

BOOK REVIEWS

Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy, by Andrew Cockburn.
Scribner, 2007. 247 pages. \$25.00, hardcover.

Jeffrey Record, professor of strategy, Air War College (his views are entirely his own)

On a visit to Iraq in December 2004, the secretary of defense was confronted by a national guardsman who wanted to know why the Pentagon had not provided sufficient body and vehicular armor against the insurgent enemy's lethal so-called improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that were shredding American road patrols and convoys. The secretary replied with typically dismissive arrogance: "As you know," he said, "you go to war with the army that you have, ...not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time."

The same can be said for secretaries of defense. In March 2003, the United States went to war in Iraq with Donald Rumsfeld, a chief architect of the most calamitous misapplication of U.S. military power since the debacle of Vietnam and now the most despised secretary of defense since Robert S. McNamara. Indeed, by the fall of 2006, Rumsfeld had become the favorite whipping boy for neoconservative pundits and congressional war hawks, who remained convinced that the decision to invade an ancient Arab heartland to overthrow an already castrated Baathist regime in Baghdad was a good idea. But for the incompetence of Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith and L. Paul Bremer, so the argument still goes, the American gamble in Iraq could have established a stable democratic U.S. client state worthy of the neoconservatives' pre-war strategic hallucinations.

President George W. Bush reluctantly fired Rumsfeld in November 2006 because the secretary had become an intolerable political liability — a lightning rod for a situation in Iraq that even Bush conceded was unacceptable. The man that Richard Nixon regarded in the early 1970s as "a ruthless little bastard" had become not only a symbol of a botched war but also the primary target in an escalating civil-military struggle to assign blame for the American mess in Iraq. And it is this struggle that provides the context for assessing Andrew Cockburn's *Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy*. The book's very subtitle and jacket cover (featuring a scowling Rumsfeld) deny any possibility of favorable treatment, and with good reason: the unpleasant former presidential aspirant proved to be as ignorant and incompetent in Iraq as McNamara, a technocrat with no political ambitions, was in Vietnam. Both men were also arrogant, abrasive, dictatorial and supremely contemptuous of professional military advice. In the case of Rumsfeld, this extended to provoking in March-April 2006 an eruption of public denunciations of him and his war policies by no fewer than six retired Army and Marine Corps generals who were obviously speaking for many of their fellow officers still on active duty.

Cockburn traces Rumsfeld's professional career from his arrival in Washington in 1962 as a 30-year-old congressman from an affluent Chicago district to his fall from Cabinet office 44 years later. It was an in-and-out-of-government career of pitiless bureaucratic cunning driven by unprincipled presidential ambitions that in the end left him with few allies. It was Rumsfeld, as President Gerald Ford's chief of staff, who engineered the 1976 "Halloween massacre" in which the White House fired CIA Director William Colby and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, dropped Vice President Nelson Rockefeller from the 1976 ticket, and stripped Henry Kissinger of his post as national security adviser. Not only did Rumsfeld have himself nominated to replace Schlesinger; he

also engineered the banishment of presidential wannabe George H.W. Bush to the political wilderness of CIA director as well as the elevation of Rumsfeld's (then) flunky, Dick Cheney, to White House chief of staff. In so doing Rumsfeld incurred the everlasting hatred of the elder Bush and the occasional loyalty of Cheney, who, as the Reagan years drew to a close, supported Bush's, not Rumsfeld's, bid for the White House (the Rumsfeld-Cheney relationship was one of considerable tension). It took the election to the White House of the son of the father who hated Rumsfeld to pave the way for Rumsfeld's return as secretary of defense. One wonders whether his selection was a calculated act of defiance on the part of Bush 43 in his difficult relationship with Bush 41.

History will not be kind to Rumsfeld as secretary of defense. The bill of indictment includes his multiple failures in Iraq, most notoriously an insistence on an invasion force too small to seize control of the country, his gratuitous intimidation and humiliation of military professionals, his bureaucratic megalomania, and his skill at side-stepping responsibility for bad decisions. Above all was his addiction to perfecting U.S. conventional military supremacy at the expense of preparing for the politically messy, low-tech irregular wars that have dominated the post-Soviet world and occasioned the only failed American military interventions: Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia and now, most probably, Iraq. In Rumsfeld's defense, however, it must be acknowledged that no single individual can be held responsible for a policy disaster of Iraq's magnitude. Iraq was a group effort. President George W. Bush is, after all, the administration's senior "decider," and Dick Cheney, the most influential vice president in history, has established a record of judgment on Iraq even worse than Rumsfeld's.

Nor does the military get a free pass. With few exceptions, those in charge went along with a Rumsfeld-dictated war plan they knew to be dangerously flawed and then went on to bungle a counterinsurgent war for which they were completely unprepared. Cockburn pulls no punches:

The generals, who had accepted [Rumsfeld's] vision of the invasion without demur, ensured the failure of the occupation through lapses both moral, tolerating the routine abuse of prisoners, and tactical, such as running pointless "presence" patrols that chiefly served as effective IED magnets. Faced with the consequences of their actions, however, the military could always point to the defense secretary's original withholding of troops as an excuse for everything that had subsequently gone wrong.

Even the one senior officer who did resign (albeit quietly) in opposition to the war, Lieutenant General Greg Newbold, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, later confessed, "I should have had the gumption to confront [Rumsfeld]. The right thing to do was to confront, and I didn't. It's something I'll have to live with for a long time." Newbold in fact believes that "if the military had said, 'we won't be part of this,' then it wouldn't have been." (One hopes the example of Iraq will encourage the military leadership to summon the gumption to oppose those pushing for war with Iran. Rumsfeld may be gone, but his chief political legacy, Dick Cheney, remains the second-most powerful man in Washington.)

Cockburn's *Rumsfeld* does not pretend to be objective, but it is an important artifact in the raging historiography of a foreign-policy wreck still in progress. It gives no quarter, but neither did its subject. Rumsfeld brought this book on himself.

Out of Iraq: A Practical Plan for Withdrawal Now, George McGovern and William R. Polk. Simon and Schuster 2006. 142 pp. with index. \$15.00.

