Book Reviews

The United States Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual, with forewords by General David H. Petraeus, Lt. General James F. Amos and Lt. Colonel John A. Nagl, with a new introduction by Sarah Sewall. University of Chicago Press, 2007. 419 pages. $15.00.

Jeffrey Record, professor of strategy, Air War College; author of Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win, *and* Dark Victory: America's Second War against Iraq

Probably no U.S. Army doctrinal manual in history has been so eagerly awaited as the December 2006 Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. The University of Chicago Press has subsequently reprinted it with a foreword by Lt. Colonel John Nagl, an influential proponent and practitioner of the new counterinsurgency doctrine, and an introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.

The need for a new doctrine — and a new approach to the war in Iraq — was self-evident to a growing number of Army officers with service in Iraq, most notably General David Petraeus, the present commander of U.S. forces in Iraq. As Nagl notes in his introduction,

> When an insurgency began in Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the Army was unprepared to fight it. The American Army of 2003 was organized, designed, trained, and equipped to defeat another conventional army….It was, however, unprepared for an enemy who understood that it could not hope to defeat the U.S. Army on a conventional battlefield, and who therefore chose to wage war against America from the shadows (p. xiii).

The manual's preface declares:

> Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN [counterinsurgency] with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies — some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith (p. xlvii).

Counterinsurgency accomplishes both objectives by challenging much of what is sacrosanct about the American way of war. America's thoroughly conventional military remains focused on large-scale warfare against the regular forces of other states. As such, it has been poorly prepared to deal effectively with non-state enemies practicing irregular warfare. Thus, the Army failed in Vietnam largely because it rejected counterinsurgency in favor of the big-unit, firepower-intensive conventional war it wanted to fight. And thus, the Army quickly polished off Saddam Hussein's regular ground forces only to be stumped when Iraqi conventional military resistance unexpectedly morphed into an insurgency. Predictably, the Army reacted as it had in Vietnam: it sought to defeat the insurgency by killing insurgents, completely ignoring the dominant political dimensions of the struggle and the disastrous strategic effects of collateral damage. The Army's initial approach to counterinsurgency likely created far more insurgents than it removed from combat, focusing as it

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did on destroying the enemy and using excessive firepower, indiscriminate searches and roundups (44,000 of the 65,000 suspected Iraqi insurgents or sectarian killers detained in Iraq since the war began in March 2003 have been released), and humiliating and physically abusive interrogation techniques.

Counterinsurgency thoroughly examines the nature of insurgency and calls for a return to the long-established principles of successful counterinsurgency, including the centrality of intelligence, the primacy of political over military responses, the integration of political and military responses, the primacy of population protection over the killing of insurgents, and the imperatives of using the minimal force necessary and establishing security under the rule of law. To underscore the utterly different requirements of conventional war and counterinsurgency — "the conduct of COIN is counterintuitive to the traditional U.S. view of war" (p. 47) — the manual postulates the following "paradoxes" of counterinsurgency operations:

- "Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be."
- "Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is."
- "Sometimes, doing nothing is the best reaction."
- "Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot."
- "The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than us doing it well."
- "If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next."
- "Tactical success guarantees nothing."
- "Many important decisions are not made by generals" (pp. 48-51).

What a radical break from the popular Weinberger-Powell doctrine of assured victory through the politically unconstrained application of overwhelming force!

Counterinsurgency is an impressive achievement. It is intellectually rich and, given the Army's longstanding institutional hostility to counterinsurgency, politically courageous. It explicitly recognizes the dangers of conventional military responses to sub-conventional military threats and the fact that our intelligent enemies are resorting to such threats precisely because of our conventional military supremacy. Is it simply coincidence that all of America's failed post-World War II military interventions — in Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia and (probably) Iraq — have come at the hands of enemies practicing protracted irregular warfare, enemies who have compensated for their material inferiority by crafting a superior strategy and mustering a superior political will to fight on? The manual is certainly, and deservedly, an affront to such primitives as the tabloid pundit Ralph Peters and the venomous Ann Coulter, who believe only the Romans got counterinsurgency right. (Plagued by an insurgent-infested population? Not to worry. The solution is simple: slaughter all the males and sell the women and children into slavery. Poof! No more insurgency.)

Yet a new field manual does not a revolution make. As Sarah Sewall points out,

> Doctrine is only a precursor to change, not its guarantor. As every student of Max Weber and bureaucracy knows, innovation does not come easily to large institutions. And this field manual is not simply a refinement on the margins of U.S. practice; given where the military has been since Vietnam, it is paradigm shattering. Thus, while the doctrine revision is a signal accomplishment, it is not sufficient to effect a real transformation of the armed forces (p. xxxv).

Counterinsurgency challenges America's very approach to war (and here I am indebted to Colin S. Gray): apolitical, astrategic, ahistorical, optimistic, problem-solving, culturally ignorant, technologically dependent, firepower-focused, large-scale, profoundly regular, impatient and casualty sensitive. Moreover, for the foreseeable future, the very word counterinsurgency will be joined at the hip to our disastrous war in Iraq. "No more Iraqs!" will mean "No more counterinsurgency!" There is also an unbridgeable chasm separating the inherently protracted nature of counterinsurgency and our domestic political tolerance for it. The counterinsurgency clock is calibrated by the decade, whereas the American domestic political clock is dominated by the two-year election cycle. It is certainly realistic to approach counterinsurgency as long war, but the American electorate is not long on patience for such war unless it is manifestly necessary, which the Vietnam and Iraq wars were not. (Over 60 percent of the American electorate believes the Iraq War was a mistake, and the recent defections of Senate Republican bulls Richard Lugar, John Warner and Pete Domenici from the White House line on the war portend the isolation of the president within his own party on the signature issue of his presidency.)

I have argued elsewhere (in *The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency*, a 2006 Cato Institute monograph) that American strategic culture is so hostile to the performance of successful counterinsurgency that we should avoid direct military intervention in foreign internal wars. We are no good at these kinds of wars, so why should we risk involvement in them except in situations of extreme necessity? I also believe the experience of the Iraq War will exert, for perhaps a decade or two, as chilling an effect on America's use of force abroad as did the Vietnam War. As there was a Vietnam syndrome, so too will there be an Iraq syndrome (see my "Back to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine?" in the fall 2007 issue of the *Strategic Studies Quarterly*).

I am further persuaded that the Army will walk away from counterinsurgency after Iraq, just as it did after Vietnam. The new religion of "smart" counterinsurgency may be spreading among some of the Army's best and brightest officers, but it is unlikely to be internalized by the resource-preoccupied institutional Army. Even in Iraq, observes Sewall, "Nothing prevents the field manual's prescriptions from being ignored or even used to mask conduct that is counter to its precepts" (p. xxxvi). More to the point, conventional war remains the Army's cultural comfort zone, and it is a far more potent budgetary claim on resources, especially on big-ticket weapons programs, than the inglorious counterinsurgency mission.

What of the Iraq War itself? Will *Counterinsurgency*, now put into practice by Petraeus, make a difference? Surely, it is too early to tell, although one suspects that the new counterinsurgency may be four years too late and a couple of hundred thousand troops short. Operation Iraqi Freedom may have been doomed from the start by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's arrogant insistence on an invasion force too small to seize control of Iraq and by U.S. occupation proconsul L. Paul Bremer's mindless dissolution of Iraq's regular army. Even a favorable turnaround in the military situation would count for little in the end, absent the Iraqi government's resolution of such outstanding political issues as the distribution of power between the regions and the central government, de-Bathification reform, the sharing out of oil and oil revenue, the establishment of provincial election laws and provincial authorities, amnesty policy, militia disarmament, and evenhanded law enforcement by Iraqi security forces. Counterinsurgency, it is said, is 80 percent political and only 20 percent military. If that is so, then the heavy lifting in Iraq lies both ahead and out of our hands.

Counterinsurgency grasps the great lesson that the Pentagon failed to learn in Vietnam and, unfortunately, may forget after Iraq:

> Western militaries…falsely believe that armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones. In fact, some capabilities required for conventional success — for example, the ability to execute operational maneuver and employ massive firepower — may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN operations. Nonetheless, conventional forces beginning COIN operations often try to use these capabilities to defeat insurgents; they almost always fail (p. lii).

Counterinsurgency deserves a wide audience. Together with Steven Metz's *Rethinking Insurgency* (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2007), it offers the reader acute insights into the nature of modern insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Diplomacy Lessons: Realism for an Unloved Superpower, by John Brady Kiesling. Potomac Books, 2007. 320 pages. $19.95

Edward S. Walker, Jr. (U.S. Foreign Service, ret.), Christian A. Johnson Distinguished Professor of Global Theory, Hamilton College; former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs and ambassador to Israel, Egypt and the U.A.E.

In February 2003, John Brady Kiesling, a mid-level Foreign Service officer stationed in Greece as head of the political section, resigned in protest against American preparations for "bloody regime change in Iraq." In his book *Diplomacy Lessons*, Kiesling says that he "wanted to leave an accurate account of how many stars aligned to make one diplomat act bravely." He also said that his book sought to answer the question of what U.S. power could realistically accomplish. Kiesling says that on the basis of his 20 years in the Foreign Service, he has gone from being an idealist to a State Department realist, which he defines as one who makes the "hard-nosed calculation of cost and benefit to the American people, based on an accurate understanding of human nature and the workings of power." His conclusion is that we cannot afford to defend our interests through means other than by presenting ourselves to the world in moral terms. From this foundation he arrives at two principal conclusions: the United States best uses its power by strengthening states rather than subverting them, and we amplify our power when we support international institutions, laws and agreements. Most of us in the profession would agree with those conclusions.

Kiesling writes well, and he is convincing when he writes about issues and events with which he had been engaged during his career. His complaints about the talking points embassies receive from Washington and our largely ineffectual public-diplomacy efforts reflect what many of us have felt. But it is not an easy problem to fix. Kiesling highlights the problem of the president, whose public statements at home undo the efforts of the Foreign Service to paint American policy in palatable hues for foreign audiences. When I was preparing press guidance in Washington, it was for the American press and the Congress, not the Greek or Egyptian Foreign Ministry. And when we were drafting talking points for the ambassadors and their staffs, we had to homogenize differing views in the U.S. bureaucracy while conforming to the outlines of policy directed by the White House. In my four ambassadorships, I used talking points as a guide, never as a script. Mr. Kiesling's contention was that ambassadors fill their report cables with their Washington-scripted presentations to prove their loyalty. I did the opposite, because I almost always amended Washington's talking points to take account of the foreign audience, not the Washington audience. And of the many cables I received from ambassadors as assistant secretary, very few followed the course that Kiesling suggests was common.

Kiesling's observation about the need for the Foreign Service and U.S. policy makers to take account of the domestic political pressures on foreign leaders is sound advice. At times we forget those pressures at our peril. I have seen major negotiations fail with Syria and with the Palestinians because we did not take adequate account of the pressures on Arafat and Asad. However, it is not always possible to focus on foreign political pressures in the face of U.S. domestic political pressures. While Kiesling may be right that we would be more effective if we had a better fix on the internal political situation in a given country and played to it, we cannot put their structural and political problems above U.S. interests, even when those interests are based on domestic U.S. politics. That is the fastest way for an ambassador to be dismissed as having gone native and to lose credibility in Washington. I have seen ambassadors do exactly as Kiesling proposes by defending a foreign country and protesting U.S. policy. That ambassador may gain credit with the foreign government, but from then on, his advice will be ignored in Washington. And it will be his last ambassadorship.

Kiesling says that his book is not meant to be partisan. Neoconservatives, conservatives and the Bush administration might be excused if they do not believe him. He criticizes President Bush for supporting the death penalty in the United Sates because it goes against the moral sensibilities of foreign publics and calls this an indefensible "gaffe." He goes on to condemn Bush's "inept" repudiation of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Climate Change Protocol. These are but samples of the politically charged language Kiesling employs at several points in this book. There are certainly arguments one could mount to support Kiesling's many conclusions about Iraq, the CIA, the FBI and the U.S. policy-making structure, but he seldom enlists them. And this is one of the principal limitations of his book. He does not give us enough evidence to support his conclusions, and his career did not put him in a position to speak knowledgeably about many of the subjects he takes on. I found myself agreeing with Kiesling at many points, but based on my own experience of 35 years in the Foreign Service, not Kiesling's arguments or the weight of his experience.

