooted in a restored understanding of the monotheistic commonalities shared by the three Abrahamic faiths. The author is a social scientist with the soul of a poet who has probably done more than any other scholar resident in the West to combat the egregious stereotypes and hate-mongering that are all too common in public-policy circles today. While readers of this book may rejoice that

such an individual moves among us, they will also most likely come away from it depressed by the probability that history is moving in the very opposite of the direction that Professor Ahmed desires.

Born in British India, raised in Pakistan, and educated in the UK, Akbar Ahmed has been living in the United States since 2000. He is an authority on the Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the author of such books as *Islam under Siege: Living Dangerously in a Post-Honor World*, *Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society*, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin*, and *After Terror: Promoting Dialogue among Civilizations*. Professor Ahmed has served as high commissioner of Pakistan to Great Britain and has held appointments at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton as well as at Harvard and Cambridge Universities. He is also a filmmaker (the *Jinnah Quartet*) and is currently composing a play entitled "Noor: Dreaming of Paradise." Perhaps most remarkably, Ahmed has developed a warm friendship with Judea Pearl, the father of the Jewish foreign correspondent Daniel Pearl, who was beheaded by al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists. The two have made a number of joint appearances before interreligious dialogue groups. All this constitutes the deeply moving story that Professor Ahmed recounts in *Journey into Islam*.

This book is the story of Professor Ahmed's on-site assessment of elite opinion in eight Islamic countries (Turkey, Syria, Qatar, Jordan, Pakistan, India, Malaysia and Indonesia). Assisted by a core research and support team consisting of three of his best students, he collected data through questionnaires and conducted interviews with a broad range of Muslim intelligentsia in each of the countries visited. Questionnaires were distributed in universities, hotels, cafes, mosques and homes. Interviews were held in most of these venues, most especially in private homes. The data are tilted toward educated youth (18-28 years old), male and female, especially as represented on the campuses of such institutions as the University of Jordan, Qatar University, the International Islamic University of Malaysia, and the State Islamic University in Jakarta. Responses averaged 120 per country. A most useful appendix presents portions of the data, with detailed assessments of their significance, for each of the countries visited. This book takes readers almost by the hand, unwrapping the Islamic world before them as they travel jointly with Professor Ahmed and his assistants on a voyage of discovery and reclamation.

Globalization (and its discontents) is a leitmotif of this volume and a theme that Professor Ahmed unfolds with unsparing honesty. He points out that the world may indeed be very "flat," in Thomas Friedman's words, between New York, London, Tel Aviv, Bangalore and Tokyo, but for traditional societies everywhere it is "not flat but uneven," with "valleys, ravines and mountains" (p. 85). "Culture, customs and ideas inherited from the past," he reminds us, "are highly prized marks of identity and determiners of behavior" (p. 85). Globalization "presupposes the dissolution of boundaries; tribalism defines itself on the basis of boundaries" (p. 86). And much of the Third World is willing to fight to the death to keep it that way. "Waziristan refuses to be flattened" (p. 87), Ahmed observes, and this refusal is shared by much of the Third World.

Professor Ahmed vividly describes the "asymmetry" between the developed and underdeveloped worlds: in the latter, one billion people earn less than a dollar a day.

There are 358 individuals (of course, not all of them are in the West) who own more financial wealth collectively than one-half of the world's population. The poverty and hopelessness of much of the Third World is attributed, rightly or wrongly, to globalization (read Americanization). "That is why so many young Muslims in the age of globalization," Ahmed remarks, "prefer Usama bin Laden to Bill Gates" (p. 16). Little of this seems to be understood in Washington, D.C., or at least American foreign policy does not indicate any such awareness.

Although he originally planned to organize this volume around the insights of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, Professor Ahmed ultimately opted for another course. In fact, *Journey into Islam* is based on three "models" of Islam, variously designated by the names of three towns in India: Ajmer, Aligarh, and Deoband. These three cities symbolize different interpretations of Islam and, according to Professor Ahmed, are universally applicable. Ajmer represents the soul of Sufism, or the sort of mysticism and transcendence perhaps best captured in the immortal verse of the Persian poet Rumi. The Ajmer approach is rooted in pluralism and the acceptance of others, Professor Ahmed maintains, and is strongly opposed to the materialist and consumer philosophy behind globalization. Today, Ambassador Ahmed believes that the Ajmer model is the "only one that can lead Muslims out of the ethnic, religious and political conflicts that globalization has thrust upon them" (p. 40).

Then there is the Aligarh model, based on the thought of such reformers as Sayyed Ahmed Kahn and Muhammad Abduh. Aligarh was long ago a pillar of support for parliamentary democracy, as historically represented by India's once-great Aligarh University. Akbar Ahmed was himself trained in the Aligarh tradition, although there is evidence today that he may be moving away from the Aligarh approach to embrace that of Ajmer. With great sadness, Professor Ahmed admits that he is today "amazed at [Aligarh's] slow but steady decline over the last decades" (p. 224). In fact, the Aligarh model in his opinion has now essentially collapsed. In this regard, he notes tellingly that "had the Aligarh model been dominant, the Muslim response to the Danish cartoons and the Pope's remarks would have been to engage in debate and write letters" (p. 219).

The Deoband model, representing all varieties of "fundamentalism," has in Ambassador Ahmed's judgment largely replaced that of both Ajmer and Aligarh during the last three decades. Inspired by such figures as Abu Ala Maududi, Hassan al-Banna, Hassan Nasrallah, Ayatollah Khomeini, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Deobandis are today the inspiration for millions of young Muslims across the Islamic world. The Deobandis are winning, Professor Ahmed argues, and there is an urgent necessity to engage them in debate before time runs out. "Time is of the essence here," he observes. "The poisons are spreading so rapidly that without immediate remedial action, no antidote may ever be found" (p. 47). But Ambassador Ahmed understands well enough that no effective remedial initiatives are remotely likely to be adopted by the present U.S. administration, mired as it is in the formulaic repetitions of such imprecations as "Islamofascism." He correctly observes that the "Deoband model... will continue to pray for Bush and his long life, because everything [the President] is doing... rejuvenates and reunites the Muslim world" (p. 72).