Marc Lynch, professor of political science, Williams College

Out of Iraq presents an impassioned appeal for a rapid American withdrawal from that tortured country. Written by the eminent historian William Polk and former Democratic senator and presidential candidate George McGovern, this short book promises a “practical plan for withdrawal.” While *Out of Iraq* offers little analysis of the current state of Iraqi politics, few effective projections of the likely impact of an American withdrawal on Iraq or the region, and a fairly impractical plan for withdrawal, it is nevertheless important. *Out of Iraq* captures the moment when dissatisfaction with the war among Americans went mainstream, crystallizing the despair over a crushing entanglement with no evident end.

Out of Iraq is a cry from the heart by two eminent Americans sickened by what they see as the Bush administration’s obstinate pursuit of a horrifically failed policy. It is no accident that the very first page begins with a recitation of the numbers of American, and the uncounted numbers of Iraqis, killed and wounded since the American invasion. Their analysis is as simple as it is devastating: America’s presence in Iraq inspires more violence and chaos than it does security, and America’s departure is an essential precondition for ending the turmoil. Worse, Iraq is corrupting the soul of American democracy, draining its moral standing and credibility, just as it does its overstretched military. Since the war cannot now be won, “The high costs have all been for naught..., the war has been a terrible and useless waste” (p. xiv). The only question worth asking, they suggest, is how to get out.

Little in *Out of Iraq* will be unfamiliar to regular readers of left-leaning blogs. It reviews the deceptions and misinformation that have dominated American discourse about Iraq, running quickly through the Bush administration’s misleading rhetoric from the first motions towards Iraq until today. It highlights the economic costs of the war, relying on an estimate by Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Blimes of ultimate costs exceeding \$1 trillion, while laying out the even greater moral costs of torture, occupation and the erosion of the rule of law. Polk offers some historical perspective, avoiding the tendency in some places to blame all of Iraq’s problems on Bush. The book presents with brutal honesty the horrific consequences of the sanctions regime of the 1990s, tracing many of today’s problems to the social and political degradation of that era. But this is not a book to be judged by its scholarly contributions: *Out of Iraq* is a political document, aimed clearly at inspiring a Democratic party that the authors lambaste for failing to offer a clear alternative (p. 15).

By simply ignoring or shredding central points of Washington’s oddly sheltered discourse, McGovern and Polk point towards some fundamental truths. While withdrawal will be painful, they write, “damage is inevitable, no matter if we stay or leave.... When a driver is on the wrong road and heading for the abyss, ‘staying the course’ is a bad idea” (pp. 98-99). Well-turned phrases in the book — “changing a misguided course would not... be a sign of weakness that would encourage our enemies and dishearten our friends; rather it would be a sign of strength and good sense” (p. xv) — will likely be repeated many times in the intense months of political battle to come.

Still, the very virtues of *Out of Iraq* — its clarity, its passion, its moral compass and above all the growing traction of its arguments — make it potentially dangerous as a guide to action. For all the book’s passion, its analysis of today’s Iraqi politics is painfully thin, offering little of the texture or complexity of today’s Iraq. In its urgency to put forward a strong case for withdrawal, it often skims over very real risks, relying on wishful thinking to smooth over difficult patches: Iraq will remain united because most Iraqis understand that anything else would be worse (p. 33) and so on.

Their greatest blind spot about Iraq is the reality of spiraling sectarian violence, which has dynamics very different from those of the anti-occupation insurgency. Much of their plan rests on the hopeful assumption that “when we withdraw, we will remove a major cause of the insurgency” (p. 99). They may be right that the inflammatory American presence generates more violence than it prevents, but set against this must be the horrific prospect of a full-scale sectarian slaughter as the American troops depart. The authors heroically assume that America’s departure will lead the insurgency to lay down its arms, its mission accomplished, rather than triggering a chaotic scramble for power between the armed and dangerous factions. But insurgency and civil war have different dynamics that point to different solutions. Could America really stand by and watch Iraq collapse into a bloody hell on live television as its troops depart? Here McGovern and Polk are coldly fatalistic: “We are as powerless to prevent the turmoil that will happen when we withdraw as we have been to stop the insurgency” (p. 99).

In stark contrast to the administration’s repeated dire warnings of an al-Qaeda seizure of Iraq and its oil fields, McGovern and Polk hardly mention al-Qaeda at all. On this level, they are surely the more realistic. No serious military analyst believes that al-Qaeda could seize power over Shia-dominated Iraq and its oil fields, even if it manages to overcome high odds and sustain a hard-bitten emirate in Anbar Province. An al-Qaeda takeover of Iraq is a phantom menace, and McGovern and Polk do well to simply ignore the administration’s provocations. They might also have pointed out that America’s presence has not prevented the establishment of precisely the “Iraqi Islamic State” that its withdrawal would ostensibly permit. Taking a wider view, they correctly note that “Iraq has become the primary recruiting and training ground” for al-Qaeda (p. 96).

Out of Iraq is particularly good at comparing the costs of staying and leaving. Too often, nightmarish scenarios of a post-American Iraq are juxtaposed with an overly rosy depiction of current reality. While McGovern and Polk go too far in the other direction, minimizing the likely costs of withdrawal and maximizing the current costs, they are right to force a direct confrontation between the competing calculations. They effectively argue that “the longer we delay in facing realities, the higher those costs will clearly be” (p. 92). Rather than waiting for the project to collapse in utter failure, better for the United States to leave on its own terms, “in an orderly way, on a reasonable schedule, and in a manner which will prevent further damage to American interests” (p. 97).

Unfortunately, the book does not offer the practical plan for withdrawal promised in the title. Its wish list of foreign peacekeepers, a rapidly trained Iraqi police force (to be accomplished with \$1 billion! [p. 102]), and generous reconstruction assistance, along with an American apology and reparations to Iraqi civilians (p. 113), will surely remain nothing more than fantasy. The ferocity of sectarian warfare today renders absurd their repeatedly expressed expectation that an American departure would lead to a rapid decline in violence. Finally, larger questions are skirted. It is not clear whether withdrawal really means redeployment, to Kurdistan or to Gulf bases, or a more far-reaching reduction in America’s presence in the region. Nor is it clear how this withdrawal fits into wider regional concerns, such as Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an area the Iraq Study Group, for all its flaws, dealt with much more effectively.