Kiesling's Greek language capability and his service in Israel and Morocco as a junior officer, as well as postings in Greece and Armenia and three postings on country desks in Washington, do not qualify him as an expert on Iraq, Arab affairs, the Middle East, nonproliferation, covert intelligence operations or senior-level policy making in Washington. Yet these are the subjects that occupy a substantial portion of his book and on which he discourses freely. Kiesling says that he "had no bureaucratic standing" to comment on Iraq policy. As a private citizen, of course; as a Foreign Service officer, no.

Kiesling's resignation did not have the impact on the administration or on the American public that he may have hoped. He broke the general convention in the Foreign Service that a resignation should take effect prior to making public statements. Instead, he had a copy of his resignation letter forwarded to *The New York Times* and spoke from Athens to its reporter in New York about his motives. As Kiesling says, his story merited a few incoherent remarks on page 13 of the *Times*, and his letter was carried on the *Times* web site. Thereafter, there was a flurry of support but no discernible impact on policy.

I respect Kiesling's courage and his commitment to his principles. The questions he asks himself are asked by most Foreign Service officers at some point in their careers. A few, like Kiesling, resign on principle. Most do not. Kiesling passes judgment on his colleagues when he says: "To criticize the war would directly or indirectly challenge the moral accommodation each of us had made to our profession." The implication that we compromise our morals to serve our careers, as Kiesling asserts, is insulting and suggests a flawed knowledge of what the Foreign Service is.

Foreign Service officers are hired to serve the elected president of the United States and his or her appointees. Our job is to give the best policy advice possible based on our knowledge of the countries in which we serve, to recommend policies and actions that will further the president's objectives, and to then implement those policies to the best of our ability. Once the president has decided on a policy, it is no longer a subject of legitimate debate unless it proves unworkable or conditions change.

Kiesling has some of it right. He makes a good case for the role of the Service in understanding a foreign country and what motivates its leaders. He seems to have a more tenuous grasp of the duty of the Service to interpret America and our politics to friend and foe alike in foreign countries. It was inconceivable to me that as political counselor in Athens, he had paid little attention to our presidential election. It was equally strange when he criticized his ambassador in Athens, Tom Miller: "Miller woke up hours before the rest of us, read everything that came from Washington, and used his superior knowledge of Washington's likes and dislikes to keep control of the mission." An ambassador has to know what Washington is thinking if he or she wants to participate in the policy debate and guide the embassy properly.

It is difficult for many of our officers to understand how tenuous the relationship is between the professional service and our political masters. The politicians I have worked for have generally been hypersensitive to questions of the loyalty of the Foreign Service. Republicans think we are all Democrats and therefore do not respect politicians or accept their decisions. We are suspected of taking sides in the internal political fights that any administration encounters between its most senior members. The American political process is confrontational, as the intensity of any political campaign demonstrates. It is a process of deep emotion that can be compromised by any hint of disloyalty. As Foreign Service officers, we serve and have impact when a politician listens to our advice, plumbs our expertise and is confident that we will not abuse our knowledge to embarrass him or her. When Kiesling resigned to, in his words, "marginally increase the political cost the warmongers would pay for the harm they wreaked on America's image and interests," he broke the rules and undercut his colleagues who remained at their posts in the hope of moderating the worst aspects of a policy that required the best and the brightest.

It is over Iraq that Kiesling resigned, and it is on Iraq that he devotes much of his book's heavy criticism of the administration, the Washington bureaucracy, the CIA, the FBI and many others. He says that policy is hammered out in a competitive process involving senior officials from different departments whose careers are judged, not on whether the policies they advocate serve U.S. interests, but whether their policies prevail. He claims that "90 percent of the world's population knew instinctively that invading Iraq was a bad decision. The other 10 percent could have reached that same correct conclusion if they had asked the right questions of the experts whose specialty it was to understand Iraq and its people." He also claims that mid-level Foreign Service officers should shoulder the burden of reality checking on behalf of the American people.

According to Kiesling, President Bush launched the war because Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction; he was motivated by irrational hatred of the United States; and legitimate leadership alternatives were available. He suggests that "balding senior officials sitting around a conference table in the White House" are guilty of group-think. When I sat around the conference table in the White House, I never found that group-think was the problem. In the latter part of the Clinton administration and the beginning of the Bush administration, we were, as Kiesling suggests, focused on Iraq — but not for the reasons Kiesling suggests.

Saddam had demonstrated twice that he was prepared to go to war with his neighbors in the Gulf, and he had shown no evidence that he had abandoned his dream of hegemony. His statements said just the opposite. We focused on Iraq because the sanctions regime that had served us well for a decade was crumbling under the triple attack of sanctions fatigue, Saddam's effective

public diplomacy characterizing the Iraqi people as "victims," and the money that Saddam used to bribe countries and individuals to subvert the sanctions.

We knew that, if the sanctions were lifted or simply disintegrated, we would never be able to reconstitute them through the Security Council, given Russian interests in Iraq and China's allergy to sanctions. We recognized that air power, as used by Clinton in 1998, was inadequate to stop Saddam if he could relieve himself of the sanctions. We had it on the authority of the CIA that the chances of a silver-bullet solution were about 5 percent. Regime change, first raised in the Clinton administration, was not the subject of discussion in the initial days of the Bush administration. In fact, Donald Rumsfeld, in one meeting, as I recall it, said he did not give a damn about Saddam or regime change. What he cared about was the danger of opening the door to a sanctions-free and inspection-free Saddam Hussein to do as he pleased in the development of WMD and the use of surrogates to deliver them. In the pre-9/11 days, we were concerned with the mid-term threat that Saddam posed to our interests and the security of our friends in the region. Through our deliberations, we were increasingly being stymied by the lack of effective alternatives to a military solution employing U.S. forces.

Kiesling gives Ahmed Chalabi a great deal of credit for misleading the president, the vice president and Secretary Rumsfeld. Just because Ahmed Chalabi wanted us to take care of Saddam and the neoconservatives for their own reasons wanted to flex American muscles, it does not mean that there were no valid reasons for eliminating the Saddam problem. Had Ahmed Chalabi never existed, it is unlikely that the course of history would have been different. I never challenged the rationale or the goal of eliminating Saddam Hussein. I had severe doubts about how well we were positioned to deal with the aftermath of an invasion.

Many of Kiesling's observations and recommendations are sound when he is dealing with structures and issues that he confronted in his own career. The book could have used more of that to highlight the important role our mid-career officers play in the game of diplomacy. However, his proposals for corrective action in areas where he had no discernible experience, such as combining the personnel systems of the State Department and the CIA with exchange assignments, make no sense and demonstrate a profound ignorance of the differing roles and responsibilities of these two organizations. His proposal to expand the UN Security Council's permanent veto-wielding membership from five to nine and to require a veto to be sustained by three permanent members demonstrates very little knowledge of our own national interest. Based on my time as deputy permanent representative in New York, each of the other four permanent members would equally rebel at such a thought.

If it is true, as Kiesling contends, that many others in the Service share Kiesling's attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy and the senior authorities who design and carry it out, then we are doing an abysmal job of bringing our young officers up through the ranks. We appear to have very little vertical communication in either direction. As Kiesling suggests, we can do better.

Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States, by Trita Parsi. Yale University Press, 2007. $28.00, hardcover.

Leon Hadar, research fellow, Cato Institute, Independent Institute

By the time this review is published, Israel may have ordered its F15 and F16 fighter-bombers to knock out Iran's nuclear facilities, starting a sequence of events in which the United States had no choice but to join the fray, with Tehran retaliating by striking America's hard-pressed forces in

Iraq, launching terrorist attacks against America and its allies, disrupting the tanker traffic through the Persian Gulf and causing global energy prices to soar into the stratosphere.

Or perhaps as you read this review, Washington and Tehran might be following the policy recommendations that author Trita Parsi sketches out in *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States*. After recognizing that they have some common interests, including in a stable and united Iraq led by a government they both support, the two governments may have taken steps to a broader negotiation that could result in historic reconciliation between the global superpower and the regional power. Who knows? Perhaps, as Parsi hopes, Israel too may recognize that a U.S.-Iran détente is in its national interest and not try to torpedo it, but even bless it. In any case, Israel may have no other choice but to accept it as one more outcome of the Realpolitik-driven Middle Eastern games that nations play, according to the author and what is perhaps one of the central messages of his study. It's the national interest, stupid! When it comes to relations among Iran, Israel and the United States, realism in the pursuit of the core interest of the nation-state has a tendency to override ideological disposition — whether Islamic fundamentalism, radical Zionism or American neoconservatism.

More likely, as this issue of *Middle East Policy* comes out, the Bush administration, following a policy promoted by Israel and its neoconservative backers in Washington, will be continuing to pursue its policy of "containing" and weakening Iran through diplomatic and economic means, hoping the regime in Tehran capitulates and accepts American dictates, or that its economic failures and declining popularity cause it to implode — two scenarios that Parsi does not consider realistic.

Hence, it is not surprising that Parsi, the president of the Iranian American Council, has been advocating in *Treacherous Alliance*, as well as in his numerous commentaries in the print and broadcast media, the ending of the dangerous escalation in the U.S.-Iran relationship. His most original contribution to the debate on American policy in the Middle East and its approach towards Tehran is to stress that a rational and effective U.S. strategy toward Iran requires a comprehensive appreciation of the complexity of the relationship between Iran and Israel and a broader historical perspective of their evolving ties, going back to the Pahlavi dynasty and the Zionist founders of the Jewish state. Or perhaps we even need to rediscover the bonds between Persians and Jews that go back to the romantic liaison between Persia's Xerxes (485-465 B.C.) and Queen Esther.

Fast-forwarding to the early twenty-first century, you would not find Queen Esther in the Oval Office. Instead, it is the Iranian-Israeli rivalry that has been dwelling at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, making it difficult for any White House occupant to adopt a policy towards Tehran that reflects the real U.S. national interest and resists the pressures from interest groups and individuals with a political and ideological ax to grind.

In any case, to characterize *Treacherous Alliance* as "timely" would be an understatement. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to describe the engrossing plots uncovered by Parsi, who maintains suspense like Tom Clancy, as "ripped straight from today's headlines." My favorite tale of intrigue is in a chapter titled "An Offer Washington Couldn't Refuse." It is a fast-paced account of diplomatic deceptions, bureaucratic double-crosses, twisted love-hate relationships (involving America, Iran and Israel), colorful locales (Washington, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Geneva) and richly drawn characters: a well-intentioned Swiss diplomat, neocon con-men, Mossad agents, Marxist terrorists and even the author himself. One is not only entertained, but also gains insights into why America finds itself in such a bloody mess in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf.

Against the backdrop of the U.S. military "victory" in Iraq and President George W. Bush's declaration of "Mission Accomplished" on the USS *Abraham Lincoln*, and as reports that the Americans were about to do a "regime change" in Tehran, Iranian diplomats prepare a comprehensive proposal that spells out the parameters of a potential "grand bargain." The plan addresses all the points of contention between Washington and Tehran, including the Israel-Palestine issue and

Iran's nuclear program. It also calls for the Americans to hand over wanted members of the Iranian terrorist group based in Iraq, the Muhjahedine-Khalq Organization (MKO), in return for the al-Qaeda operatives the Iranians are holding. The proposal is written by the nephew of the Iranian foreign minister and Iran's ambassador to France, Sadegh Kharrazi. It receives a green light from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei. It is delivered to Washington by the Swiss ambassador to Tehran, Tim Guldimann, the caretaker of U.S. interests in Iran, to both the State Department and to Republican Bob Ney of Ohio. That influential Republican lawmaker favors a dialogue between Tehran and Washington — Parsi is working at his office at that time — and promptly sends a staffer to hand deliver it to Karl Rove, President Bush's top adviser, who calls the document "intriguing." Secretary of State Colin Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage as well as National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice favor a positive response to the Iranians. But Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, whose neoconservative aide Douglas Feith is already devising plans to attack Iran (and Syria), are successful in their efforts to press Bush to rebuff the offer. "In the end, the secret cabal got what it wanted: no negotiations with Tehran," Lawrence Wilkerson, a former aide to Powell, tells Parsi.