Despite the fact that so many have said so much over so many years about the sense of pluralism, brotherhood and "dignity of difference" embedded in the Abrahamic tradition

of monotheistic commonality, the hard truth today seems to be that this is an understanding whose time has past. Bouthaina Shaban, Syrian minister of expatriates, may repeat that Muslims "shouldn't think of East and West. [One] can't be a Muslim unless [one] believe[s] in Abraham and Christ. The oldest synagogue in the world is in Damascus. The oldest church in the world is in Damascus" (p. 19). And Professor Ahmed may add that Damascus has a shrine dedicated to the head of John the Baptist, who is revered as the prophet Yahya in Islam, where Christians and Muslims still do pray together, and another shrine for the head of Hussein, grandson of Muhammad, and even one for the remains of Saladin al-Din al-Ayubbi. Nevertheless, Deobandis everywhere seem to be listening less to the varied voices of such "People of the Book," drowned as they increasingly are by the imprecations of the resurgent Kharijites of our time.

The present is dark, and the future may prove even gloomier, Professor Ahmed reluctantly admits. He agrees that 9/11 represented the "collision of two civilizations: that of the West, led and represented by the United States, and that composed of Muslim societies..." (p. 9). Indeed, it is "difficult not to believe that political scientist Samuel Huntington may have been right," he notes. "Perhaps a 'clash of civilizations' [is] underway between the West and Islam, from which there [is] no escape" (p. 195). Professor Ahmed voices a fear that has struck many of his fellow combatants for peace in those lonely moments of introspection: "I [feel] like a warrior who [knows] the odds [are] against him," he writes, "but [has] never quite realized that his side [has] already lost the war" (p. 192). These are honest but very depressing words.

Especially distressing are the ways in which religious symbols and traditions are now manipulated in the West to serve predetermined ideological or political objectives. Professor Ahmed itemizes a litany of ills that many others have also identified: the apocalyptic messianism of the *Left Behind* books by Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins, 63 million copies of which have been sold; the video game that accompanies the *Left Behind* saga that identifies all non-Christians as the enemy; the unalloyed anti-Islamic tirades of CNN's Glenn Beck; and Fox TV's enormously popular program "24," which depicts torture as necessary for hero Jack Bauer to extract the information from the "terrorist" in time to save America. Ambassador Ahmed notes that this attitude of arrogance and venomous contempt for Muslims extends into the highest echelons of the Bush administration. Recall Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's observation, when questioned about the looting of the Baghdad Museum, that "stuff happens," and the president's own crystal clear directive to the first American viceroy of Iraq, Jay Garner: "Kick ass." Much of this is merely an echo of exactly what the Deobandis themselves are saying, from their very different perspective. If all this is not the mark of at least the beginning of a true "clash of civilizations," pitting the West against the Islamic world, what is?

Nevertheless, such obdurate ignorance is of a piece with the radically misleading simplification by President Bush at the very beginning of the "war on terror:" You are "either with us or against us." All else might be said to stem from that initial formulation. Such phrase-mongering, combined with the administration's refusal to understand the complexity of the tribal, sectarian and religious identities with which it would inevitably have to deal, has been characteristic of President Bush and those around him from the

beginning. Worse, the administration has largely refused to retain as counselors those area experts who do understand such matters but are not necessarily Bush political loyalists. These failures doomed the effort from the start. Meanwhile, Professor Ahmed notes, Americans largely failed to "understand that their culture [was] drawing critical notice in other parts of the world," a failure "worsened by the seeming 'casual arrogance' of their leaders" (p. 201). He adds that, even more than the issue of Israel and the Palestinians, it was Iraq that convinced Muslims everywhere that "Islam was being maligned in the West" (pp. 16-17).

Professor Ahmed goes further. He denounces by name such neoconservatives as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, John Bolton and Daniel Pipes, in addition to the Project for a New American Century, as the authors of many of the United States's current woes. Notably, he scores what he considers the malign influence of Professor Bernard Lewis on American policy toward the Middle East over the past three decades. "Despite being ethnocentric and outdated," he remarks, "Lewis' ideas [have]...become the accepted and indisputable foundation of U.S. foreign policy" (p. 136). The result has been that "any kind of a popular movement in the Muslim world finds itself on a collision course with U.S. interests. Democracy in the [Islamic] world and American foreign policy just do not mix" (p. 228). The great irony here is, of course, the fact that the Bush administration, whose "war on terror" which was meant to fight and contain radical Islam, has "turned out to be its strongest supporter, through its arrogance, lies, and blind support of Israel" (p. 228).

Professor Ahmed notes that Benjamin Franklin once remarked, "Whatever is begun in anger ends in shame" (p. 209). But Franklin's was a voice speaking directly from the heart of the Old America. In the new, crusading, neoconservative America, the prudence of a Ben Franklin has been replaced by the "Bring it on" challenge of President Bush. This has catalyzed the progressive radicalization of the entire Islamic world, which Professor Ahmed has so brilliantly depicted in this important book. "The sleeping giant of the East [is] stirring," one of Ambassador Ahmed's interlocutors told him. "The world needs to take notice" (p. 15).

**The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World**, by Mohammed Ayoob. University of Michigan Press, 2008. 232 pages. \$22.95, paperback.

*Robert Springborg, MBI Al-Jaber Chair in Middle East Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; director, London Middle East Institute*

Although explicitly aimed at students in introductory courses and at nonspecialist readers, this is no dumbed-down textbook. Its argumentation is sophisticated, convincing, supported with ample empirical detail and presented in crisp, clear prose. While it does indeed fill the gap of a suitable introductory text to the subject, it will also be of value to specialists because of its intellectual merits and the wide scope of its coverage. Those familiar with the author's previous works on the subject will find here a useful crystallization of his ideas, combined with an expanded empirical universe that stretches from Morocco to Indonesia.