The real importance of McGovern and Polk’s short book has been to offer an alternative framing of the choices facing America in Iraq from those found in either the careful calls for regional diplomacy and redeployment of the Baker-Hamilton Commission’s report or the president’s wildly unpopular and almost certainly doomed choice to instead “surge” tens of thousands of additional American troops into Iraq. The once heretical idea of a rapid American withdrawal has now moved to the center of American politics. Withdrawal gets ever-more support in public-opinion polls and has been endorsed by Democratic presidential candidate John Edwards, while both houses of Congress passed a bill containing the (unenforceable) demand for a 2008 departure date. Detailed

proposals for a withdrawal are popping up everywhere from *The Nation* (Juan Cole) to the Council on Foreign Relations (Steven Simon) to MIT's Security Studies program (Barry Posen). Clearly, a sea change has taken place in American politics on the question of Iraq. *Out of Iraq* may one day be read as a key crystallization of this moment.

What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat, by Louise Richardson. Random House, 2006. 312 pages. \$25.95, hardcover.

Mia Bloom, author of Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror

Admittedly this reviewer approached *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat* with more than a healthy dose of skepticism. I was immediately turned off by the way in which Louise Richardson, executive dean at the Radcliff Center at Harvard, begins her book by unbelievably alleging an absence of good books on terrorism or, as she says, the one definitive book on the subject. Her audacity in claiming to fill a void already occupied by the likes of Bruce Hoffman and Martha Crenshaw is at best rather surprising, and at worst, displays an ignorance for an increasingly well-developed field of study.

The author begins her book on a personal note. Her discussion of how she was "almost recruited" by a terrorist organization in Ireland comes across as superficial and unconvincing, and to some, could be perceived as rather offensive. According to most experts, the process of recruitment and radicalization is gradual, fairly lengthy and quite complex, and being Irish in itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for recruitment to the Irish terrorist movements. Statements such as "I was fourteen, and if the IRA would have had me I'd have joined in a heartbeat" (p.xiv) come across as a literary ploy to convince readers of her nonexistent *bona fides* as a terrorism expert or as someone who conducts primary research in this field. Unfortunately, neither claim (implicit or otherwise) is borne out by what is to follow.

Beyond such claims of "almost was a terrorist" and the oddness of claiming originality and authenticity, the book suffers from a variety of other shortcomings. Richardson's superficial and disorganized treatment in *What Terrorists Want* has little to contribute to our understanding of the subject. Unlike research developed after decades of study of the phenomenon (along the lines of the works by Martha Crenshaw, Bruce Hoffman or David Rapoport, or as a result of years of first hand experience combating terrorism from an insider's perspective (e.g. of Michael Scheuer, Richard Clarke, or Daniel Byman) or even books based on personal interviews and actual field research (such as those by John Horgan, Yoram Schweitzer, or Jessica Stern) this book offers very little for the informed reader. Primarily it draws on secondary sources already published by many of the authors listed above.

The book skips temporally from one decade to the next, from one case to the next, and blends different kinds of cases of state terror, nationalist groups which employ violence, and groups engaged in suicide terror without any understanding of the distinctive environments in which each develop.

Professor Richardson's claims to original research are misleading, though she does assert to have interviewed as many terrorists as would talk to her. All of the interviews cited in the book were aired on TV, posted on websites, or conducted by others. Not one original interview (not even of the Irish groups who allegedly tried to recruit her) is listed within the copious footnotes.

The book itself repeats many oft cited claims to understand the underlying rational motivations (practically nobody in the field still consider the terrorists "crazies," pp. 14, 69, 117) and the point is hardly worth laboriously stating yet again, to approach counter terrorism measures using

soft power tactics (winning hearts and minds of the population), and to blame the war in Iraq for many of the problems in fighting terrorists today. All of this by now has been said time and time again.

The standard history of terrorism from below and above in Chapter Two has been produced three times in recent books on the subject (indeed, one from the very same publisher as Richardson's book, and written by Robert A. Pape). Unfortunately, there is nothing new or even slightly different here. Discussions of terrorist motivation at the individual, organizational, societal, and state sponsorship levels have been explored more comprehensively in a half a dozen books elsewhere and more convincingly to boot.

Subsequent chapters do not improve on this. The superficial discussion of religious terrorism in Chapter Four indicates a lack of understanding of the complex history and dynamics of Islam or the changes over time in Islamic ideology regarding the use of violence.

As I labored through the chapters, everything sounded so familiar until I realized that anyone who has read even a handful of books on the subject of terrorism will know all of this already. This raises the question: which audience is this book written for? Certainly not anyone who has the slightest knowledge of the subject matter since there is literally nothing new. Only someone with the most cursory knowledge about terrorism will benefit from this book.

Given the sheer volume of books on the subject of terrorism, one should steer clear of such superficial treatments and read work based either on original research or first hand experience. *What Terrorists Want* provides neither. The novice reader would be advised to seek out the ultimately more informative and authoritative *Inside Terrorism second Edition* by Bruce Hoffman.

Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today, by Marc Lynch. Columbia University Press, 2006. 252 pages. \$19.36.

Joana Odencrantz, political science department, University of Utah

Can an Arab public sphere meaningfully be said to exist? If so, how is this sphere relevant in the absence of institutional mechanisms to meaningfully translate its preferences into outcomes? Marc Lynch argues in *Voices of the New Arab Public* that not only does an Arab public sphere exist, it is changing Arab political culture. Lynch further argues that this public sphere has introduced a new level of official accountability into a region marked by an absence of the democratic institutions that transform public preferences into policy outcomes and render public officials answerable to the public that elected them.

Lynch draws upon an extensive database of some of the most important talk shows aired by Al-Jazeera as well as thousands of opinion essays in Arab newspapers to reveal how the Arab critical debate over Iraq initiated a meaningful discursive pluralism. Satellite TV and the Internet have shattered state control over information and challenged the official claim to enforce a public consensus. Lynch argues that the legitimacy of challenging official pronouncements and the expectation of disagreement have introduced pluralism into the Arab political sphere. This is vital to any kind of meaningful pluralist politics. Although democratic institutions are absent in the Arab world, the Arab public sphere has initiated a certain accountability into Arab politics. Arab states find it increasingly difficult to set themselves apart from regional political developments as the Arab public sphere sets events and issues side by side. Lynch demonstrates this limited accountability through Arab states' flouting of the Anglo-American-led sanctions regime on Iraq. The apparent Arab transnational public consensus against sanctions produced a cascade effect wherein Arab regimes quickly changed their behavior to support the perceived normative Arabist consensus.