The author also chronicles other machinations: secret talks between American and Iranian diplomats in Geneva; behind-the-scenes efforts by the Iranians to sell their proposal to the Israelis (General Mohsen Rezai, the former commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, tells a group of Israeli officials in Athens that Iran, like Pakistan and Malaysia, was not ready to recognize Israel but would avoid confronting the Jewish state directly or through proxies); the successful attempt by the Pentagon and the neocons to sabotage the "quiet diplomacy" between Washington and Tehran (and indirectly Israel) by accusing Iran of helping to facilitate a terrorist attack in Riyadh by members of al-Qaeda in Iran; and the continuing efforts by the neocons and the Israel Lobby and their supporters on Capitol Hill to provide support for Iranian opposition groups and groom Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late shah, as Iran's version of Ahmed Chalabi.

Like any good yarn, Parsi's saga has a villain that keeps reappearing at every twist and turn: Michael Ledeen, a neoconservative "policy intellectual" associated with Israeli Labor party leaders and Italian neo-Fascists, not to mention shady Iranian arms dealers and a cast of intelligence operatives. He was believed at one time by the CIA to be "an agent of influence of a foreign government." Ledeen's modus operandi seems to be a never-ending effort to reorient the U.S. relationship towards Iran based on the current interests of Israel. Hence in the 1980s, Ledeen becomes a central figure in the Iran-contra affair as he tries to promote an American opening to a "moderate" Iranian ayatollah as a way of assisting Iran during its war with Iraq — exactly what Israel's Shimon Peres was then advocating. After 9/11, Ledeen emerges as the most prominent pundit (and an occasional schemer in secret encounters with dubious Iranian figures) promoting U.S. military action against Iran that would result in a "regime change" there. Again, there is a policy that seems to reflect the kind of approach that Israeli leaders and their supporters are lobbying for in Washington.

As Parsi points out, there is no touch of irony in Ledeen's and, by extension, Israel's policy of diplomatically and militarily flirting with Tehran in the 1980s, when America (the "Great Satan") and Israel (the "Little Satan") were the main focus of its revolutionary ethos, while attempting to isolate and punish Tehran after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, just when the Iranians were trying to open a dialogue with the Americans, who had just defeated two of their most hated nemeses — the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. In this and other cases, explains Parsi, Israel's foreign-policy harddrive consisted of the so-called Periphery Doctrine, adopted by the leaders of the Jewish state in its early years. It was aimed at strengthening Israel's ties with the non-Arab states on the periphery of the Arab world — Turkey, Ethiopia and Iran — as well as with non-Arab and non-Muslim minorities such as the Kurds in Iraq, the Maronites in Lebanon, and the Animists and

Christians in Sudan. When it came to Iran, the relationship that blossomed during the time of the shah was intertwined with the close ties the two Middle Eastern countries had with Washington in its strategy against the Soviet Union and Nasserism. Israel had hoped that closer ties with Iran would help contain the pressure from the hostile Arab "interior" while the Iranians regarded Israel, with its close ties to Washington, as a strategic asset that could help them win American assistance.

The harddrive of the Periphery Doctrine, according to Parsi, survived many crashes, including the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the end of the Cold War and the first Gulf War, although concrete foreign-policy outcomes had taken surprising turns. In the 1980s, the fear that Saddam Hussein's Iraq would defeat Iran had driven Israel's Defense Minister Peres to press the Reagan administration to help Iran's ayatollahs, who, notwithstanding their hostility towards the Jewish state, were encouraging Israel to provide them with military assistance and lobbying in Washington as a way of helping them contain Iraq. In the 1990s, as Parsi sees it, Prime Minister Peres, hoping that the Oslo process and globalization would help Israel make peace with and integrate itself into the Arab "interior," turned the Periphery Doctrine on its head by trying to demonize the Islamic Republic as the leader of a radical Islamic menace that supposedly threatened not only Israel, but America and its Arab allies. This Israel strategy was evolving just when the Iranians under President Rafsanjani were trying to move towards détente with Washington. But the Israelis, according to Parsi, were successful in persuading the Clinton administration to isolate Iran. This approach has remained in place, with the Israelis and their supporters in Washington, as Parsi suggests, trying to sabotage any attempt at rapprochement between the United States and Iran that could threaten Israel's position as America's main ally in the Middle East and elevate Iran to the status of a regional power.

Through this and other provocative observations and intriguing accounts, some of which have never been made public, and which are based on 130 in-depth interviews conducted with Iranian, Israeli and American officials and analysts, Parsi is able to spin complex plots in a very lively way and with an eye for detail and personalities. As I read *Treacherous Alliance*, I sometimes had the feeling that I was watching one of the critically acclaimed documentaries on BBC's "Panorama" or PBS's "Frontline," in which ex-officials' and pundits' recounts of historical events are punctuated occasionally by news clips narrated by the producer. Indeed, those readers hoping to be introduced to a comprehensive and detailed history of the relationship among the members of the Iran-Israeli-U.S triangle will clearly be disappointed. Even a professional historian digging in old archives in Tehran, Jerusalem and Washington would find it impossible to describe and analyze the rich history of a complex relationship in such a relatively brief study. Moreover, based on the author's PhD dissertation (submitted to Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies), the work includes almost no references to new or old declassified documents. As Parsi points out, the study and its conclusions derive mostly from his on- and off-the-record interviews with former officials and experts. Not unlike "Panorama" and "Frontline," the book reads like the work of a journalist, consisting mostly of quotes from, or references to, interviews that are framed by Parsi's brief commentaries and analyses.

"To ensure the reliability of the interviewees and their accounts, an extraordinarily large number of people have been interviewed and their accounts *have been cross-checked*" (my italics), Parsi notes in the preface to his book. "No argument in the book is dependent on one or two quotes alone," he emphasizes. "The cross-referencing and the large pool of interviewees have also ensured that the accounts presented in the book reflect the essence of the exchanges, even though the exact recollections are difficult to reproduce after twenty years." Some of the interviewees include former high- and mid-level officials (and on the Iranian side, a few current officials, like Iran's UN Ambassador and Deputy Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who is quoted quite extensively),

but also (especially on the Israeli side) a few think-tank analysts and old timers whose perspectives and speculations may be interesting and provocative but who lack access to information about current policy making in the three capitals. Moreover, almost all the interviewees have their own political and even personal agendas to advance. It is not clear exactly how their accounts "have been cross-checked," and the author does not always give a clear explanation when he provides us with a quote from this or that source on whether he is introducing us to reliable information about what had happened (that he or others had checked and confirmed) or to interpretations by his sources on what had happened. The bottom line is that we will probably have to wait many years for the main players to publish their memoirs and researchers to gain access to American, Israeli and Iranian archives before having a complete picture of this period.

I also think that Parsi's analytical approach is a bit flawed. He tends to overstate the significance of the centrality of Israel's Periphery Doctrine in shaping the "treacherous alliance." Hence, we are led to conclude that Israeli foreign policy has been dominated by debate between "pro" and "anti" Periphery Doctrine "schools of thought"; at one point, Parsi even describes Israelis who allegedly wanted to use the MKO as part of an anti-Iranian disinformation campaign as "pro-MKO," and he seems to exaggerate the supposed willingness of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his short nine-month tenure as part of a strategy to "return" to the Periphery Doctrine. In fact, the harddrive of Israeli foreign policy has always consisted of its core national-security goal, which revolves around its relationship with the neighboring Arab states. The relationship with Iran, or for that matter with Turkey and even with the United States, is the "software," the changing sources of diplomatic and military power it uses to advance its main foreign-policy goal: managing its relationship with the Arabs, including the Palestinians. For Israel, it's still the Arabs (and the Palestinians), stupid! At the same time, notwithstanding the importance of the role of Israel and its supporters in influencing U.S. policy towards Iran, there is little doubt in my mind that, if and when a U.S. president decides that opening a dialogue with Iran is in the national interest, he or she will resist all domestic and external pressures. President Richard Nixon, a member of the once-powerful "China Lobby," made a similar decision when he went to China.

Reading Legitimation Crisis in Tehran: Iran and the Future of Liberalism, by Danny Postel. Prickly Paradigm Press, 2006. 130 pages. $10.00.

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I first met Mohsen Sazegara in his office at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), one of the leading neoconservative think tanks in Washington, D.C. In 2005, Sazegara had accepted a fellowship at the institute to do research on the Iranian dissident movement, in which he had actively participated since the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997. As one of the founders of the Revolutionary Guard Corps and a prominent Iranian journalist twice imprisoned for his political activities in 2003, Sazegara was primarily known to me for his campaign to hold a popular referendum on Iran's theocratic constitution. In November 2004, this idea had received widespread support among reformist activists in Iran and dissidents in exile like Reza Pahlavi, son of the late shah, though some were suspicious of Sazegara's earlier links to the regime.

After a brief chat about Iran's upcoming 2005 presidential elections, Sazegara suddenly began to praise President George W. Bush, describing him as a "wise leader" who truly understands the democratic movement in Iran. According to Sazegara, American and Iranian leftists in the United

States are out of touch with Iran's aspiration for democracy and still stuck in the anti-imperialist mentality of the Cold War era. For Sazegara, neoconservatives like Patrick Clawson and Michael Ledeen are key defenders of Iran's democracy movement, whose support is crucial to bringing change to the country. While Western leftists continue to overlook Iran's struggle for democracy by obsessively denouncing U.S. imperialism, a loose association of Iranian activists in exile — best represented by liberal feminist writers like Azar Nafisi, Stanford political scientist Abbas Milani and pro-monarchists like Manoucher Ganji — is increasingly establishing ties with neoconservative circles in Washington. With regime change in mind, they advocate a series of democracy-promotion schemes that primarily include the support of non-violent popular uprisings (Nafisi and Milani) and possibly an actual U.S. military intervention (Ganji). Central to their belief is that the Islamic Republic is now a tired authoritarian entity facing considerable pressure from liberal opposition forces. And since the theocratic government in Tehran is essentially incapable of reform, a liberal democratic order in Iran can most effectively be realized through Washington-led democracy-promotion tactics.

With this background in mind, Danny Postel's *Reading Legitimation Crisis in Tehran* is particularly thought-provoking. It brings to light a new interpretation of contemporary Iranian politics that offers an alternative to neoconservative democracy promotion. The book also offers a self-critical look at the politics of the Left, holding liberals responsible for their lack of solidarity with Iranian democrats in their struggle against authoritarianism. Postel examines the way in which liberal Iranians are reclaiming liberalism for Western liberals by re-reading Western theorists "with a Persian horizon in mind" (p. 8).

"Universal values" inherent to liberalism — civil liberties, human rights, freedom of expression, women's rights and secularism — are now being realized in Iran's national struggle for democracy. According to Postel, the title of the book reflects the "actual crisis of legitimation and the intellectual ferment taking place in Iran today" (p. 8). Such ferment heralds the "renaissance of liberalism" led by intellectuals and political activists who are closely reading authors such as Kant, Mill, Habermas and Rorty and resurrecting liberal thought in a non-Western setting.

This collection of essays and interviews is divided into four chapters. The first offers a good description of progressives' failure to recognize the democracy movement in Iran. Although part of the reason for this is a lack of understanding of Iran's "complex multiplayer drama," Postel is quick to point out that this failure is due to the Left's fear of U.S. meddling in Iranian politics. They know what happened in 1953, when the CIA led a coup to topple the Mossadeq regime. Nevertheless, Postel accuses Western leftists of failing to show solidarity with Iranian democrats. Unlike the 1970s and 1980s, when American and European progressives gave their full support to pro-democracy movements in Chile, El Salvador, Indochina and Nicaragua, the Left has largely remained silent on Iran. As a result of this apathy, neocons have been able to steal the leftists' tradition of support for democratic movements around the world. Postel's objective, he claims, is to regenerate the Left's tradition of civic activism and build transnational ties with other liberal democratic movements around the globe. In the case of Iran, this can be done by bringing "Iranian activists to North America on speaking tours to raise awareness and resources for the movement there, to help it get more exposure in the Western press, and to build the kinds of personal bridges that those of us who've been involved in solidarity work over the years know are so essential" (p. 28).