The fundamental message of the book is that Islamism is a political rather than a religious phenomenon, and hence must be understood within the framework of the nation-state. Because this approach flies in the face of much accepted wisdom about the phenomenon, which among other things overstates the religious, enduring, and transnational natures of Islamisms. Ayooob consciously sets himself the task of "de-mythification." Noting that political Islam is a modern phenomenon, an "invention of tradition" because there never was an Islamic state and no such concept within the Quran, he goes on to contest notions that mixing religion and politics is unique to Islam, that political Islam is monolithic; and that it is inherently violent.

While in reality religion and politics were demarcated very soon after the death of the Prophet, the fiction of their indivisibility was maintained as a strategy of regime legitimation by the three great Sunni dynasties: the Umayyad, the Abbasid and the Ottoman. But in all, the religious establishment was subordinate to temporal authority, a relationship that has continued within Arab successor states, including Saudi Arabia, where the House of Saud has held sway over the institutionalized manifestations of Wahhabism. Ayooob concludes that the relationship between religion and politics in Islam has not differed substantially from that in Christianity, with the exception that the more coherent organization of Christianity gave rise to more direct conflicts between temporal and religious authority in Europe. He notes the paradox that, while the development and application of law in Islam occurred within civil society and primarily beyond the sphere of the state, contemporary Islamists contend that the state should be the instrument by which the sharia is applied and extended, thus departing from traditional Muslim practice. He concludes his debunking of the *din wa dawla* myth by stating that "Islam is no more politicized than Judaism and Christianity. . ." (p. 14).

As for what he sees as the misleading contention that Islamism is monolithic, he notes that this arises in some measure from the fact that Islamic vocabulary, which springs from the same sources, transcends political boundaries. But, in fact, "no two Islamisms are alike"; they are all conditioned by the national contexts within which they originate and operate (p. 15). Similarly, Islamisms's association with violence is debunked on the grounds that most such movements operate peacefully and seek to affect politics through constitutional means, even when the rules of the political game disadvantage them.

The rise of Islamism is explained as the result of the colonial dialectic, in which deficiencies in Muslim societies by comparison to their imperialist conquerors were seen by Salafis, such as Muhammad Abduh and Rashi Rida, as resulting from deviating from the path laid out by their "righteous ancestors." Hence, the term Salafi. From its inception, therefore, Islamism was concerned with jihad, which was given the contemporary meaning of a struggle for national independence while using the vocabulary of classical Islam. A further impact of colonialism was to undermine the role of religious scholars, the ulama, while stimulating the emergence of Islamist thinkers who had not received classical training and whose primary concern was political, not religious.

Precisely because Islamism arose within specific historical and national contexts, it is extraordinarily diverse. So it is more appropriate to speak of Islamisms or, as Chapter Two suggests, "Islam's multiple voices," than it is of any essentialist Muslim society. Manifesta-

tions of this diversity include the views of contemporary Islamist intellectuals, such as Fazlur Rahman, Abdolkarim Soroush and Tariq Ramadan. In sum, "no individual, group or tendency in the contemporary era . . . can speak authoritatively on behalf of Muslims, let alone Islam" (p. 41).

The book's intellectual framework thus established, it proceeds to undertake paired case studies of "self proclaimed Islamic states" (Saudi Arabia and Iran); states confronting ideological and pragmatic Islamisms (Egypt and Pakistan); Muslim democracies (Turkey and Indonesia); and Islamist national resistance movements ( Hamas and Hezbollah). The final empirical chapter is devoted to various manifestations of transnational Islam, commencing with al-Afghani and including Tablighi Jamaat, Hizb al-Tahrir, al-Muhajiroun, and of course al-Qaeda.

This comparative approach is an excellent tool with which to illustrate the overall diversity of Islamism as well as substantial variations within even similar categories. Thus, in the case of the two self-proclaimed Muslim states of Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example, what is most apparent are profound political differences, the former being an anti-constitutional monarchy and the latter a constitutional republic. In both cases, these states are modern constructs, as Islam does not prescribe any particular model of rule, whether authoritarian, democratic or structural.

The comparison of Egypt and Pakistan illustrates how the relatively competitive and more democratic nature of the latter nurtured Islamists more committed to democracy than the former, but that in both cases Islamists have chosen the tool of the Leninist-style political party to pursue their interests. As regards differentiation and even contestation between ulama and lay Islamists such as Mawdudi, Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, Ayoob observes "hybridization" occurring as the former become more radical and the latter more moderate. Al-Azhar and the Muslim Brotherhood, in other words, are beginning to join ranks intellectually and operationally in their opposition to the Mubarak regime.

Underlying the democratization of Islamists in Turkey and Indonesia is the successful economic globalizations of both countries. These export-oriented economies have facilitated the rise of an Islamist bourgeoisie or what might be thought of as a successful synthesis of globalizing and moralizing. Having increasing economic and political stakes in their countries, Turkish and Indonesian Islamists have become increasingly moderate. They have even become more active defenders of globalization and democratization than the secular forces they have supplanted, especially their respective militaries.

While the politically and economically benign environments of Turkey and Indonesia underlay the emergence of moderate, development-focused Islamism there, in Palestine and Lebanon the shortcomings of state and nation are reflected in the radical, violence-prone nature of Hamas and Hezbollah. Although both are profoundly different than al-Qaeda — their political objectives are territorially focused and their political Islam is a surrogate national-liberation ideology — it cannot be contended that either is going to evolve into a normal political party any time soon. Both reflect the "abnormal situations of occupation and state debility — along with the corollary of external intrusion" (p. 130). Their transformation into political parties is impeded by those structural constraints, not by their Islamist ideologies.