Lynch's book has particular salience for American officials critical of the Arab media. While the Arab media posed a challenge to American efforts to control information, many American critics simply failed to understand war coverage contextualized by an Arab public sphere and informed by Arab rather than American perceptions. Lynch asserts that a significant gap developed between American and Arab journalists as a result of differential access to events. While admitting that Arab reporters sometimes indulged in emotionalism, Lynch points out that they investigated the impact of the war by moving through the Iraqi streets. American journalists were embedded with military units. The difference in American and Arab coverage is less a result of supposed Arab bias than the result of covering the war from two different perspectives — that of the invader and that of the invaded. The two different realities that were reported stimulated further official American criticism that the Arab press excessively stressed Iraqi civilian casualties without simultaneously addressing Saddam Hussein's tyranny and atrocities. As Lynch makes clear in his book, Iraq was for a decade a touchstone of Arab identity politics and political argument. The Arab public sphere did not perceive a need to replay ten years worth of intra-Arab debate for American consumption. While Iraqis later took the Arab public sphere to task for failing to emphasize Saddam's tyranny and brutality, American criticisms simply seem petulant and uninformed.

The new Arab public sphere could degenerate into an arena for identity-driven discourse under the incipient tyranny of the majority, or it could provide the underpinnings of a more liberal and pluralist politics. Lynch posits that this crossroads has been reached. In this context, Lynch weaves in his oft-repeated argument that, if the United States truly wants to see democracy in the Arab Middle East, it must engage with this public sphere and not try to sidestep it. It is critical and suspicious of American policy. Democracy will not lead to attitudes that are more pro-American, as neoconservatives seem to think, but will provide a forum for dialogue and interaction.

Marc Lynch's current book is a worthwhile read for academics and policy makers alike. It is particularly relevant to American officials, who seem to entirely misunderstand the liberalization potential of a contentious and highly critical Arab public sphere. For academics, Lynch provides an intriguing examination of how a public sphere can exist and demand accountability in the absence of participatory institutions. The question of how far a public sphere can take Arabs into the realm of pluralism, absent institutions, is an appropriate one — one that Lynch not only asks but perceives as essential to the future of Arab politics today.

The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977, by Gershom Gorenberg. Henry Holt and Company, 2006. 454 pages. \$30.00, hard-cover.

Michael Rubner, professor emeritus, International Relations, James Madison College, Michigan State University

On May 7, 2006, approximately 700 Israeli policemen, backed by 1,000 soldiers, dragged dozens of Jewish settlers out of a three-story, Palestinian-owned building in Hebron. The eviction of the squatters from the home near the Tomb of the Patriarchs, a shrine holy to Muslims and Jews, was ordered by Israel's Supreme Court. It ended in a bloody confrontation in which 19 officers and seven settlers were injured (*Naples Daily News*, May 8, 2006, p. 14A). The violent clashes pitting Jew against Jew in Hebron constitute the latest chapter in a drama that began in the fateful weeks following Israel's conquest of the Sinai, Gaza Strip, West Bank and Golan Heights in the aftermath of the June 1967 War. In *The Accidental Empire*, Gershom Gorenberg, an American-born Israeli journalist and former associate editor of *The Jerusalem Report*, lays bare in painstaking, yet highly

informative, detail the origins and evolution of Israel's settlement enterprise in the conquered territories during the first decade of occupation.

Drawing on archival research, extensive interviews with scores of Israeli officials, and first-hand accounts of settlers in the West Bank and Golan Heights, Gorenberg notes that even prior to the 1967 War, at least some Israelis on both the religious Right and socialist Left had not reconciled themselves to the 1949 Armistice lines, longing instead for a Greater Israel that would encompass the entire West Bank. On the Left, leaders of the *Ahdut Ha'avodah* (Unity of Labor) party, most notably Yitzhak Tabenkin and Yigal Allon, envisioned a contiguous socialist state stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River on the east. On the Right, the survivors and their children from three Orthodox kibbutzim, collectively known as *Gush Etzion* (Etzion Bloc), gathered each year on Mt. Herzl, vowing to return to the settlements 10 miles south of Jerusalem that were destroyed and taken over by the Arabs in May 1948.

Israel's swift and decisive victory over Egypt, Jordan and Syria in June 1967 made it possible for determined activists on both extremes of the political spectrum to translate such grandiose dreams into reality. However, the circumstances surrounding the eventual creation of settlements and the motivations that impelled Israeli Jews to strike roots beyond the so-called Green Line varied with respect to each of the territories that were captured in the June war. The overwhelming majority of those who settled in the West Bank during the first decade of occupation were Orthodox Jews, religious fundamentalists who, in the words of Amos Elon, were "obsessed with God's promise to Abraham in the Bronze Age or with the messianic promise — or perhaps with both" (*The New York Review of Books*, June 22, 2006, p. 58). According to Gorenberg, the persistent deadlock within the government of national unity over the disposition of the West Bank enabled religious zealots to take matters into their own hands by staking claims to various tracts of land in what they referred to as Judea and Samaria.

The peculiar pattern of decision making surrounding Israel's settlement enterprise in the West Bank initially became evident a few weeks after the end of the war, when a group of religious activists sought permission from Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to resettle the Etzion Bloc. Personifying the paralysis within the government that resulted from the refusal of the doves to annex the conquered land, and the opposition of the more hawkish ministers to return to the pre-war armistice lines, Eshkol simply announced to the cabinet that a military outpost would be established in the Etzion Bloc and that the reclaimed area would be connected to Israel proper by a corridor. Within a few months, this and two adjacent military posts were transformed into civilian settlements on the sites of the original communes that fell in 1948.

In a similar vein, the impetus for the Jewish return to city of Hebron came from a group of religious activists, led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger, who undertook an intensive lobbying campaign to reestablish a Jewish presence in a city inhabited by some 160,000 Palestinians. In response to such pressure, Labor Minister Yigal Allon submitted to the cabinet in mid-January 1968 a proposal for building a Jewish neighborhood near Hebron. With the government unwilling and unable to take action, Levinger and his zealot followers decided to take matters into their own hands, create "facts on the ground," and present the government with a *fait accompli*.