Chapter two begins with a somewhat uncritical look at Azar Nafisi's best-selling memoir, *Reading Lolita in Tehran*. Using Nafisi's model of everyday struggle against totalitarian rule through reading "great literature," Postel considers the possibility of rereading classical liberal texts as a way to remind Western leftists of their heritage. Western liberals have become defensive because of the Bush administration's attempt to entangle liberal ideals with U.S. imperialistic ventures in the Middle East. The task at hand is to reassert those liberal values that we in the West

take for granted. In this chapter, Postel redefines liberalism as a "radical political project" that remains unfinished. In what he regards as the rise of "liberal Third-Worldism," Iranian liberalism can offer Western liberals a new opportunity to understand themselves by demonstrating solidarity with fellow liberals around the world.

Chapter three is a commentary on Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson's, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism* (2005), which offers the first English translation of Foucault's writings, letters and interviews on the Iranian revolution. Following Afary and Anderson, Postel links Foucault's postmodernist critique of liberalism with Islamist autocratic ideology, arguing that the French philosopher's support for the Islamists stems from his enmity toward modernity's dark side. Foucault was blind to the dangers of Islamism, presuming that the Iranian revolution promised a whole different "regime of truth" (p. 64). The most interesting section of this chapter is Postel's recognition of the impact of Foucault's works on young Iranians in the postrevolutionary era.

Chapter four consists of an interview with the Iranian philosopher Ramin Jahanbegloo, who was imprisoned in 2006 for plotting a "velvet revolution" in Iran. Jahanbegloo explores themes such as the history of Iranian Marxism and the future of liberalism in Iran. He explains why Marxism has been largely absent from the intellectual landscape of the post-revolutionary era: much of pre-revolutionary fascination with Marxism was limited to Stalinism and pop-cultural heroes like Che Guevara. With the collapse of Soviet communism and the failure of Islamist utopianism, Iranian intellectuals have now "returned to earth, to the here and now, after decades of ideological looking for salvation in eschatological constructions" (p. 9). Liberalism, with its universal aspiration for the attainment of truth and human dignity, has found a new home in Iran.

Postel also invites us to consider the project of democracy promotion through NGOs, international civic associations, women's-rights groups and those citizen activists in the West who can support Iran's dissident groups at the grass-roots level. Given the current entanglement of liberalism with U.S. military interventionism and some of the NGOs' close ties with Washington, it is not easy to support Iranian democrats without having the regime accuse them of collaboration with foreign governments. As Negar Azimi has successfully argued (in *The New York Times* Magazine, June 24, 2007), recent attempts by Washington to promote democracy in Iran since the State Department's allocation of a $75 million budget to advance freedom and human rights have largely been counterproductive. Iranian authorities now arrest anyone they suspect of spreading "propaganda" against the regime. Jahanbegloo was the first major casualty of Washington's policy of democracy promotion, and now five other Iranian-American scholars and journalists have been detained, Haleh Esfandiari of the Woodrow Wilson Center being the most high-profile. Postel's idealistic stance for building solidarity fails to offer a practical solution to this dilemma.

Postel's book presents an odd vision of romantic activism, attempting to motivate rather than simply explain. A strange form of Orientalism runs through these pages: uncorrupted and virtuous natives have the natural disposition to recover the nearly forgotten liberal virtues of an advanced Western civilization oblivious to its own natural greatness. The reference to Nafisi's memoir, *Reading Lolita in Tehran*, is central to Postel's subtle Orientalist thinking. Nafisi describes how reading banned books under totalitarian rule provided her and her students the ability to create a temporal realm of freedom through the power of imagination, in which the crushing weight of the outside world would disappear. But, as Hamid Dabashi (in *Al-Ahram Weekly*, June 1-7, 2006) and Fatemeh Keshavarz (*Jasmine and Stars: Reading More Than Lolita in Tehran*, 2007) have shown, Nafisi's work is replete with Oriental biases. Dabashi argues that Nafisi's book is a tale of "selective memory" that reductively depicts Iran as a violent and vile country because of its "Islamic" disposition against women, hence cultivating American public opinion in favor of military intervention. For Keshavarz, Nafisi's memoir deliberately ignores women's agency and their active role in the Iranian public sphere, even during the darkest period of the regime's rule in the 1980s.

Postel tends to exaggerate the influence of Iranian liberalism and at the same time downplay other democratically minded movements led by religious reformist intellectuals and activists. Abdul Karim Soroush, Alavi-Tabar, Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, Mojtahed Shabestari, Mohsen Kadivar, Ayatollah Hussain-Ali Montazeri and Ayatollah Youssef Sanei are hardly mentioned in Postel's book. (In his interview with Postel, Jahanbegeloo briefly makes reference to these thinkers and finds it suprising that they too have been influenced by thinkers like Kant and Popper.) Soroush has produced some of the most powerful critiques of Islamist authoritarianism. In contrast, Postel overemphasizes the importance of Jahanbegloo, a liberal philosopher who does not have a wide readership in Tehran or beyond. Soroush and Kadivar have many more followers; they are admired by both secular and religious democratic activists, and their books are read by activist women and students in diverse reading groups. Both Iranian and non-Iranian liberal intellectuals have been in constant contact with reformist thinkers like Soroush, and a vibrant exchange of ideas and networking have taken place between secular and non-secular democratic activists since the election of Khatami in 1997. Why not mention them in the book?

Not only does Postel exaggerate the reach and popularity of liberalism in Iran; he deliberately marginalizes religious reformists, who contest the ideological assumption that secularization is essential to democratic modernity. This reduces the Iranian democratic movement to a mere secular-liberal experience.

Despite my objections to Postel's argument, *Reading Legitimation Crisis in Tehran* forces us to ask a crucial question: What is the best way to promote democracy in Iran? For the most part, Washington needs to recognize the possibility of diverse forms of democratic modernities, which may or may not include the normative process of secularization. With more than 100 years of democratic aspirations and revolutionary movements led by both religious and secular groups, Iran already has a strong democratic tradition that is bound to pose serious challenges to the future of authoritarian rule. The most powerful dissident current in the Islamic Republic is likely to emerge not from the liberal Iranian community but rather from the pro-democracy religious factions within the system (especially those based in the Qum seminary), who pose the most serious challenge to the legitimacy of the Islamist state. Iran's future democracy will likely emerge from an implosion of the state, as in the former Soviet Union, rather than an explosion caused by a "velvet revolution" instigated by liberal Iranians.

Distant Relations: Iran & Lebanon in the Last 500 years, H.E. Chehabi, ed. Center for Lebanese Studies, Beirut. I.B. Tauris & Co., 2006. $28.95, hardcover.

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The connections between Iran and Lebanon have received much attention in recent years. Drawing the ire of the Bush administration and the Olmert government in summer of 2006, the latter sought to break the ties between Hezbollah and Iran while also containing Hezbollah's growing power and influence. Neither objective was achieved. Instead, Israel was drawn into a protracted bloody confrontation that caused widespread destruction in Lebanon. A year later, the Wino Coad commission investigating that war issued a damning verdict on the Israeli government's conduct criticizing Olmert's "serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence.... His decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front and of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel."

Olmert survived this political crisis, which threatened to unravel his political career; however, the Lebanese quagmire continues to burden its southern neighbors and others in the region. Iran, too, continues to obstruct efforts toward regional stability. Understanding the enduring linkages between these two countries is an ongoing challenge for policy makers and politicians alike. A new volume by Houchang Chehabi, *Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years*, provides a definitive contribution, including an elaborate bibliography.

The historical links between Iran and Lebanon date back to the Achaemenid Empire, in which the Phoenician coastal city states of Tyre, Sidon, Byblos and Arvad were launching grounds for Persian-Hellenic battles. Indeed, the Phoenicians, capitalizing early on their skill as traders, benefited too from the vastness of the Persian empire. These early ties foreshadowed the future "commercial, capitalistic and political" nature of this relationship. Chehabi's edited volume begins with the emergence of the sixteenth century Safavid Dynasty, when the most definitive links were forged.

Albert Hourani's "From Jabil Amil to Persia" describes a defining moment. Shah Ismail invited the clerical community of Jabil Amil and Bahrain to Iran to convert the Sunni population to Twelver Shia Islam. The Amili scholars, while importing this brand of Islam, equally adapted to the new Persian domain. This mutually beneficial relationship was marked by the assistance and, more important, the legitimization that the Shiite religious leaders of Jabal Amil in south Lebanon granted to the Safavid dynasty. Indeed a quid pro quo of sorts developed between the clergy and the crown: the Lebanese clerics legitimized Safavid dynastic rule in exchange for expansive clerical influence over conversion and education.

Rula Jurdi Abisaab's chapter takes the reader through the vicissitudes of Shia renewal within the Safavid Empire. "They were the proselytes of a new era that necessitated a redefinition of the jurist's role in society and called for a new venture towards temporal authority and the Shii state." Shah Ismail used the presence of the ulema to balance against the warrior Qizilbash and the Persian aristocracy. Abisaab articulates the games of power politics in ethnic terms as well. As the shah increased the power of the Amili scholars within the political order of Safavid power, there was growing competition between Persian and Arab scholars and further definition of the boundaries between Sunni and Shia.

Beyond the clerical migration that laid the foundation for this relationship were the student migrations. Iranian students began to attend the alluring Protestant and Jesuit colleges that had opened in the Levant. "Going to study in Beirut was for a young Iranian a way to get a modern Western education without leaving the Muslim world." Many of the Iranian elite from the Hoveyda brothers to Shapour Bakhtiar studied in Beirut. The city was a multicultural, pluralistic landscape that opened avenues to both the East and West.

Over the years, Beirut provided refuge to many of Iran's political and religious activists. The Bahai community found sanctuary among Lebanon's Cedars, as did many Pahlavi opponents. While Mohammad Reza Pahlavi pursued a foreign policy based on *Realpolitik*, Iran's Shia connections played a part in its foreign relations. William Abbas Samii's chapter suggests that the shah maintained contact with prominent Shia as well as the Maronite community, which quietly encouraged Shia empowerment. Similar to Iran's use of Hezbollah today, the reliance on Maronite Christian leaders for its purposes reveals the importance of mutual state interests. The shah, unlike the revolutionary regime, was unsuccessful in cultivating longstanding ties to the community due to the tide of Arab nationalism that swept over the country.

Needless to say, the shah's support of Musa Sadr represents the quintessential link between the two countries. Musa Sadr, while born in Qom, traced his lineage back to the Jabil Amili clerics who migrated to Iran during the Safavid era. Sadr eagerly returned to the land of his ancestors as an Iranian clerical envoy in 1959. In the article by Chehabi and Majid Tafreshi, it becomes clear that

the shah, Sadr and oppositionists were struggling to advance their own interests amidst the wider regional political struggles in Palestine, Lebanon and Iran. While Sadr received initial political support from the shah, he was morally behind Khomeini's movement against clerical quietism. While the latter maintained absolute support for the Palestinian cause, Sadr directed his effort towards Shia empowerment as Palestinians began to overrun southern Lebanon in the aftermath of 1971. Indeed, these inter-Shia squabbles between Sadr, the shah and Khomeini reveal much about the tension and ideological disunity that existed within the pre-1979 revolutionary movement.

For the Pahlavi monarchy, further obstruction can also be attributed to the presence of political opponents who worked within the Shia community. From the Mossadegh collaborator Ayatollah Kashani to Mostafa Chamran, who worked intimately with Sadr through the revolution, to the infamous Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, who assisted in the creation of Hezbollah — these dissidents used the linkages between the two societies to plant an Iranian foothold in the hills of Jabil Amil. It was through these bonds that Iran gained further entrée into Lebanon in the aftermath of its 1979 Islamic revolution.