The treatment of transnational Islam emphasizes its lineage back to al-Afghani,

illustrates that it has nonviolent as well as violent forms, and contends that even the apparently successful al-Qaeda is unlikely to have lasting impact on Muslim societies. Its transnational agenda is at odds with the needs and concerns of most Muslims, which are focused on their own states and reflect their own national interests. The apparent weakening of al-Qaeda in Iraq at the hands of Sunni Islamists would seem to provide evidence for the proposition that state-based political Islam is likely to trump its transnational competitor, even in circumstances quite favorable to the latter.

The concluding chapter presents well-developed arguments as to how authoritarianism favors the rise of Islamism within oppositions at the expense of secularists and why the exercise of U.S. power has recreated the colonial dialectic, again stimulating the rise of radical, liberationist Islamism.

Because Ayoob's arguments are clearly presented and forcefully made, it is an easy task to stake out counterarguments, whether they are true or not, a pedagogical exercise that should serve to reinforce the book's value as a text. That the nation-state is the sole independent variable here is a case in point. Might the rise of Islamism be attributed to other factors as well? How, for example, does this variable explain the rise of religiosity, which seems to be virtually a global phenomenon? And what relationship is there between growing Muslim religiosity and the rise of Islamism? Does this not indicate that a social movement, possibly independent of the state, explains at least part of the rise of Islamism? The extreme variant of this critique is that Muslim societies are returning to type after a long interlude of colonialism and postcolonial, quasi-secular rule. Left to their own devices, Muslim polities will be Islamist, or so it could be argued.

The argument that democracy begets moderate, democratic Islamism is supported with the empirical cases of Turkey and Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, Egypt and Pakistan. Yet, in the first two cases, the role of the military might also have been important in their democratic transitions. The military, in combination with a mobilized civil society, which in Turkey is strongly secular, has served as a constraint on Islamism. This has possibly induced it to accept half a loaf rather than try to impose Islamism on society. The moral, then, is that a comparatively open state, but one anchored by forces that can constrain Islamists, may be the optimal precursor for a transition to established democracy.

Some aspects of Islamism are not touched upon; were they, the tale might be somewhat different. Gender, sexual-preference and religious inequalities, which very few Islamists are willing to seek to erase, are primary obstacles to a citizenship-based state. Without this basis, democracy is impossible. The inward-looking, defensive nature of Muslims as revealed by the Pew Global Attitudes Project and similar surveys, combined with the Islam-as-victim presentation in school textbooks in Muslim-majority countries, also indicates a mindset that is not conducive to an open society. In sum, there is evidence that Islamism taps into deep-seated societal attitudes that make it hard for others, including secularists, to compete politically or even to be tolerated in some cases, let alone be accorded full and equal rights. The argument that the AKP in Turkey has become a post-Islamist organization, focused not on identity but on service provision and fully committed to equal rights for all, would suggest that this evidence is irrelevant. However, this charac-

terization of the AKP is premature, as Ayoob indicates.

A book of this scope and erudition is likely to contain a few errors, but this reviewer could only spot one. It was in the second half of the *nineteenth*, not the twentieth, century in which representative institutions began to emerge in Muslim countries (p. 90). The claim (p. 94) that Jordan has moved toward greater political openness is an error of interpretation, if not of fact.

Quibbles aside, the next time I teach a course on this subject, this is the book I shall use and strongly recommend that others do as well. It not only debunks pernicious myths, but puts a clear case that is far more right than wrong and serves as an excellent thesis against which antithetical ideas can be discussed.

**Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen**, by Jillian Schwedler. Cambridge University Press, 2006. 252 pages. \$80, hardcover.

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Does political participation lead Islamist parties to be more moderate? By now a vast literature exists on this question, fueled especially by the success of Hamas and Hezbollah. Jillian Schwedler's *Faith in Moderation* is a useful contribution to this debate precisely because she does not claim to present an overall answer. Instead, she uses detailed case studies of Islamists in Jordan and Yemen to critique the moderation thesis. While Schwedler's analysis seems incomplete on one important point, *Faith in Moderation* has a great deal to offer to the theoretical debate on this issue.

Schwedler insightfully observes that the vast literature on the "inclusion-produces-moderation" thesis is overly linear and simplistic, and that it marginalizes the importance of "stalled" transitions — political openings that do not lead to full democracy. Furthermore, it fails to explain how parties "moderate," or even what "moderation" means. Schwedler aims to address the first two problems by rejecting a teleological discourse in which all political situations exist somewhere along a road to democracy, and the third by providing a better working definition of "moderation." She points out that "limited political openings restructure public political space, even when transition processes seem to have stalled" (p. 77). Such restructured space can lead Islamists to "moderate," which Schwedler carefully defines for her purposes as "movement from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives" (p. 3).

Schwedler narrates and discusses in detail the institutional effects of Jordanian and Yemeni political openings in the late 1980s. In both countries, state and Islamist elites have long had close ties, which the latter exploited by transforming themselves to take advantage of opportunities the government deliberately presented by allowing political participation. Such transformations created Islamist political parties: the Jordanian Islamic Action Front (IAF) and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah). In neither case, of course, did openings lead to full democracy, so both countries' transitions have been seen as "stalled." The heart of Schwedler's book is her answer to the question of

why the IAF has "engaged a democratic narrative as integral to the movement's larger Islamist agenda" (p. 172) while the Yemeni Islah party has not. Schwedler identifies three reasons. First, she points to "the relation of the regime to public political space." The Jordanian monarchy stands outside the electoral process, but "President Salih's party must at least pretend to win elections" (p. 194). This has given the IAF more freedom to ally with other parties and to act as an opposition, because such actions do not directly threaten the regime's power. Islah, on the other hand, has had to maintain good relations with the ruling General Popular Congress party to avoid being seen as a rival and pushed out of the legal political realm.