In mid-April 1968, on the eve of Passover, Levinger and a group of some 100 of his guests moved into the Park Hotel in Hebron, which they had rented for a period of ten days. Refusing to leave the hotel after the end of the holiday, the squatters were visited and supported by various cabinet members, including Allon, Minister without Portfolio Menachem Begin, and Religious Affairs Minister Zorach Warhaftig. One month later, a ministerial committee authorized Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to move the self-proclaimed pioneers to other lodgings in the city. On May 19, 1968, Levinger and his entourage moved from the hotel to a former British fortress at the edge of the city, and, shortly thereafter, the ministerial panel decided to allow a Jewish neighborhood in the

East side of Hebron and to permit the settlers to open businesses there. The Jewish presence in the city has grown since then to approximately 500 persons. It has been a constant source of friction between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government.

In marked contrast to the West Bank, the first settlers who were attracted to the Golan Heights were predominantly secular Israelis from the United Kibbutz movement, motivated by both an ideological commitment to communal farming and a determination to enhance the country's strategic security. However, the process that culminated in the erection of settlements on the Golan was similar to the pattern that was evident in the West Bank. Without prior government authorization, activists took matters into their own hands and, following the pre-state ethos of the Zionist Left, created their own facts on the ground to gain permanent control over disputed land. Official approval of the *fait accompli* was engineered by political allies of the settlers within the cabinet as a last step.

Thus, approximately five weeks after the end of the June war and less than a month after the cabinet had formally decided to return the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for a full peace treaty, several Israeli settlers arrived on the Golan and established an agricultural "work camp." Several weeks later, the cabinet approved Allon's proposal for the already existing and additional civilian "work camps," ostensibly to help maintain existing orchards on the Heights. Shortly thereafter, the ministers approved the construction of two quasi-military "outposts" at the northern and southern ends of the Heights. By mid-October 1967, these "outposts" had been transformed to civilian communes. By February 1968, 10 such communities had sprouted on the Golan, containing more than 800 Israelis. Officially ratifying the continuously growing Jewish presence on the Heights, Prime Minister Golda Meir, Eshkol's successor, announced in February 1969 that the Golan would remain in Israeli hands. In essence, the bargaining chip was off the table.

Gorenberg notes that, if they were intended to serve as the country's first line of defense, the Golan settlements in particular turned out to be Israel's Maginot Line during the first hours of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Rapidly advancing Syrian tanks required the evacuation of women, children and eventually men from the Golan, as several communities were eventually overrun by enemy armored divisions. Consequently, "one more preconception, the faith in settlements as fortresses, evaporated. Instead, border kibbutzim were another burden on an army holding off collapse."

According to Gorenberg, the impetus for settling the occupied territories was spurred not only by domestic political activists but also by reactions of government officials to real and anticipated threats from external sources. For example, when it approved on September 14, 1970, the establishment of two military outposts in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli cabinet was in all probability motivated by the fear that the American diplomatic initiative known as the Rogers Plan would result in U.S. pressure on Israel to give up the area again, as it did once before in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez War. In a similar vein, the cabinet decision in August 1974 to erect a settlement at Maaleh Adumim, on slopes leading up from Jericho to Jerusalem, coincided with the efforts of then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to broker an interim agreement with Jordan that would have entailed Israeli withdrawal from portions of the West Bank. Likewise, in late November 1975, following the passage of the resolution by the UN General Assembly declaring Zionism a form of racism, the cabinet approved, in an act of defiance, the construction of 30 additional settlements in the subsequent 18 months.

Gorenberg argues that high-level officials in the Johnson and Nixon administrations were distracted by the Vietnam War and hence paid little attention to Israel's creeping annexation of the territories. Although mid-level State Department diplomats did privately warn Israeli officials that the settlements were an obstacle to attaining a just and lasting peace, it was not until March 23, 1976, that William Scranton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, publicly declared in the Security Council that "substantial resettlement of the Israeli civilian population in occupied

territories, including in East Jerusalem, is illegal.” However, the unprecedented verbal rebuke was not matched by punitive action. On the contrary, deeming it "unbalanced," the United States vetoed a resolution that condemned Israel's settlement activity. Instead of leaving the erroneous impression that the United States merely acquiesced in Israel's settlement enterprise, Gorenberg should have noted explicitly that American largesse in the decades following the June 1967 War considerably facilitated the construction of Jewish communities in the occupied territories.

Among the many intriguing revelations strewn throughout the book, two in particular stand out. First, it is apparent that top Israeli government officials were made aware very early on that the construction of civilian settlements in the territories violated international law. On September 14, 1967, Theodor Meron, the legal counsel in the Foreign Ministry and one of Israel's most distinguished legal experts, concluded in a memorandum to Foreign Minister Abba Eban that "civilian settlement in the administered territories contravenes the explicit provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention." Gorenberg suggests that Prime Minister Eshkol, Defense Minister Dayan, and Justice Minister Yaakov Shimshon Shapira were all informed about Meron's legal opinion. Eshkol sought to wiggle around the prohibition of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which explicitly prohibits an occupying power from transferring its civilian population into the area it occupies, by deliberately describing the initial Israeli outposts in the West Bank and Golan Heights as *military* camps or bases. In fact, all of these settlements were very shortly thereafter populated entirely by civilians.

Second, we learn that Shimon Peres, currently Israel's dovish elder statesman, was a staunch advocate of settlements during his tenure as defense minister in the Meir and first Rabin administrations. In July 1974, Peres promised religious activists from *Gush Emunim* (Bloc of the Faithful) that he would try to secure cabinet approval for establishment of a new settlement, Elon Moreh, in an area northeast of Nablus on the West Bank. When the activists moved into the area in defiance of a government ban, Peres refused to level charges against them. In April 1975, when Gush activists set up a so-called "work camp" in the vicinity of a former Jordanian army base northeast of Ramallah, Peres opposed removing the squatters. A month later, Peres justified the exclusive presence of civilians in what became the settlement of Ofrah as a temporary housing area for army employees. It took approximately two additional decades for Peres to realize that the ever-expanding Israeli presence in the West Bank was a major, if not *the* major, obstacle to attaining a just and lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Overall, Gorenberg has produced a very illuminating and insightful historical account of Israel's incremental colonization of the territories during the first decade of occupation. Yet this otherwise outstanding work suffers from several shortcomings, not the least of which is the conspicuous absence of the Palestinians as the victims of the occupation. With the exception of a brief description of the demolition of houses and uprooting of orchards to make room for Jewish settlements in the Rafah Plain in northeast Sinai, Gorenberg says almost nothing about the destructive impact of the settlements on the daily lives of ordinary Palestinians throughout the territories. The author's account also leaves the erroneous impression that Israel's colonization took place primarily on public lands in relatively uninhabited areas. In fact, an Israeli government report that was recently leaked to Peace Now, an Israeli organization that advocates a Palestinian state alongside Israel, indicates that 39 percent of the land on which Jewish settlements had been built was privately owned by Palestinians (*The New York Times*, November 21, 2006, p. 1). Coincidentally, the same report notes that the settlement of Ofrah, which receives a good deal of attention in the book, was constructed on land that was almost entirely owned by Palestinians.