The Iranian Revolution cemented Iran's link to Lebanon. For Khomeini, Lebanon provided the ideal outlet for successfully exporting Iran's "model." The Shiis, as stated by Chehabi, were a "natural audience," considering the extreme nature of the regime's ideology coupled with the geostrategic conditions in the aftermath of the revolution — war against Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Chehabi highlights the factional nature of the regime's Lebanese foray, which continues to dominate Iranian internal politics today. Tehran's crowning achievement was the 1982 creation and 1985 institutionalization of Hezbollah.

At the time of the 2006 conflict, the policy debate centered on the political and military linkages connecting Iran and Hezbollah. Many speculated on the patron-client relationship dating back to the group's formation. Tehran, having nurtured this proxy in its own ideological image, is thought to have significant political influence on the actions of Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah. However, Chehabi postulates another argument. While it is clear that Iran has financially and militarily sustained the group since its inception, ideological divergences between the two could signify greater independence. Indeed, after Khomeini's death in 1989, Iran reoriented its isolationist foreign policy towards integration over isolation. In this vein, the clerical regime under the aegis of President Hashemi Rafsanjani moved towards pragmatic foreign relations.

Such moves in the aftermath of the 1989 Taif accords also led Hezbollah to acknowledge its political and social limitations as an ideological Islamist champion amidst the diversity of the Lebanese state. Indeed what ensued was a gradual moderation in Hezbollah's leadership in order to participate in the 1992 parliamentary elections. While Hezbollah has not been warmly embraced by Lebanese society, one cannot contest the success of Hezbollah's model of providing for the dispossessed — a model imported from Iran, where such munificence has not trickled down to the masses. Hezbollah has supplanted the weak central government. It has also expanded its sources of patronage beyond the Islamic Republic.

Equally illuminating is Chehabi's chapter on inter-ulama relations. Often assumed to be linked, there is ideological and epistemological disagreement over the concept of *velayat e-faqih*. The differences are grounded not only in religion but also in politics. What becomes clear through Chehabi's analysis is that inter-Shia relations are not uniform. There exists a tension between the theological centers of Qom and Najaf and those in Lebanon. The latter have developed an identity reflective of the pluralistic Lebanese environment and the nature of the Lebanese community. This is exemplified in the difference in mourning rituals of Ashura, which were imported to Lebanon by Iranian students in the nineteenth century. The Iranian ceremony is decidedly violent and, when performed in Lebanon, provoked opposition among the religious establishment. Today too, while Hezbollah maintains Iranian allegiance, Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah provides a balanced perspective for the Shia community.

Chehabi's volume has emerged at an important time. As both Lebanon and Iran continue to be embroiled in domestic and regional crises, it is critical to understand the roots of their differences as well as the links between the two. Chehabi unveils some crucial misperceptions and contradictions that are important to consider when deconstructing this relationship.

From Oslo to Jerusalem: The Palestinian Story of the Secret Negotiations, by Ahmed Qurei ('Abu Ala'). I. B. Tauris & Co., 2006. 319 pages. $45.00, hardcover.

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No Palestinian official is more qualified to tell the inside story of the secret Oslo negotiations between the PLO and Israel than Ahmed Qurei, also known as Abu Ala. Long before he served as speaker of the first Palestinian Legislative Council, and later as prime minister of the Palestinian National Authority, Qurei led the Palestinian delegation through 14 rounds of secret negotiations that culminated in the signing of the historic yet controversial Oslo accords in September 1993. He was intimately involved in each phase of the negotiations, from his initial encounter in London in December 1992 with Professor Yair Hirschfeld, an activist in the Israeli Labor party with close ties to Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, to the conclusion of the talks ten months later.

In the introduction to *From Oslo to Jerusalem*, Qurei explains that he intended to present the Palestinian version of what had occurred in Oslo in order "to put an end to speculations and to half truths." What indeed motivated Qurei to write this book remains somewhat of a mystery, because, by his own admission, the Palestinian version of the Oslo negotiations had already been ably documented a decade earlier in *Through Secret Channels* by his close colleague Mahmoud Abbas. At the time, Abbas was head of the PLO's Department for National and International Relations; he had served as a key adviser to Yasser Arafat during the Oslo talks. The "half truths" that are never explicitly identified by the author may refer to the Israeli accounts of the negotiations: *The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East*, by Uri Savir and *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord*, by David Makovsky. As director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, Savir became his country's chief negotiator with Qurei beginning at the sixth round of talks, in late May 1993. Makovsky, the diplomatic correspondent for the *Jerusalem Post*, reconstructed the Oslo process through interviews with Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian, American and Norwegian officials.

One suspects that Qurei felt impelled to write this book because he had not received sufficient credit for his pivotal role in the Oslo negotiations. The quest for long-overdue accolades is abundantly evident throughout this volume, from the author's reminder in the introduction that "the Oslo Agreement is especially associated with my name," to his plaint about being unfairly excluded by Arafat from a PLO delegation that visited French President Jacques Chirac at the Elysée Palace. In the same vein, Qurei insists that he, not Hirschfeld, authored the initial document that eventually emerged after numerous iterations as the Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP) on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. The lament of denied glory is also evident in Qurei's reminder to the reader that the honor of signing the accords at the White House ceremony went to Mahmoud Abbas: "For reasons of protocol, I had not been designated to sign the agreement, although I had negotiated every single word in it."

It is therefore not surprising that, by reading this work, one learns more about Ahmed Qurei's personal aspirations and disappointments than anything new and previously untold about Oslo.

As such, From Oslo to Jerusalem merely serves to confirm the published accounts of the PLO-Israeli rapprochement by Abbas, Savir, Makovsky and British journalist Jane Corbin (in *Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel to Peace Between Israel and the PLO*).

Qurei identifies several reasons for the PLO's willingness to enter into direct talks with Israel. He notes that the breakdown of the Soviet Union left the Palestinians without their principal political ally. Furthermore, with the exclusion of the PLO from the then-deadlocked bilateral Jordanian-Israeli negotiations taking place in Washington, Palestinian leaders felt a need to convince the United States, which had not been sympathetic to their cause, that the PLO was genuinely committed to a negotiated political solution. The PLO also needed to regain legitimacy within the international community, and political and financial support from various Arab states that had been lost as a result of the PLO's backing for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The electoral victory of the Israeli Labor party, for whom reaching peace was on top of the agenda, and the need to put an end to harsh Israeli reprisals during the first Intifada further motivated the PLO leadership in Tunis to exploit the newly opened Oslo channel.

From Qurei's account we learn that the first five rounds of secret talks, beginning on January 22, 1993, took place between himself, Hassan Asfour and Maher Kurd on behalf of the PLO, and Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak, two Israeli academics with close ties to Yossi Beilin and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. These initial encounters took place despite serious concerns and uncertainties within the PLO leadership about the extent to which the Israeli interlocutors were officially authorized to speak for their government. These difficulties were further compounded by the absence of clarity about the kinds of issues that Israel was willing to negotiate and by the inability of the Palestinians to determine whether the Norwegian channel was to serve as a substitute for, or as an adjunct to, the peace negotiations taking place in Washington.

Some of these doubts were laid to rest in late May 1993, when Israel decided to upgrade the talks to the official level by dispatching Uri Savir to Oslo. Savir and Qurei developed a close personal friendship and a constructive working relationship that contributed to progress on the DOP during the sixth round of talks. But the amiable atmosphere of the negotiations turned sour during the seventh round in mid-June after the arrival of Yoel Singer, the legal advisor of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Qurei describes Singer as an aggressive interrogator and Grand Inquisitor who "behaved, frankly, as if he was the public prosecutor at an Israeli military court ready to pronounce severe sentences on some hapless Palestinian citizen who had been tortured into confessing a crime against the Israeli state."

The Oslo talks began to unravel during the following four rounds. According to Qurei's account, the responsibility for the impasse in the talks fell entirely on Israeli shoulders. At the beginning of the ninth round in early July, Singer introduced a radically revised draft of the DOP that Qurei deemed unacceptable because it included many provisions objectionable to the Palestinians and inexplicably excluded items that had previously been agreed to by both parties. As a result, profound disagreements emerged between the parties on five issues regarding the substance of the DOP, with the PLO insisting that the DOP contain explicit reference to Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, a listing of the issues to be deferred to the final status negotiations, a guarantee that the Israeli withdrawal from "Gaza first" would not end up as a retreat from "Gaza only," specification of modalities for the proposed elections to be held in Jerusalem, and identification of the rights of Palestinians displaced in the 1967 war.

Qurei insists that he was compelled to introduce a new DOP draft with 25 amendments during the tenth round on July 11 solely in response to the Israeli draft. While accusing the Israelis of placing on the table for a second time issues that had previously been agreed to, Qurei's account stands in sharp contrast to that of his Israeli counterpart Savir, who lamented in *The Process* the tendency of the Palestinian negotiators to withdraw earlier concessions and to introduce new

demands. Not surprisingly, the eleventh round in late July ended in a shouting match, with Savir suggesting that the negotiations be terminated and with Qurei announcing his intention to resign.

The five contentious issues were eventually resolved during a six-hour phone call on the night of August 17-18 between Israeli Foreign Minister Peres in Stockholm and PLO leader Arafat in Tunis, with Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Joergen Holst relaying the messages both ways. While the Palestinians clearly won Israeli concessions on three of these issues, Qurei merely lists these without identifying them as such, stressing instead the compromises that Israel had successfully extracted from the PLO. Here, again, Savir's account of the bargaining is much less one-sided because it highlights the *mutual* give and take in Oslo.

The only issue that remained on the table after agreement on the DOP had been reached involved mutual recognition. Qurei acknowledges that he was very reluctant to accept the notion because he believed that the least the PLO should have insisted upon, in return for acknowledging Israel's right to exist, was an explicit recognition by Israel of the Palestinians' right to their own independent state. As it turned out, neither the DOP nor the letters of mutual recognition exchanged by Arafat and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on September 9, 1993, contain any mention of a Palestinian state. Yet, despite this glaring and deliberate omission, Qurei inexplicably held on to the belief that Oslo "would lead inexorably to a Palestinian state."

Qurei heaps well-deserved praise on several Norwegian diplomats for offering and helping to sustain the Oslo channel. Establishing a secret and initially unofficial channel between Israel and the PLO was the brainchild of Terje Larsen, a Norwegian sociologist who, along with Deputy Foreign Minister Jan Egeland, helped to set up the exploratory discussions in Oslo beginning in January 1993. Eventually, the Norwegians played a key role in persuading Israel to elevate the talks to an official level in May 1993. Following the serious deadlock during the tenth round in mid-June, Foreign Minister Holst and his assistant Mona Juul helped to resuscitate the talks by providing assurances to Arafat and Peres that the other party was committed to reaching agreement through the Oslo channel. Qurei notes that, in addition to ensuring utmost secrecy and providing congenial settings for the talks, Holst's tact and integrity in relaying ideas and identifying topics for discussions with both sides contributed greatly to the emergence of trust among the interlocutors in the late rounds.

Qurei confirms previous accounts that American officials had been made aware of the Oslo channel long before Shimon Peres presented the agreed-upon DOP draft to Secretary of State Warren Christopher in California in late August 1993. He notes that Holst's predecessor as foreign minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, and his deputy, Jan Egeland, submitted regular reports to Washington about the status of the talks. Furthermore, Holst himself delivered a copy of an early draft of the DOP to State Department officials in early 1993 and sought their comments.

The final chapter in Qurei's volume, "Philosophy, Strategy and Tactics," is a very disappointing conclusion to what could have been an illuminating addition to the literature on the Oslo negotiations. The subheading, "The Achievements of the Oslo Agreement," should have been more accurately named "The Intended Aims of the Oslo Accords" because the achievements alluded to by the author were ephemeral at best. Thirteen years had passed between the signing of the Oslo accords and the publication of this book. Hence, it would have been reasonable to expect Qurei to provide at least a brief explanation of the reasons for the utter collapse of the Oslo process in the intervening years. Yet, other than a single sentence blaming "certain Israeli governments in the last ten years" for having failed to abide by the Oslo agreements, one searches in vain for a somewhat more substantial and less one-sided analysis of the reasons for Oslo's demise.