Second, Schwedler contrasts the "internal structure and decision-making practices" of the two parties (p. 195). Islah's leaders have been the same people for the last 15 years and have frequently been willing to differ with each other or with the party's official line. The IAF, by contrast, has stronger discipline, keeping its leaders true to the party line even when they disagree and turning over offices regularly. This has helped it create a model of democratic activity while propagating pro-moderation ideas through the party.

Finally, Schwedler argues that the development of such ideas is the "most pivotal" factor. The IAF has sought to justify political participation in terms of its core Islamic values, while the Islah generally has not. The result is that Jordanian Islamists have internalized a democratic narrative to a greater degree than those in Yemen.

Schwedler's explanation is convincing and quite thorough when dealing with her first two institutional factors. But her discussion of each party's intellectual commitment is a bit weaker. This is especially disappointing since she not only views this as the most important factor but also sees such an "ideational" angle as notably lacking in other literature. Certainly *Faith in Moderation* provides ample evidence that the IAF *has* made this commitment to a greater degree than Islah, but Schwedler does not unpack the *why* here as thoroughly as she does in the rest of her argument. She attributes the difference between the parties to leadership decisions, but even with the historical background she provides as an explanation for these decisions, one is left feeling that her discussion could have been more thorough.

A bottom-up, sociological approach might have been useful here. Schwedler's work is quite strong in explaining how "restructured political space" produces "new organizational structures, such as political parties, trade unions, and other interest groups" (p. 26), but weaker in considering the reciprocal process. Yet it seems likely that just such an examination could have helped explain the IAF's greater commitment to justifying its participation. As it is, this factor seems imperfectly integrated with the rest of Schwedler's argument, despite its importance.

Nevertheless, *Faith in Moderation* is a very important contribution to the literature on Islamic moderation. Schwedler's explicit renunciation of any attempt to predict moderation, or to prescribe means of achieving it, allows her to concentrate on the particulars of her case studies, and then to use this data to critique the general theory of how moderation works. Her rejection of a simple line from inclusion to moderation, her focus on the precise conditions under which inclusion has and has not produced moderation, and her incorporation of both institutional and ideological factors, make her work quite useful. As Schwedler notes, her conclusions cannot be applied directly as a template to other

situations — not least because many current policy debates revolve around whether to allow pre-existing parties to enter politics, whereas the IAF and Islah were created by political openings. And of course, Schwedler notes, neither the IAF nor Islah has much chance of becoming the government. But the broad implications of her theoretical arguments are such that those researching and thinking about Islamist political participation cannot afford to ignore Schwedler's work.

**Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence**, by Aliza Marcus. New York and London: New York University Press, 2007. 351 pages. \$35.00, hardcover.

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Formally established on November 27, 1978, but with immediate roots dating back several years earlier, the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK), or Kurdistan Workers party, led by Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan long labored in relative obscurity as far as the United States was concerned. No longer, however. Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the PKK camps in northern Iraq have become an increasingly important issue for the United States. Turkey has repeatedly threatened large-scale military intervention into northern Iraq to root them out if the United States, Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq refuse to do so. If such intervention were to occur, it would not only threaten the relative stability of the KRG, but might even result in disastrous U.S.-Turkish clashes.

However, the United States, battling the insurgency to the south, is in no position to go after the PKK, ensconced in its mountainous retreats. Indeed, retired U.S. General Joseph Ralston has been serving since August 2006 as the U.S. "Special Envoy [to Turkey] Countering the PKK." His mission seems to be to placate Turkey with largely meaningless verbal assurances in order to forestall Turkish intervention. The issue of the PKK sanctuaries even became involved in the July 22, 2007, Turkish parliamentary elections. Accordingly, Aliza Marcus's reader-friendly, but detailed, study of the PKK will be welcomed by both policy makers and scholars.

As a journalist reporting on the PKK in the early 1990s, Marcus had run afoul of Turkey's stringent security laws for an article she published in November 1994 on the government's torching of Kurdish villages during its anti-PKK campaign. Her present book is not the first dealing solely with the PKK. More than a half a decade ago, Paul White published a solid analysis, *Primitive Rebels Or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Turkish National Movement in Turkey* (Zed Books, 2000), which largely dealt with the PKK. More recently, Ali Kemal Ozcan published a detailed theoretical analysis, *Turkey's Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan* (Routledge, 2006), while Kevin McKiernan's journalistic account, *The Kurds: A People in Search of Their Homeland* (St. Martin's Press, 2006), also dealt in part with the PKK. David Romano's

recent sophisticated study, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity* (Cambridge University Press, 2006) also contains some significant analysis of the PKK, while Denise Natali's equally sophisticated work, *The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran* (Syracuse University Press, 2005), has little. Of all these recent studies, Marcus only lists the White book in her bibliography, which also omits several other earlier works in English that had previously dealt with the PKK. The inevitable time lag between final revisions and publication probably explains some of these omissions. Certainly, Marcus now gives us the most thorough and readable account of the rise of the PKK and its charismatic leader, Abdullah Ocalan.

The author bases her analysis on detailed interviews with very knowledgeable former PKK members, most now living in European exile. She also "incorporates information from a variety of [other] sources, including interviews with well-known Kurdish opponents of the PKK, independent Turkish and Kurdish activists, and foreign sources with knowledge" (p. vii). Her analysis is particularly objective, given her own thorough knowledge of events based on her years of earlier reporting on the PKK.