Some of the glaring omissions in *The Accidental Empire* are clearly due to the limited temporal scope of the book. Gorenberg's account ends with the May 1977 election that brought Menachem Begin's Likud into power. At that time, the territories encompassed about 80 settlements with

approximately 11,000 residents. It is estimated that today about one-quarter of a million Israelis live in 125 officially sanctioned settlements in the West Bank. Close to another 200,000 Jews reside in the annexed areas of East Jerusalem, and about 16,000 remain in 32 settlements on the Golan. Not surprisingly, none of the many effects of this colonization process — whether on the Palestinians, the Israeli polity and economy, or the peace negotiations — could be captured and analyzed in a saga that unfortunately ends much too early. One can only hope that the gifted author of *The Accidental Empire* will follow this path-breaking study with an equally illuminating sequel.

Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground: The Case of Palestine, by Michael Keating, Anne Le More and Robert Lowe. Chatham House Publishers, 2006. 232 pages. \$69.95, hardcover.

Nadia Hijab, senior fellow, Institute for Palestine Studies; former UN development officer.

In August 2005, I was in Ramallah, seat of the Palestinian Authority (PA), to evaluate a democracy-building project. Donors had already made a considerable investment and were trying to decide how much more to allocate. It was a surreal exercise. While I was there, the Israeli occupation forces were preparing for their unilateral disengagement from Gaza even as they were cementing the Wall around Ramallah. Access to the city was sealed off except through Israeli-controlled checkpoints, one of which provided a fast track for the international community and the other a choke point for Palestinians.

Private questions to donors as to the sustainability of development under these conditions and whether they might do better to lobby their capitals to take political measures to end the occupation were met with a rueful shrug. Questions to Palestinian counterparts as to who was doing the strategic thinking about how to achieve national liberation were met with puzzled looks. In the end, the international community's response to the democratic election of Hamas a few months later made the whole exercise moot.

Against this background, I turned with great interest to *Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground: The Case of Palestine*. The book should be required reading for Western aid workers and foreign politicians in this and other conflicts. It should also be read by the taxpayers of those countries to better understand the purpose and impact of their government's foreign policies and the role of aid within those policies. Why has \$6 billion of taxpayers' money given in aid to Palestinians between 1993 and 2004 not staved off a collapse of the Palestinian economy, polity and society? Why do donors provide aid, given Israel's obligations as an occupying power, and fund major infrastructure projects that Israel then destroys? Citizens need to ask these questions because, in a globalized world where violence is on the move, they pay the price for their countries' policies.

Michael Keating and his 18 co-authors take on these thorny issues and support their arguments with a wealth of data, charts and time lines. The issues troubled not just the authors but also the donors themselves, some of whose agencies funded the production of the book. Three conclusions are unanimous — and damning:

- Without a political agreement, socioeconomic development cannot be achieved and sustained. Indeed, as several authors note, donor aid has shifted from 7:1 in favor of development assistance in 2000 to 5:1 in favor of emergency assistance by 2002.

- Aid in the absence of a political agreement can do more harm than good, by funding the occupation, postponing the national agenda, creating unaccountable elites, co-opting the leadership needed to achieve freedom and justice, and making donors feel good and powerful, among other things. See, for example, the essays by Nigel Roberts and Rex Brynen on the PA's system of patronage, and Jeff Halper's honest and insightful essay into ways to provide solidarity without reinforcing the skewed power dynamic.
- Aid has not prevented the de-development of Palestinian society.

Among the book's greatest strengths is that the co-editors — Keating, who initiated the project, Anne Le More and Robert Lowe — are not taken in by the short-lived euphoria over Israel's unilateral disengagement from Gaza, which took place while the book was being finalized. Their findings had identified the core problems that would not be addressed by Israel's actions, and many of the essays are amazingly prescient about the terrible situation in which the Palestinians now live, making the book especially relevant to policy makers today. Chancellor Angela Merkel, who is determined to prioritize a solution to this conflict during Germany's presidency of the European Union (January-June 2007), and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who in January 2007 undertook her eighth "listening" tour to the region, should send off for their copies.

The book brings together writers from a wide diversity of political viewpoints. In general, they are divided into two broad camps: those who discuss the needs, interests and responsibilities of "both sides" and those who recognize that, although there are two sides to the conflict, only one side is occupying the other. The latter group provides the more compelling analysis, and they get close to uncovering Israel's real strategy. They also eschew what Mary B. Anderson calls "words that sanitize actions" in her excellent essay on how to "do no harm." She notes that such language reinforces "the 'business as usual' feelings on which Israeli policy depends."

There are examples of such "sanitizing" in several essays. The most galling, for this reader, are those that contribute to the "two sides" fiction. "Both Hamas and the settler movement, however, were insensitive to any potential manipulation of aid levels to either the PA or Israel," wrote one author. "Yet the current Israeli and Palestinian leaderships have not displayed a realistic strategy for peace or even for ending the violence," wrote another. Donors were willing, said a third, to tolerate "the PA's cohabitation with violent rejectionists to the confiscation of land in the West Bank and alleged Israeli transgressions of international humanitarian law." (Alleged? Surely not.)

The problem with the "both sides" approach is that the Israeli settlement enterprise is a clear attempt by one side to settle the conflict in a way that destroys the other side's national and human rights. As noted in the book, Israeli governments — both Labor and Likud — have more than doubled the settler population in the occupied Palestinian territories during the Oslo process and built Jewish-only roads to integrate their settlers, together with the stolen (to use a non-sanitized word) land and water, into the Israeli state. This is not just a detail that can be added to one side of a balance sheet of shared Israeli-Palestinian responsibilities. How could the PA "demonstrate much greater commitment to preventing attacks on Israeli citizens" as the land was pulled out from under the Palestinians' feet and as they were penned into ever-smaller enclosures?