Curiously, Qurei finds considerable merit in the step-by-step approach that informed the DOP — leaving fundamentally critical issues including Palestinian statehood to be resolved by 1998 — but does not assess its pitfalls, despite acknowledging that the "balance of power drastically

favored Israel and worked against the Palestinians." Mahmoud Abbas was much more prescient than Qurei when he noted at the meeting of the Palestinian Central Council, which ratified the Oslo Accords in October 1993, that Oslo "carries within it the possibility of establishing an independent state, but it could also prolong the occupation for many years." Indeed, as has been noted recently by Saeb Erekat, the current chief Palestinian negotiator, when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, "nothing is solved until everything is solved" (*New York Times Magazine*, July 8, 2007, p. 54). That is a lesson Qurei fails to draw.

Perhaps because he devoted indefatigable effort to bring about an Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation, Qurei still clings to the illusive hope that what had been accomplished in Oslo "could pave the way for coexistence, cooperation and a better future, in place of a history filled with hatred, suffering and blood." Regrettably, for most Israelis and Palestinians, all that remains of Oslo nowadays, in addition to shattered dreams, is the indelible memory of the hesitant handshake between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin eons and eons ago.

A Framework for a Palestinian National Security Doctrine, by Hussein Agha and Ahmad S Khalidi. Chatham House, 2006. 139 pages. $18.95.

Beverly Milton-Edwards, director of the Center for the Study of Ethnic Conflict, Queens University Belfast

The task of addressing the components of a Palestinian national-security doctrine has always been difficult. Amid the fallout over the election of a Hamas government and incipient internecine conflict between Hamas and Fatah forces throughout the latter half of 2006 and early 2007, the task has become all the more pressing and all the more difficult. Some of the most serious internal fighting, involving elements of the Palestinian security sector as protagonists, immobilized the Palestinian polity.

Hussein Agha and Ahmad S. Khalidi are both well placed to undertake the task of presenting a set of proposals or a framework that connects with internal dimensions of Palestinian national security. The two authors are not only experts in their field, but they bring to their assessments intimate experience of peace negotiation, conflict resolution and national-security concerns in the Palestinian arena. One other and prominent feature of the authors that becomes apparent throughout the text is the Diaspora voice in the debate about Palestinian national security. A timely reminder that, even as energies are absorbed by events in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where anarchy and conflict prevail, the security concerns of the Palestinian Diaspora should never be ignored.

In the past, Agha and Hussein have been bold in making public the secret discourses of peacemaking and the ugly realities of the asymmetry of power between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and promoted debate about all important capacity building that would go towards achieving a more fair and just peace for all parties. They have played key roles in the Oslo process, the Palestinian experiment in autonomy, including the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and the challenges that such changes have presented the PLO.

A Framework for a Palestinian National Security Doctrine can be read in a number of ways and benefits from addressing more than one audience. The book's four-part structure and various appendices can easily be utilised as a handbook for policy makers and others who are engaged in the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, with a specific focus on national security issues and debates. Here the authors provide an easily digested and familiar framework that addresses the

most common and salient features of national security debates across the globe. In this book, force and violence, the role of the state, hard and soft power, and international and regional factors are identified in terms of familiar discourse on national-security interests and needs. Under this framework, however, Agha and Khalidi identify the specifics of the Palestinian context in order to make sense of these wider debates.

The authors also remind the reader that, in terms of the doctrinal debates about national security, the only state that the Palestinians find themselves in is one of limbo. The Palestinians neither enjoy formal nation-statehood nor are dedicated purely to the insurrectionist tactics of a liberation movement. This status works to undermine a sense of unity and security among constituent Palestinian elements in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem as well as the Diaspora.

Using a range of arguments, the authors demonstrate the inherent tensions around national-security assessments between the PA — as an institution of governance for some Palestinians — and the PLO, as the constituent body of the Palestinian people including those in the Diaspora. The Israeli factor in the debate, whether with respect to the present (lack of statehood) or the future (possible Palestinian statehood) remains a major leitmotif of the dimensions of security outlined in the book. Additionally, the relevance of the debate in the absence of a two-state solution is also highlighted by Agha and Hussein and thus leaves the reader with as many questions unresolved as resolved. The authors illustrate how national needs should be aligned to the means that they have at their own disposal for defense.

This means that Agha and Hussein, in outlining the fundamentals of a national-security doctrine, propose that formal non-offensive methods such as non-violent defense — civil disobedience, sit-downs, mass mobilization etc. — should be institutionalized by the Palestinians themselves. This does not mean that they reject the right to self-defense, which they see as a legitimate right of the Palestinians or any other people, but rather that this right is asserted within a broader framework of non-offensive defense. Nonetheless, it is clear that the two believe that this approach will optimize the best means and assets that the Palestinian people possess, whether within the structures of their own state or not.

There are, of course, flaws in this approach. Agha and Hussein try to anticipate their critics by outlining aspects of the debate in which they believe that certain factors may need to be taken into account or viewed as ameliorating issues. Much of this type of thinking is apparent in the fourth section of the book, where they outline the Palestinians' changing strategic environment. There is an astute reflection on the regional context, future threats, the impact of technological developments, and the demographic challenge as both a potential strength and a weakness of the Palestinians regarding national security.

There is smart thinking here on such issues, and it is further in evidence in the sections on liberation versus state-building. Here the PA is identified as the embodiment of the dilemma that the Palestinians face with respect to this issue. Should the PA, in terms of a framework for national security, be the sole preserve of state-building, or should it pursue the goal of national liberation until occupation is ended and a settlement that addresses refugee rights is forthcoming? Agha and Hussein believe that this dilemma currently traps the PA and thus the fate of the Palestinian people. They suggest that the PA decisively choose either state-building or resistance but not both. Whether there is the energy or the will for such a decision within the structures of either the PA or the PLO, however, is questionable.

Since the victory of Hamas and defeat of Fatah in the Palestinian legislative elections of January 2006, an alternate discourse on national security — one that highlights the dichotomy between state-building/governance and resistance/liberation — has created a chasm within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The incorporation of Hamas into the fabric of the Palestinian polity

both in the territories occupied by Israel and the Diaspora is, however, evidence of a perplexing display of cognitive dissonance by the authors as they address the theme of a Palestinian national-security doctrine and its constituent elements. At most, the impact on the Palestinian political environment two decades ago of Hamas's insertion of itself, with its competitive and oppositional challenge to the hegemony of the PLO, is referred to in passing by the authors as part of the cleavages within the Palestinian national movement or internal opposition groups of the Islamist variety. Surely as a result of this, and other aspects of the spirited defense of the PLO as a democratic national movement that emerges in the narrative, there is cause to reflect on the ways in which the authors choose to understand the national-security debate.

To be fair, Agha and Khalidi are explicit in stating from the very start of their book that they seek to initiate a debate and offer relevant questions without "conclusive" answers. They are, moreover, inviting the reader to bear in mind that some important aspects of this debate are not addressed and that the book is not like a fly caught forever in amber but a live and dynamic document designed to promote critique and debate. In this respect, while it is improbable that a Palestinian framework for national security is likely to emerge in the near future, the authors have furnished a document that is Palestinian in nature and not determined by foreign governments who intervene at will to undermine the Palestinian national project.

The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, edited by M. Hakan Yavuz, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006). 354 pages. $25.00.

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The experience of Turkey's Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party) continues to puzzle domestic and international observers of Turkish politics. Many are surprised to see an Islamist party emerging as the strongest defender of Turkish membership in the EU in the context of a political culture that is increasingly dominated by nationalist and anti-globalization forces. What explains AKP's pro-EU, pro-market and pro-globalization stances? Does the party demonstrate an unprecedented level of pragmatism in order to implement a hidden Islamist agenda? Or is what underlies the AKP phenomenon a genuine sociopolitical transformation of Turkish society? Alternatively, is the cause of the difficulty to locate the AKP phenomenon caused by the conceptual tools of the modernization school that expects certain behavioral codes from so-called Islamist movements? What conclusions can we derive from the Turkish case that are applicable to other societies in the Muslim world? All these questions, their answers and the surrounding debates are put together here in a single volume, *The Emergence of a New Turkey*. However, inasmuch as any such a study requires a comprehensive historical and sociopolitical background, the analytical scope and depth of the book go beyond the six years of the AKP's existence.

In addition to the editor's informative introduction, the volume brings together thirteen articles dealing with various aspects of the party's ideology, organization, leadership and policies. Contributors include both academics and politicians. Also helpful are the translations of two major speeches by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and his deputy, Foreign Minister and presidential candidate Abdullah Gul, which are included as appendixes. Erdogan discusses the concept of conservative democracy, and Gul talks about the need for democratic reform in the Muslim world. Conservative democracy, which the AKP claims as its official identity, was developed by Erdogan advisor Yalcin Akdogan, who explains the meaning and utility of the concept. According to Akdogan, conservative democracy implies that politics should be based on reconciliation and

tolerance rather than conflict and polarization. It requires the exercise of a limited form of power — as opposed to authoritarianism — and considers popular sovereignty the linchpin of political legitimacy. One is left wondering, however, in what ways conservative democracy as espoused by Akdogan differs from liberal democracy.

This new ideological reconstruction misses an important fact: by accepting conservatism as its defining identity, the AKP is admitting that its social base is located at the opposite pole of the political spectrum from the reformist secularist elites. However, such a picture has never reflected the true social basis and ideological orientation of Turkish political parties. This inaccurate description has become even more problematic in the context of post-Cold War globalization and the EU membership process. It should come as a puzzle to many observers that the AKP's social base, which is supposed to be conservative, favors globalism and integrationism. This indicates a desire for a fundamental restructuring of the system. The secularist establishment, meanwhile, has emerged as nationalist and isolationist conservatives striving to maintain an economic and political system that no longer meets the needs of the society.

Many of the contributors contend that the AKP's rise is to be explained by the socioeconomic transformation that has led to the rapid social mobilization of Anatolian-based political and economic actors. If that is indeed the case, to highlight conservatism instead of reform as the ideology of a party that defends change could be highly misleading. Yavuz's chapter explaining the social and economic roots of the AKP indicates that the current political transformation is an outcome of the neo-liberal economic policies of Turgut Özal (1983-1993). Yavuz stresses the role of political economy in the Islamic political movement in Turkey. The chapters by Sultan Tepe, Massimo Introvigne, Ihsan Dagi, and Ziya Onis together provide a solid conceptual framework for an examination of the broader transformation of the Turkish ideological landscape within which the AKP has emerged. It becomes clear that "conservatism" is at best incomplete to capture the AKP ideology and serves to justify the orientalist discourse — that observant Muslims cannot escape the boundaries of Islamism and moral conservatism in their practice of politics. In this sense, it is also a mistake to compare the AKP with European Christian Democratic parties that are conservative in the true meaning of the concept. As William Hale shows in his chapter, the AKP emerges out of a dynamic change in its society and is an outward-looking political movement, whereas the Christian Democrats demonstrate culturally protectionist reflexes, as indicated by their stance on the issue of Turkey's EU membership.

In her chapter, Edibe Sozen, now one of the vice presidents of the party, discusses the AKP attitude regarding women. According to Sozen, women who join the party have divergent backgrounds and motivations and hence cannot be considered as a single group. But the party often faces criticism that it does not adequately allow political participation by women. However, it should also be stated that participation by headscarf-wearing women is constrained by the application of secularism as jointly enforced by judicial and military bureaucrats. In his chapter, Ahmet Kuru calls this interventionist attitude assertive secularism and compares it with the notion of passive secularism. Kuru attests that the Turkish state is not a monolithic unit and hence state ideology is a contested space as characterized by a conflict over the definition of secularism. Yet, it is not very clear whether the assertive secularism as demonstrated by the Turkish Kemalist elites is secularism in the first place or rather a totalitarian practice of attempting to shape the daily lives of people who subscribe to a specific religious doctrine.