Marcus divides her study into four parts, the first dealing with the origins of the PKK. "Ocalan's supporters would make much of the fact that he came from as depressed surroundings as his followers, unlike many of the earlier leading Kurdish figures, who often were linked to large tribal or wealthy landowning families" (p. 15). He literally "came out of nowhere" (p. 30). On the other hand, Marcus also adds that "what is missed is that many of the early supporters were actually those who had lifted themselves out of their poverty-stricken, uneducated 'lumpen' surroundings" (p. 37). After a brief stint working in a Turkish government office in Diyarbakir and then Istanbul (measuring land deeds), Ocalan "enrolled in the prestigious political science department of Ankara University" (p. 23). "The state's own assimilationist policies had in some cases awakened exactly what it was trying to wipe out" (p. 26). "Being arrested for joining a peaceful demonstration convinced Ocalan there was little room to act in Turkey's democracy . . . [and] that armed revolution was the only answer" (p. 25). "The negative reaction of the Turkish leftists to his ideas helped convince Ocalan that there was no point in continuing to look for a Turkish partner" (p. 28). Ocalan also argued that the "fatal flaw" of the other Kurdish leaders was that they "always remained part of feudal Kurdish society" (p. 34). Thus, these other Kurdish "leaders were not true Kurdish revolutionaries. . . . While rivals accused Ocalan of hate-mongering, some Kurds saw in his stance a certain independence that made them think he could be the one to lead them to their own state" (p. 35). Citing one of Ocalan's earlier associates, Marcus writes how "the 1920s were our model, how the Russian Communist party forbade all other parties and got rid of the cliques. We saw this as all positive and we wanted to do the same" (p. 42).

In the summer of 1979, more than a year before the military coup of September 1980, Ocalan secretly left Turkey for Syria, where he remained for almost 20 years. It proved to be a fortuitous move, enabling him to avoid being captured with most of the other Turkish and Kurdish militants when the military seized power. In Syria, Ocalan eventually made useful contacts. As one former associate explained: "From the Palestinians we learned things. We learned about making demonstrations for martyrs, about ceremonies. We did a

lot of reading on a people's war; we also had armed training. They gave us clothing, cigarettes. We owe the Palestinians something" (p. 58). Soon the PKK had the Helwe Camp (later called the Mahsun Korkmaz Camp) in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. Massoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic party (KDP) also allowed the PKK to build a base in northern Iraq. "In Lebanon they learned how to make bombs and throw grenades, but in northern Iraq they would learn how to survive in the mountains as a guerrilla force" (p. 71). In the early 1980s, the PKK sent survey teams into southeastern Turkey to map out the terrain and finally caught Turkey by surprise when it launched its guerrilla struggle in August 1984.

Part II deals with the consolidation of the PKK's power. In practice, this meant Ocalan's consolidation of absolute authority over the organization. Indeed, at times, Marcus's major theme appears to be "Ocalan's cult of personality" (p. 210), "narcissism" (p. 266) and sheer "paranoia" (p. 135). He "always was concerned about challenges to his authority and to the unity of the PKK under his authority" (p. 90). "Between 1983 and 1985, Ocalan ordered or encouraged the murder of at least 11 high-level former or current PKK members" (p. 94). "At least 24, perhaps closer to 50 or 100, new recruits were executed in 1989 and 1990 on suspicion of being real or potential traitors" (p. 135). Sometimes Ocalan even blamed others for these murders and then executed the perpetrator. Referring to himself as "the 'Party Leadership,' . . . Ocalan . . . applied, manipulated, ignored and changed everything at will" (p. 144). He even "began to believe that the PKK's actions were behind many world events . . . [and] saw himself as the center of world events" (p. 266). To protect his position, Ocalan also opposed broader Kurdish unity. "The development of a politically experienced Kurdish class was hobbled" (p. 163). Reading this, one cannot help but be reminded of Stalin's tactics and wonder how the PKK ever became so powerful.

In the third part of her book, Marcus analyzes the PKK's serious attempt to win control of southeastern Turkey in the early 1990s. She explains that Ocalan also could be "politically savvy and reasonable" (p. 211). He had a "relatively strong grasp of the need for political changes, underscoring the very practical, ideological elasticity that had helped the PKK survive and grow so successfully over the years" (p. 244). Although at times he had a "coarse, patronizing and even threatening way of talking . . . [it] could be tempered by a vigorous defense of the Kurdish struggle" (p. 157). "Thousands of other young Kurdish men and women began to throw their support behind the groups, helping turn the PKK into a mass organization" (p. 160). The PKK's pursuit of a relentless guerrilla war won it mass trust and respect, while its decision also to move into legal, nonviolent activities gave it a much longer reach. Marcus refers to this mass civilian support as the "*milis*" (p. 154), although it was more commonly referred to as the Kurdistan National Liberation Front (ERNK). "It helped that the PKK was the only Kurdish nationalist organization fighting the Turkish state, making it hard for Kurdish nationalists to ignore it and still be active" (p. 217). *The Serhildan* (people's uprising) that occurred in the spring of 1990 even had the possibility of becoming "something like the Palestinian *intifada*" (p. 180). Weapons proved easy to obtain: "After U.S.-led Coalition Forces established a safe haven in north Iraq [in 1991], huge stocks of old Iraqi army weaponry and equipment were there for the taking" (p. 186). "The Turkish military clearly was on the defensive" (p. 219).

The PKK's success, however, "assumed a static situation, one in which the Turkish army did not learn from its mistakes and Ocalan did not make any" (p. 181). In May 1993, the Turkish military began to change its overall counterinsurgency tactics by burning villages that had supplied the PKK and resorting to the clandestine murder of civilian Kurdish activists. "Everyone spoke of the same problems, not enough supplies, no contact with the local people, constant attack by [pro-government Kurdish] village guards" (p. 240). Ocalan proved incapable, or maybe unwilling, to react. Indeed, he "may have spoken against a mass uprising because he feared that it would remove the Kurdish fight out of his control" (p. 181). "When [PKK] commanders raised the problem of the forcible evacuation of Kurdish villagers, Ocalan exhorted them to press the villagers to return. But PKK rebels could barely protect themselves any more, let alone unarmed civilians" (p. 241). "To the extent that mistakes had been made, Ocalan stressed, they were made by rebels who were too weak or too cowardly to properly implement his orders" (p. 240).