In terms of spelling out what is really going on, perhaps the most powerful papers in the collection are those by Anne Le More and by Mushtaq Khan, who pose some very uncomfortable questions to the donor community. Le More notes that "Oslo enabled Israel to begin separating both peoples without having to withdraw from the Occupied Territory." She points out that the system of closures "became institutionalized" after March 1993, Gaza was sealed off by an electronic wall in 1994 and the pass system was introduced in 1994, with passes given to less than 3 percent of the population in 1995. And these were in the heyday of the Oslo peace process.

Khan goes further. He dissects Israel's "security first" conditions throughout the peace process to reveal Israeli strategic concerns that are not compatible with an intended withdrawal "even to borders close to the pre-1967 borders." He argues that Israel does not believe its interests would be served by a Palestinian state because this would not address the rights of millions of Palestinian refugees and, even more significantly, would not address the growing demands of the 1.4 million Palestinian citizens of Israel for equality within the Jewish state. Thus, Israel's strategic concern to maintain a Jewish identity may actually be undermined by a Palestinian state, he says: "Both 'security first' and the associated facts on the ground become explicable as part of an Israeli strategy of long-term management of its 'Palestinian problem' through conditional, partial and reversible transfers of governance responsibilities in densely populated parts of the Occupied Territory."

Khan notes that this is not a risk-free strategy. Among other things, it could lead to the emergence of a Palestinian leadership that believes the conflict with Israel is a zero-sum game, as well as of Palestinian constituencies that organize nonviolently to claim full civil and political rights. Both of these scenarios have emerged today. Khan's analysis also gives readers an understanding that the participation in the present Israeli cabinet of far right nationalist Avigdor Lieberman, whose views on "transfer" of Israeli Arab citizens out of the state have been described as racist by many Israelis, does not emerge out of a vacuum but is well within the broad Israeli policy framework.

I would take the analysis a step further and argue that Israel's strategy has remained unchanged since the earliest days of Zionism: to give life to the myth of "a land without a people for a people without a land." Israel's settlement policy in the West Bank is a clear continuation of the Zionist movement's five-decades-long settler policy in pre-1948 Palestine. The unwillingness to give up the dream of a Greater Israel in a land as people-less of Palestinians as possible explains the determination to avoid the two-state solution.

As Le More noted in her paper, Palestinians in small enclaves and seams created by the Wall gradually move away in "localized transfers." David Shearer and Anuschka Meyer, in their insightful paper on Israel's obligations as an occupying power, also describe the way depopulation can occur inside "closed areas" created by the Wall. Today, the West Bank is no more than a collection of Bantustans where people migrate, if they can, to seek survival and development elsewhere.

Yet there are still over five million Palestinians in what is and was Palestine, almost equal to the number of Israeli Jews. How is the Zionist dream to be fulfilled? In 2003, there was a scare among advocates of Palestinian rights that Israel might use the U.S. invasion of Iraq as a cover for mass transfer of Palestinians, as happened in 1947-48 and 1967. That did not happen. But, as the authors compellingly show, the deliberate policy of closure of Gaza that Israel planned all along as part of its unilateral disengagement could provide an answer to Israel's "demographic dilemma": civil war among Palestinians. This would result in Palestinians engaging in "self-ethnic cleansing" rather than Israel's having to do it. This interpretation seems too much of a horror to be true, but it is borne out by the facts on the ground today and the history of the past century.

Where does the international community go from here in its political and economic approaches to this conflict? As several authors note, donors are even more worried that they may seem to be facilitating the occupation in the wake of the International Court of Justice ruling in July 2004 that affirmed the illegality of Israel's Wall — as well as its associated regime — and called on all states not to do anything that would support this regime.

What to do? No one is proposing a cut-off of humanitarian aid. Rather, the aim must be to end the situation that makes aid necessary. The best way forward for the Palestinians, Israelis and the world is to finally apply international law to the conflict, as is well articulated in Claude Bruderlein's very interesting paper on human security, and Karma Nabulsi's compelling analysis of the de-democratization of the Palestinian body politic as a result of Oslo, and other papers.

Donors have two options. The first is to use their considerable aid not just to Palestinians but also to Israel to push through the application of international law in an even-handed manner. There is a strong element of hypocrisy in the aid boycott of Hamas when “both sides” use measures that violate international law (attacks on civilians by Palestinians, as well as by Israelis, in addition to targeted assassinations, home demolitions, collective punishment, land confiscations and the occupation itself), when Israel blatantly does not recognize past agreements or Palestinian national rights, and when someone like Lieberman serves in the Israeli cabinet.

A few authors in *Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground* suggest using aid to make Israel comply with its obligations under international law. Scott Lansky, who provides a very useful analysis of the U.S. aid role in the Oslo peace process, recalls that former President Bill Clinton asked Congress to hold up Israel’s supplemental aid package because former prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu decided to freeze Israel’s implementation of the Wye agreement. Lansky suggests that aid could be used to get Israel to stop its settlement activity, but quickly adds, “The point here is not to sanction current aid to Israel, which is likely to be counterproductive.” Well, why not? Providing Israel with huge amounts of aid as well as preferential trade access and other benefits in both Europe and the United States has clearly convinced Israel there is no price to pay for its destruction of Palestinian national rights.

Another suggestion comes from David Shearer and Anuschka Meyer in discussing Israel’s demolition of homes in Rafah in 2004: “If Israel were presented with the \$15 million bill for Rafah’s reconstruction, as international law stipulates, would it prompt a rethinking of military strategy and encourage other methods of surveillance that cause less harm to civilians and property? Should the legal obligations on Israel, and donors for that matter, be applied before donors reach for their chequebooks?” After all, these governments are signatories to the Geneva Conventions and must live up to their obligation to ensure Israel’s respect for the Conventions.

The Europeans have much more of an interest than the United States in the stability of the region, given their proximity, and they also have considerable clout though they prefer not to admit it. Just a hint that the EU may be considering the application of Article 2 of its trade-association agreement with Israel, which provides for upholding human rights, would do a great deal to get the Israeli government’s attention.