Foreign policy is an important aspect of the AKP's political record, particularly for foreign observers. The AKP is largely praised for its push for EU membership in the face of strong resistance even from secularist intellectual and political elites. On another front, the political tenure of the party coincided with the ongoing Iraq War, leading to a tension in U.S.-Turkish relations. While the volume does not include a chapter devoted to EU membership, Saban Kardas provides a

succinct examination of the dynamics operating within the AKP-led government during the 2003 Iraq War. His analysis refutes the structuralist account, which under-theorizes domestic politics. As shown by the author, not only other significant stake holders — the military, the president and opposition parties — but also divisions within the party affected Turkish decisions during the Iraq War. In another chapter on foreign policy, Burhanettin Duran examines the interactions among domestic and international factors in shaping Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government. Duran believes that the EU membership process has had a transformative impact on Turkish foreign policy's orientation, particularly in regard to the Middle East. Both Kardas and Duran credit the influence of Erdogan's chief adviser, Ahmet Davutoglu, for AKP's proactive and multidimensional foreign policy.

Overall *The Emergence of a New Turkey* is a timely volume that will serve not only as helpful reading in graduate and undergraduate courses on Turkish politics, but also a case study for the theoretical question of the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

Prison Writings: The Roots of Civilisation, by Abdullah Ocalan. Translated by Klaus Happel. Pluto Press, 2007. 320 pages, with notes, bibliography, and index. $40.00, hardcover.

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For almost a quarter century, Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan led the Kurdistan Workers party (known universally by its Kurdish initials, PKK) and its predecessors in a guerrilla war against Turkey that resulted in some 37,000 deaths (the great majority being Kurdish), 3 million displaced persons, and 3,000 destroyed villages. He eventually lost the military struggle and was captured after escaping to Europe, where he tried unsuccessfully to begin negotiations for peace. He was condemned to death by a Turkish court, which later commuted the sentence to life imprisonment as part of Turkey's EU candidacy. Given the new-found pride and determination of many ethnic Kurds in Turkey, however, Ocalan and his call for democratization to solve the Kurdish problem may yet win the final political victory.

The present volume follows upon an earlier one (*Declaration on the Democratic Solution of the Kurdish Question*) written during his original trial in 1999; surprisingly, it contains little on the Kurds. However, it does contain much Marxist analysis on political, social, economic and religious developments in the Middle East from ancient Sumerian times to the present. A projected second volume will follow and deal more specifically with the Kurds.

The book is divided into five parts, the first of which surveys ancient body politics from Sumer to Rome. Ocalan states that "the earliest state-based society and the oldest written sources of human history can be found in Lower Mesopotamia and can be accredited to the Sumerians" (p. 5). He also argues that "the mythological fabrications of the Sumerians, their rituals and practices of worship, constituted the oil that fuelled and kept the machinery of social institutions, both in sub- and super-structure, running smoothly" (p. 15). This pattern largely replicates itself in the base and super-structure of all subsequent polities and illustrates the importance of the institutionalization of religion in creating a patriarchal political order to which the individual was completely subordinated.

In his second part, Ocalan examines medieval Europe and the Middle East as well as the impact of Christianity and Islam. He concludes that the former has been more supportive of progress and modernity: "The Christian religion . . . played quite a positive role in the intellectual and structural

development of the European nations" (p. 172). Although Islam at first opened with an era of progressive achievements, dogmatism and fatalism stifled further development. This, of course, was not an uncommon view of many modernist leaders in the Middle East including Kemal Ataturk and Gamal Abdul Nasser. The Ottoman Empire "only had to guard the cultural graveyard" (p. 174) — in other words, the Middle East already was declining relative to the West during Ottoman times.

In contrast, the European Renaissance and the development of capitalism propelled the West forward by emphasizing the importance of the individual, secular thought, new modes of production, scientific progress, and new forms of political organization such as democracy and the nation-state. "The East, in particular the Middle East, has been in a defensive position ever since" (p. 110). Ocalan deals with these developments in the third part of the book. He also points out more negative traits of the West such as the continuance of state-based male domination as well as the imperialist grafting of European traits onto the rest of the world. The original promise of "unsuccessful real socialism [communism]" (p. 286) failed to provide a solution to these problems, and with its collapse democracy became the main form of government because it enabled individuals to seek freedom nonviolently.

In part four, Ocalan contemplates the contemporary international situation and its future, arguing that the Middle East should adopt such modern European achievements as individual rights, secular thought and politics, and pluralism. However, the Middle East remains the principal region that dogmatically resists assimilating Western civilization. This situation makes the Middle East ripe for its own renaissance based on its own cultural past.

Democratization is the means to achieve this renaissance, and it constitutes the fifth and final part of Ocalan's book. Female and minority rights can help establish pluralistic, federal body politics, which can offer mechanisms for resolving existing social, religious and ethnic conflicts. Globalization also plays a role in dissolving despotism. Decentralized federations can merge into a democratic Middle East Federation: "Geographic and cultural similarities throughout the region, and shared economic needs and water resources, might form the basis for a democratic federation of the entire region" (p. 287). Civil society is the primary means of furthering these changes. Armed struggle only results in weak, reactionary and autocratic regimes. Organized armed defense, however, is legitimate. The Kurdish question links Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, four of the main states in the Middle East.

Ocalan is long on theory but short on specifics for implementation. Nevertheless, his vision of a modern, democratic, and federal Middle East freed from its reactionary past inspires new hope for a better future. Thus, Ocalan's treatise is impressive not so much for the philosophy of history it espouses, but for the glimpse it conveys of the author: a man stamped as nothing more than a terrorist by Turkey, the United States and the EU and, therefore, unworthy of serious engagement, but who nevertheless is revered by millions to whom he gave a new sense of dignity. It can be read with profit by anyone who seeks to forge a modern secular future of peace and progress for the Middle East built upon the best offered by previous world civilizations. As Ocalan himself writes: "There is no need for a war of civilisations. . . . People in the Middle East should make their barren ground a holy land again and boldly and generously open their hearts to all that exists" (p. 175).

The manner in which Ocalan's treatise was compiled is noteworthy. Apparently, he simply gave handwritten pages to his lawyers or relatives infrequently visiting his cell in the island prison of Imrali. On other occasions, he dictated to the lawyers or had them take notes while he spoke. He had no access to sources and no one with whom to discuss matters. One wonders to what extent the Turkish authorities were aware of what he was doing and permitted it. The translator and editorial team are to be commended for having produced a readable and interesting manuscript. Their joint project ends with more than 10 pages of notes, a short bibliography, and useful index.

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The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims, by Andrew G. Bostom. Foreword by Ibn Warraq. Prometheus Books, 2005. 759 pages, including index. $ 28.00, hardcover.

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Professor of medicine Andrew G. Bostom has compiled in *The Legacy of Jihad* primary and secondary sources on jihad and non-Muslims (a*hl adh-dhimma*) under Islamic rule. Ibn Warraq (a pseudonym) says in his foreword that the author translated from Arabic the works of commentators on Islamic manuscripts. Ibn Warraq stresses that dealing with jihad could turn out to be hard for reasons of political correctness, fear of playing into the hands of racists to the detriment of the West's Muslim minorities, commercial motives, feelings of postcolonial guilt, just plain fear and intellectual terrorism. Bostom oversaw the translations on jihad of secondary sources from French, and he has included Shiite and Sunni, classical and modern works. And Ibn Warraq raises the question why Middle East historians didn't do this job of compiling jihad sources from all periods.

Historians of the Middle East have often researched the doctrine of jihad. Bernard Lewis worked the topic several times. He devoted a chapter in his source book, *A Middle East Mosaic* (Random House, 2000), to "war." Rudolf Peters added a chapter about it to his pioneering *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam* (Wiener, 1996, 2005). Germans have dealt with the topic often. And this is the problem with Bostom's work: it does not reflect the complex history of the subject.

Bostom has put together eight chapters on jihad, starting with a survey of conquests and the imposition of Islamic rule. Then he offers sources from the Quran and Hadith, classical writings by Muslim theologians and jurists, and academic overviews from the last century. Chapters five to eight are devoted to jihad in the seventh to eleventh centuries in different world regions; jihad and slavery; and, finally, Muslim and non-Muslim chronicles of jihad campaigns. Four appendices with sources and a bibliography make this book a compendium. The author's choice of sources magnifies jihad; in fact, Islam appears to be nothing but jihad.

Bostom includes in his book a document from World War I (p. 221), a "1915 Ottoman Fatwa." He says this text is believed to be an excerpt from a fatwa by Shaikh Shawish, titled al-jihad, and that the English translation was provided by the "American Agency and Consulate, Cairo, Egypt, March 10, 1915." Bostom explains that the Jewish community of Alexandria was worried about this pamphlet and handed it over to the Americans in Egypt.

The Shaikh of Islam issued his jihad fatwa on November 11, 1914, in Istanbul. There was no previous fatwa of similar ranking. The text in Bostom's book is a commentary circulated by Abd al-Aziz ash-Shawish in March 1915. It is not a "1915 Ottoman Fatwa." A fatwa would have been written in typical question-and-answer style. Shawish, although educated at al-Azhar University and Dar al-Ulum in Cairo, was in no position to issue an Ottoman fatwa. But he was in the inner circle of the Ottoman war minister, Enver Pasha. Shawish lived until 1914 in Istanbul, then in Berlin, where he worked in the propaganda department of the Foreign Office, which had been founded for one reason only: to incite jihad against the British, French and Russians in their colonial hinterland. What appears in Bostom's book as Islamic jihad text was made in Berlin and Istanbul.

Henry I. Morgenthau (Doubleday, 1918) remembers a similar Arabic document. It was circulated around the same time that the Shaikh of Islam issued his jihad fatwa, after the Ottoman sultan-caliph himself declared jihad in Istanbul on November 11, 1914. Morgenthau's document is broader, but the hard core is the same, especially regarding the little and great jihad, war "by mouth and heart" (hatred of the infidel), and how to wage holy war by three methods: personal deeds with cutting instruments, collective bands to slay infidels (for the Ottomans, this included local Greeks, Armenians and Jews) and jointly by army campaigns.

Berlin had enlisted a dozen foreign nationals like Shawish to spread millions of jihad pamphlets in the languages of Islam throughout Africa and Asia, where they were to be read to Muslims in mosques. Morgenthau, the U.S. ambassador in Istanbul from 1913 to 1916, reported that a pamphlet, printed in Arabic and distributed secretly, instructed Muslims on how to carry out the 1914 Ottoman fatwa.

In Bostom's case, the interpreter was not familiar with jihad doctrine. He translated the concepts of al-jihad al-asghar and al-jihad al-akbar, which the Prophet Muhammad used, according to tradition, as "lesser war" and "greater war," respectively. Originally, little jihad generally meant the duty to spread Islam by use of arms and the killing of enemies. The great jihad refers to an individual's spiritual struggle with his own soul to overcome base instincts. However, we find in both pamphlets a Turkish redefinition. Now the great jihad is a holy war for the Ottoman Empire, and the little jihad is a holy war in a single country beyond it.

The pamphlet in Bostom's book is also directed against the Egyptian rulers acting on the advice of the infidel English. Cairo had declared itself neutral in the Sinoussi jihad against the Italians in Tripoli. "This shall never be forgiven them. However," the text continues, "our Egyptian brethren have helped us to a certain degree financially and morally in the last two wars, and in spite of their unbelieving rulers, forwarded their collections on our behalf to the Capital of the Caliphate." This indicates an Ottoman author in Enver Pasha's circle such as Shawish.

A few words on the context of Bostom's document. If one considers Berlin's switch from a peacetime to a wartime policy against the British, French and Russians and their Islamic lands, one sees a jihad made in Germany. It was a concerted German-Ottoman action in five stages: Max von Oppenheim's design to revolutionize Islamic lands; agitation for jihad by the Foreign Office's apparatus in Berlin and Istanbul; the Ottoman fatwa; Shaikh Salih's commentary on the fatwa; and jihad by armies, sending envoys to Islamic lands and distributing pamphlets. It was a new weapon to globalize an ideology of hatred. Let us look briefly into the five elements of the German-designed jihad.