The fourth and final part of this book deals with Ocalan's capture in February 1999 and subsequent events. This section is not as thorough as the previous three. Marcus could have said more about why Ocalan was finally expelled from Syria, the rise of the new legal Kurdish parties (HADEP and then the DTP), and how in her own words "the PKK survives" (p. 305) despite seeming "empty, bereft of a focus" (p. 299). She correctly argues that "Ocalan in captivity became a symbol of the Kurdish nation — oppressed, imprisoned, used and then discarded by nations with other interests at heart" (p. 280). She also concludes that "the PKK survives because it is popular among Kurds in Turkey. It is popular because it fought for so long, and the PKK's fight tied people to the party and gained it Kurdish respect" (p. 305). The PKK also remains because "the state's fundamental approach did not change: In front of every, even limited, reform, the state put obstacles to slow down implementation" (p. 293). "The Kurdish problem will remain because the answer lies in Turkey opening a real dialogue with Kurds, and taking it from there" (p. 304).

Despite her detailed interviews to gain insights into the workings of the PKK, Marcus apparently never met Ocalan himself. In addition, she interviewed few if any of his top political associates, such as Cemil Bayik, Duran Kalkan, Murat Karayilan (who currently heads the PKK guerrillas in northern Iraq's Kandil Mountains), Halil Atac, Mustafa Karasu and Ali Haydar Kaytan. She does not even mention that Kani Yilmaz, once considered possibly the PKK's number three in command, was expelled from the organization after Ocalan's capture and eventually assassinated in northern Iraq. Although she gives an excellent analysis of his falling out with Ocalan and eventual capture by the Turks, Marcus never even mentions the well-known nickname of the legendary PKK military commander Semdin Sakik, aka Parmaksiz Zeki (Fingerless, having had a thumb blown off while firing a missile). For some reason, she also writes about "Iraqi Kurdistan, as it is now called" (p. 301), instead of using its current, universally known name, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

But this is petty carping. Marcus has given us an excellent, objective and most readable account of the PKK, complete with a bibliography, an index, and numerous interesting photos. Her book will be must reading for policy makers, scholars, and lay persons interested in this still-important organization.

**The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide**, by Guenter Lewy. The University of Utah Press, 2005. xiii and 370 pages. Index, 3 maps. \$23.00, paperback.

**The Armenian Rebellion at Van**, by Justin McCarthy, Esat Arslan, Cemalettin Taskiran, Ömer Turan. The University of Utah Press, 2006. vii and 296 pages, 11 maps and an index. \$25.00, paperback.

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At last, nearly a century after the ghastly events following the deportation of the Armenian population of Eastern Anatolia in 1915-16, a carefully balanced and scrupulously fair study, presenting an analysis of the accounts of both sides, has finally appeared. Guenter Lewy deserves the highest praise for his sober and reasoned approach to this saga of horrors, which began on April 24, 1915, during the early stages of World War I. It resulted in the mass dispersal of both Christian and Muslim populations in the region and the death of 642,000 Armenians — according to the author's own reckoning, nearly 40 percent of the prewar Armenian population of the Empire (p. 240). Of those surviving by the time of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, all but a handful living in Constantinople had fled to Russia, Syria, Lebanon, Greece or further abroad. Nor does this take into account those Armenians, especially women and children, who were forced to convert to Islam to save their lives. Total numbers are not known, he says, but "it is said to have been high" (p. 177). In his preface, Lewy states, "I have no special ax to grind" (p. x), and as one reads through the book, it becomes clear he does not.

The main point of dispute, as the subtitle indicates, is not that hundreds of thousands of Armenians perished in horrific circumstances, but whether their demise was the result of a calculated plan by the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress, i.e., the Young Turk government that seized power in 1908) to eradicate the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire (where the vast majority of the Armenian people had been living for millennia). In other words, was it a genocide or simply a desperate response to the invading Russian Czarist Army, which threatened the survival of the Ottoman state? Lewy's evidence tends to support the latter, but it also points out that the Turkish authorities were unable to ensure the safe relocation of the more than one million Armenians in the vilayets concerned, at a time when their writ barely extended beyond Constantinople and other main urban centers. They must have known that huge numbers would suffer and die as a result. The very fact that they chose Deir el-Zor in what is today eastern Syria as a final destination — a completely Muslim Arab region barely able to support its own population in the best of times and totally unprepared to deal with masses of wretched, starving Christians — confirms this. Of the number of Armenians who managed to reach Deir el-Zor (180,000 between June 1915 and May 1916, according to Lewy), a mere 15,000 were left alive by August 1916 (p. 217). Anyone who has visited the shrine dedicated to the Armenian martyrs in Deir el-Zor, which I have, cannot but be convinced that the Ottomans were guilty of a terrible crime. Perhaps it was not genocide

by design, but it was definitely genocide by default.

There is no doubt that, in spring 1915, many Armenians were supporting the invading Russian troops and sabotaging Ottoman efforts to send necessary supplies to their army on the Eastern front. There is also no doubt that the majority of the Armenian community were not actively involved but desperately trying to survive the depredations of war, the raids of Kurdish tribal bandits, and the struggle to find food for their families.

The Turkish position has always been that the Armenians who died were the victims of a civil war of their own making and that as many or more Turkish and Kurdish Muslims also perished or were displaced by the conflict. Even some Turks are beginning to question this hard-line defense. The Turkish historian Selim Deringil is quoted by Lewy as saying that "no historian with a conscience can possibly accept the 'civil war' line, which is a travesty of history" Lewy agrees (p. 122). That the Armenians desired independence is not in question, but the Russians were not inclined to give it to them. Had the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution not forced the withdrawal of troops from Anatolia, it is probable that the Armenians would have been swallowed up by the czarist empire, as they were in the end by the Soviets. The Russians may have used the Armenian revolutionaries to their own ends, but neither they nor the Ottomans had any interest in an independent Armenia.

Ottoman sources for the deportation and massacres are few and disputed. But there are the copious accounts of European and American consulate and embassy officials in the region, and, of course, the diaries of American missionary eyewitnesses, who were well-established in the area by virtue of the many schools they had established in the late nineteenth century, not to mention the recollections of the Armenian survivors themselves. Many, though certainly not all, of the diplomatic accounts supported the Armenian position, as did the missionaries and the survivors themselves. Lewy believes that most of the survivor accounts are credible. Some may have been exaggerated or even fabricated, but, just as outright fraudulent survivor accounts of the Holocaust exist, "Deplorable as they are, [they] do not destroy the utility of survivor testimony" (p. 148).

What emerges from Lewy's study is the dire state of the empire and its population in 1915 and its inability to protect and feed its own Muslim citizenry, let alone the Armenians. As Lewy points out, "At a time when even soldiers in the Turkish army were dying of starvation, it is hardly surprising that little if any food was made available to the deported Armenians, who were seen as in league with Turkey's enemies" (pp. 56-57). Justin McCarthy and other Ottoman apologists make much of the fact that perhaps as many Turks and Kurds died as Armenians. But for Lewy, this is a red herring. I would agree. Lewy concludes that "Muslim refugees also suffered greatly, but their movement westward was for the most part at their own pace rather than under the lash of gendarmes. The agonizing deaths of Armenian women and children during the long marches through the desert find no parallel among the adversities experienced by the Turkish population" (p. 241).

For the Turkish government to deny Ottoman responsibility for the Armenian suffering makes no sense. It was not the state founded by Kemal Atatürk that ordered the deportations, and its present authorities have nothing to lose by admitting that their predecessors made mistakes. This is Lewy's final conclusion as well. He makes clear that not all Armenians were targets of massacre. The three largest urban Armenian concentrations

— Constantinople, Smyrna and Aleppo — were exempt from the deportation order, as were the smaller communities of Armenian Catholics and Protestants elsewhere. "If the Armenians could be persuaded to forgo resort to the legal concept of genocide as a systematic and premeditated program of the destruction of a people," Lewy argues, "and be satisfied with a Turkish acknowledgment of sincere regret for the terrible suffering of the Armenian people during the First World War, a path might open toward reconciliation" (p. 271). At some point in the future, this is what must happen.

It is particularly ironic that the same University of Utah Press that gave us Guenter Lewy's balanced approach to the Armenian massacres should have also published the very sort of heavily slanted account — *The Armenian Rebellion at Van* — that Lewy decries. Even the choice of the word "rebellion" is provocative. Lewy in his book refers to it with the more neutral, and certainly more correct, word "uprising" (p. 95). The four authors of this study of the events at the southeastern Anatolian city of Van in late spring 1915 consist of "the generally pro-Turkish Justin McCarthy" (Lewy, pp. 155 and 250) and three others with obviously Turkish names who do not write as individuals anywhere in the book. As McCarthy is listed first (and out of alphabetical order), one must assume that he is the party responsible for the resulting product of collective, and clearly selective, research.

From the outset the reader is asked to accept the view that the Turks have been treated unfairly in this whole controversy ("Americans and Europeans had been fed on a diet of anti-Turkish propaganda that made the Armenians into saints and the Turks into devils," p. 1). While most Western observers did side with the Armenians, it was not as cut and dried as "saints and devils." Clearly we have a very strongly biased agenda at work here, and the reader should take everything that follows with a grain of salt. The American missionaries, according to McCarthy, "came to Van with the intention of drawing Armenians away from the Gregorian Church and into Protestant beliefs" (p. 17), when in fact their primary intent was education and health care for a population desperately in need of both. Conversion was very low on their list of priorities. A few pages later we are told that "Armenian students alone had the benefit of the modern education offered by American missionaries" (p. 20), when in fact the schools were open to children of all faiths. That Muslims in Van may have refused this opportunity was due to their own fanaticism. Muslims elsewhere in the empire joined their fellow Ottoman Christians in institutions like the Syrian Protestant College (later the American University of Beirut) in substantial numbers.

For McCarthy and his colleagues, it was the Armenians who brought the ensuing catastrophe of deportation and massacre upon themselves, even, in the case of some of their leaders, by deliberate design. The suffering of Turks and Kurds at the hands of Armenian revolutionaries was, it seems, ignored. "It must be said that most Europeans did not care about the Muslims" (p. 37), whereas Lewy correctly notes that "the reports of the missionaries did not ignore the sufferings of the Muslim population" (Lewy, p. 144). McCarthy reports the fall of Van to the Armenians and their Russian allies on May 20, 1915, without ever once mentioning the deportation order of May 2, as if the government plan to remove all Armenians from the city and vilayet of Van played no role in the Armenian uprising and resistance, only noting that by 1919, the Armenians "had been

driven out" (p. 2). The burning of the Muslim quarter of Van city was due to the Armenians' "irrational hatred of all things Muslim and Ottoman" (p. 245), as if the Turks had done nothing during the earlier massacres of 1894-96 and the atrocities leading up to 1915 to make the Armenians fear and hate them. Irrational? I don't think so. Neither "deportation" nor "Deir el-Zor" appear in the index nor, it seems, in McCarthy's frame of reference. We are also asked to believe that, whereas there were 112 Armenian villages in the vilayet of Van before World War I, there were nearly double that number (200) of intact Armenian villages in the same region in 1919, at a time when the entire Armenian population had been killed, forcibly deported, or forced to convert to Islam (Table 9.1, p. 245).

As a concluding flight of genuine irrationality, we are told that the Armenians would have been better off "remaining loyal to the Ottoman Empire" (p. 266), as if this were at any time an alternative to national suicide and ethnic cleansing on the most horrendous scale. According to McCarthy, "The Armenian revolutionaries lost" (p. 258). This may be true of the battle, but not the war. Today, despite more than a century of Turkish oppression and opposition, there is an independent Republic of Armenia, thanks to the perseverance of its people and the support of much of the rest of the world.