Oppenheim served as an archaeologist and diplomat in the Middle East for 20 years. He suggested to the kaiser in 1898 the advantage to declaring jihad against German enemies via the sultan-caliph. After World War I began, the Germans indeed requested that Enver Pasha proclaim jihad. The kaiser also asked him to enter the war: the sultan should call for jihad in Asia, India, Egypt and Africa. Some scholars even expected "Islamic fanatics fighting for Germany."

Oppenheim, the German "Abu Jihad," designed a 136-page master plan in October 1914: "Revolutionizing the Islamic Territories of Our Enemies." The emperor confirmed his idea to have the sultan-caliph incite Muslims to jihad. This was the plot: The sultan leads a jihad against the British, French and Russians. Berlin delivers money, experts and material. Jihad fighters are Muslims in British India, French North Africa and Russians in Asia.

The call to fight goes out in several languages according to psychological factors. Berlin creates an Oriental News Department in the Foreign Office. Fomenting revolution among Muslims in India is key to victory. Expeditions are to be sent to Karbala (Iraq), Iran and Afghanistan to trigger uprisings. Germans provide intelligence to Muslims, while the Turks incite them against their foreign masters. Islam, concluded Oppenheim, will be "one of our sharpest weapons."

Oppenheim became the head of the Oriental News Department, employing native Muslims and establishing 75 propaganda centers in the Ottoman Empire. Some called his jihad strategy war by revolution, but it was an asymmetrical war waged by incitement to jihad in anti-imperial uprisings. It was a double strategy with the colonial hinterland supporting the front by uniting troops in the wide lands of Islam. Of course, it raised questions. Was the Ottoman sultan the accepted caliph to all Muslims? Was it then permitted to fight on the side of certain infidels against selected infidels and "their" Muslims?

As Oppenheim had suggested, a fatwa answered this. The Shaikh of Islam affirmed this in his jihad fatwa. To summarize: His Majesty the Padishah of Islam orders a jihad as a general mobilization and individual duty for all Muslims according to the Quran. Since Russia, England and France are now hostile to the Islamic caliphate, it is also incumbent upon all Muslims ruled by these governments to proclaim jihad against them and to actually attack them. The protection of the Ottoman Empire depends on all Muslims hastening to partake in the jihad; if some refrain, they are committing a sin and deserve divine wrath. For Muslims of enemy countries, it is forbidden to fight against Islamic troops, even if the enemy forces them. Otherwise they deserve hellfire for murder. It is a great sin for Muslims under the rule of England, France, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro and their allies to fight against Germany and Austria, which are the allies (see details in a book I edited, Germany and the Middle East, Wiener, 2004).

According to this fatwa, the sultan-caliph was the sovereign of all Muslims. It was permitted to fight with infidels against infidels and their Muslims. The latter had not only no right to fight back; they had to turn against their foreign overlords. Enver's confident Shaikh Salih al-Sharif al-Tunisi confirmed this new jihad doctrine. Enver asked him to travel to Berlin to popularize jihad (he did the same with Shawish). For this purpose Shaikh Salih wrote a commentary in November 1914. His haqiqat al-jihad (the truth of jihad) was published soon afterward in Berlin. It was a blueprint for other pamphlets, like the one in Bostom's book. What did it mean? A coalition jihad was possible, on the side of allied infidels or just against certain other infidels. Jihad was now even an individual duty for all Muslims. Peace between Islam and Europe is possible if there is no foreign occupation of Islamic lands.

In the end, the execution of the jihad was disappointing for Oppenheim, although perhaps not for the Ottomans, who turned it against Armenians. The majority of Muslims beyond the Ottoman Empire ignored the jihad, although Germans spent a lot of money for jihad expeditions and propaganda such as the weekly Al-Jihad. Nevertheless, it was not by mere chance that Hasan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after World War I. As Oppenheim's successor concluded, the seeds of Islamic uprisings had been planted. One day there would be an accumulation of people ready to turn against their rulers. It took about 60 years after World War I for the first Islamic revolution to start. Jihad was one of its key concepts.

Returning to Bostom's book, the chain of events goes like this: Oppenheim points the kaiser to the Ottoman jihad potential in 1898. The diplomat draws up the jihad plot in October 1914 as a concerted, but very secret, German-Ottoman action. He works in Berlin and Istanbul and incites jihad even beyond the Ottoman Empire. As planned, the sultan-caliph proclaims a selected jihad, and the Shaikh of Islam legitimizes it in a fatwa in November. Shaikh Salih in his commentary changes the doctrine as a blueprint for pamphlets by Shawish. An American diplomat in Cairo gets a copy, as Morgenthau did in Istanbul. From there it goes to Washington's archives and enters Bostom's book as an "Islamic" source. Here is one reason that Middle East historians rarely arrange source material as Bostom has — history in each period is complex enough. Which scholar feels at home in all periods? Such courage can lead to results that offer texts without context.

Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East. by Valerie Marcel and John V. Mitchell. Brookings Institution Press, 2006. 322 pages. $22.95, paperback; $52.95, hardcover.

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Valerie Marcel's timely book *Oil Titans* brings insight into the culture of five of the more traditional national oil companies (NOCs) from the Middle East and North Africa: Saudi Arabia's Aramco, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the Kuwait Petroleum Company (KPC), the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) and Algeria's Sonatrach.

These five NOCs represent some of the most important producers in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and hold a sizable portion of the world's current and future oil and gas resources. With over 600 billion barrels of oil reserves, or 50 percent of the world's total, they account for 25 percent of current output. While OPEC quotas cap their production, state interference, corruption, cronyism, underinvestment, a reluctance to cooperate with international oil companies (IOCs), and the less-than-optimal application of new technologies have combined to retard the potential of some of the companies in question. Underinvestment during periods of low oil prices is expected, but during the last three years of prices exceeding $50 per barrel, some of these producers have continued to move much too slowly in investing in new fields.

Basing her analysis not on desk work but on interviews with a range of people inside these companies, Ms. Marcel offers a unique approach to educating the reader about the inner workings of what are arguably some of the world's most important oil firms. Between 14 and 36 people were interviewed in each company, including the younger generation and women who were not part of the early decisions to create these national champions.

Ms. Marcel's access was unique but controlled. Those she interviewed were likely to have been vetted by senior management. At the same time, getting people to speak candidly on the record would have been difficult under any circumstances. Since NOC managements were provided summaries of the interviews and given a chance to comment prior to the book's publication, the resulting picture of each of these companies has been shaped by the NOCs themselves. A more complete picture could have been drawn if existing and former employees had been asked to comment anonymously and if IOCs had offered off-the-record, unattributed views on what they see as the pluses and minuses of these NOCs.

In the end, the book is more academic than analytical. It doesn't provide a complete picture of the challenges these companies face. Rather it reflects on the backgrounds of these companies and addresses selective issues raised by those interviewed.

Ms. Marcel helps us to understand how the formation of Aramco from the Arabian-American Oil Company occurred. It was a slow process that ended in 1988 with the creation of Saudi Aramco. Foreign managers have always had a role in building the company and maintaining it, and the legacy of U.S. influence remains. Aramco has considerable operational autonomy from the state and has managed to keep a monopoly on oil production, fending off a challenge in 1998 to open the sector to IOCs. IOCs eventually had to settle for the gas sector's opening earlier in this decade. Over the last three years, Aramco has had to defend itself against accusations, most notably by Houston investment banker Matt Simmons, that it was overestimating its oil reserves and future production capacity. The debate has forced Aramco to adopt greater transparency with respect to field data and production plans.

Algeria expropriated IOC assets more swiftly and with greater hostility, following a bitter war of independence from France. Sonatrach was created in 1963, a year after Algeria negotiated indepen-

dence. Today, its oil reserves are limited, and its future lies more with gas. Like Aramco, Sonatrach has considerable operational autonomy from the state. It overcame its historical antipathy toward France to rely on French companies along with a wide range of other IOCs to develop both its oil assets and what is arguably one of the world's most advanced gas industries, a source of both pipeline and LNG supplies to Europe and elsewhere. Still, what troubles Sonatrach is its lack of attention to exploration. Ms. Marcel's interviews revealed that only 40 percent of the country has been explored, and that 70-80 percent of oil discoveries were made prior to nationalization. NOCs generally — and Sonatrach is no exception — are reluctant to risk funds on exploration and do not offer adequate enticements for IOCs to meet this challenge either.

NIOC was formed in a hotly nationalistic and competitive environment, with the overthrow of the shah in 1979 exerting a profound effect. Its roots in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have continued to hinder its ability to deal rationally with foreign oil companies and left it with a deep mistrust of UK companies, in particular, British Petroleum. It is more xenophobic and doggedly self-reliant than any of the other NOCs in this group, stemming from the Iranian regime's isolation by the United States. Battered by more than a decade of U.S. sanctions and suffering from many decades of oil-and-gas-sector mismanagement, NIOC has been unable to raise production and could soon see a drop in its output. To reverse this trend, NIOC needs access to Western oil-field management techniques and to technology for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) for its existing old fields. It also needs LNG technology to create a modern gas-export industry. As in Kuwait, NIOC's activities are ring-fenced by the parliament, which has limited the company's maneuvering room and hindered commercial relations with IOCs. As tensions grow between Iran and the United States and Iran's Arab neighbors in the Gulf, NIOC's problems are likely to multiply. Among the five NOCs that Marcel studied, it is the most vulnerable to internal and external political pressures and has been held back the most because it has not dealt more extensively with IOCs.

KPC's history is also steeped in British intrigues, with the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) tied in the past to BP. Kuwait nationalized its industry abruptly in 1975. While it never had the level of hostility to UK interests that Iran has exhibited, the Kuwaiti parliament has blocked serious foreign involvement of any kind in the country's oil and gas sectors. KPC today is still marked by the trauma of the 1991 Gulf War, which some allege was brought on by overproduction of oil by KPC. Until the recent removal of Saddam, Kuwait feared a second invasion. The 1991 war led to an exodus of Palestinian and Algerian mid-level managers and engineers that has left an enduring skills gap. It also left a legacy of mistrust by society of the government. The subsequent friction between parliament and KPC has tied the hands of the NOC and bred resentment by KPC managers and staff toward the parliament's interference in their decision-making processes.

In Algeria and Abu Dhabi, IOCs have access to equity reserves, and NOC-IOC relations are much smoother. Abu Dhabi doesn't share the mistrust of IOCs reflected to varying degrees in the other countries. Abu Dhabi's oil industry was never fully nationalized; IOCs have worked with ADNOC extensively. ADNOC has mastered the development of its resources through partnerships that bring together several foreign companies in each project, providing what ADNOC sees as best practices, which do not limit it to the input of just one company. Its strategy of diversifying foreign partners seems to have paid off, as it has moved forward as both a significant oil producer and an important LNG exporter. Unfortunately, like Kuwait, it suffers from a shortage of locals to fill mid-level management slots. The expected retirement in the near term of managers from the Indian subcontinent will leave a vacuum at the top. In both Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, the new generation is said to be driven more by ambition and a desire to make money than by work. Often young people want to be installed as CEOs without taking the necessary steps to reach that level.

The book does reveal the culture of these companies and explain their historical backgrounds, offering insights on why they are what they are today. These aspects are well researched and laid

out. Anyone who deals with these or any NOC today needs to understand their histories and backgrounds. Ms. Marcel's aim is not to delve into controversial issues and question marks; the work is more descriptive than critical or prescriptive. What she describes is a culture of long-term thinking by these NOCs, which fail to see the need to act now on some of their serious shortcomings. While IOCs are usually accused of short-term thinking, NOCs are not prepared for major short-term changes. Many are not developing the necessary competence.

The role of NOCs, as described by Ms. Marcel, is to be guardians of their nations' resources, but this has its dangers. NOCs are not proactive and don't adequately address the immediate needs of developing their oil and gas industries. Tensions arise between the business sense of some NOC managers and the state and its ministries. The NOCs often have opportunities but lack funding. Among the five examined in Ms. Marcel's book, Aramco is the least burdened by these concerns.

Ms. Marcel has succeeded in identifying some of the different drivers among the generations within these NOCs and what is holding the companies back from progressing more efficiently. She provides a useful handbook for understanding five of the world's most important national oil companies.