The other option is for donors to witness and collude in the physical, social and political destruction of a people, and, with it, the whole body of international law that the human race put in place during the twentieth century to avoid other global conflagrations that would end its time on earth.

Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad by Matthew Levitt. Yale University Press, in cooperation with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006. 324 pages, \$26.00, hardcover.

Sara Roy, senior research scholar, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University

Author’s Note:

This review, published here in its entirety, was originally commissioned by *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, the official foreign-policy journal at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. Between the time I was invited to write the review and the time I was told it would be published, over two months had passed during which I had had several exchanges, some of them difficult, with the editorial staff. However, by the end of the process the editor-in-chief, with whom I had been working, was pleased with the review,

and so was I. He sent me an e-PDF of the review as it would appear in the journal (Volume 31:1 Winter 2007). The PDF version of the page proofs revealed that the editor had excerpted two relevant sentences (featured in sidebars) to highlight observations that I had offered in the review:

1. “While there can be no doubt that, since its inception, Hamas has engaged in violence and armed struggle, and has been the primary force behind the horrific suicide bombings inside Israel, Levitt’s presentation reduces this increasingly complex and sophisticated organization to an insular, one-dimensional...entity dedicated solely to violence...and Israel’s destruction.”

2. “The ability of Hamas to reinterpret itself over time through processes of radicalization, de-radicalization, de-militarization, and re-radicalization is a pronounced and common theme in its historical evolution.”

During a subsequent exchange the editor-in-chief wrote, “Thank you for your hard work as well. It’s a good review.” I believed that was the end of the matter. Just a few days later, I received the following e-mail message from the same editor-in-chief:

Dear Ms. Roy:

...After careful review and much consideration of the merits of your piece, we have decided that we are ultimately unable to publish your review for this edition. Your review was evaluated by several of our editors and an external editor for objectivity. Unfortunately, they disagreed with my decision to publish your review for the following reasons: despite their agreement with many of your points, all reviewers found the piece one-sided. This one-sidedness dissuaded readers from reading the piece to the end; ultimately, this last point is the most important. Although I found your arguments valuable, if readers consistently feel this way, I am unable to move forward with a piece.

My apologies for the way in which this process was carried out, and for the time that you spent on editing the piece. Thank you once again for your submission and your efforts. If you would like to discuss this further, please feel free to e-mail me.

In more than 20 years of writing and publishing I have never experienced such behavior or encountered what to me, at least, is so blatant a case of censorship. I am therefore extremely grateful to Anne Joyce and Stephen Magro for agreeing to publish the review in *Middle East Policy*.

At the beginning of the first Palestinian uprising, I was living in Gaza and spent much time in the refugee camps interviewing families about the political and socioeconomic changes taking place around them. Despite the harsh living situation, Palestinians were filled with a palpable sense of hope and possibility that has since evaporated. Hamas was then struggling to create a popular constituency, despite overwhelming support among Palestinians for secular nationalism. That was 18 years ago, and neither I nor anyone else ever thought that Hamas would one day emerge as a major political actor: democratically winning legislative elections, defeating the majority Fatah party and heading a Palestinian government.

In his recent book, Matthew Levitt, who is deputy assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis at the U.S. Department of the Treasury and an expert in financial counterterrorism, argues that Hamas is strictly a terrorist organization that is not only a domestic threat but a global one, a part of an international jihad network with links to al-Qaeda that must be met with force. He further argues — and this is the core of his book — that despite the existence of differentiated political, social and military sectors within Hamas, they are all part of the same “apparatus of terror.”

Levitt devotes significant attention to attacking the Islamist social sector (*dawa*) and Hamas's charitable institutions. It is the principle aim of his book to show how Hamas uses its extensive social-service network—mosques, schools, kindergartens, orphanages, hospitals, clinics, sports clubs, youth clubs—to further its primary political agenda, which he claims is the destruction of Israel. He argues that through its social support structure and services, “Hamas leverages the appreciation (and indebtedness) it earns through social welfare activities to garner support — both political and logistical — for its terrorist activities.” Levitt summarizes his argument as follows: “The general deprivation of the Palestinian people in the Israeli-occupied territories predisposes them to favor the much-needed social support that Hamas provides.” He continues, “In addition to purchasing goodwill, charities also create a built-in logistical support umbrella underneath which terrorist operations are sheltered and operate.” He explains that the *dawa* network operationally supports terrorism through recruitment, employment and financing and by providing institutional legitimacy.

His evidence, at times interesting, particularly with regard to Hamas's external sources of financing, is more often than not based on assumption, extrapolation and generalization. For example, as evidence for how religious organizations raise money for Palestinian terrorism, Levitt quotes from a pamphlet produced by a Quranic memorization center that was sponsored by the Ramallah-al Bireh charity committee. The pamphlet listed 30 ways to enter heaven, including “Jihad for the sake of Allah by fighting with one's soul and money.”

In another example of how hospitals are used to support terrorism, Levitt briefly describes the Dar al-Salam Hospital: “According to information cited by the FBI,” the hospital is considered a Hamas institution because it was founded with “Hamas funds and protection.” But Levitt fails to provide any real evidence of these funds or how and why they are considered “Hamas.” The assumption is that these ties, even if they are shown to exist, are inherently evil and can be nothing else.

In a chapter on how the *dawa* teaches terror and radicalizes Palestinian society, Levitt writes, “Recipients of Hamas financial aid or social services are less likely to turn down requests from the organization such as allowing their homes to serve as safe houses for Hamas fugitives, ferrying fugitives, couriering funds or weapons, storing and maintaining explosives, and more.” He cites as evidence for this sweeping statement one resident of Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza who fed Hamas militants daily. The possibility that Palestinians receive support from Hamas institutions without preconditions or that popular support requires more than the lure of financial incentives and free social services does not enter Levitt's argument. Levitt also claims, “When angry, frustrated or humiliated Palestinians regularly listen to sermons in mosques in which Jews, Israelis and even Americans are depicted as enemies of Islam and Palestine, Hamas's official policy may not restrain individual enthusiasm.” One wonders how Mr. Levitt knows these things, given that he appears never to have stepped inside a Hamas institution in Gaza or the West Bank or to have conducted any fieldwork at all.

While these arguments are oft-repeated in today's media, Levitt does little to address research that supports a very different conclusion regarding the Hamas *dawa*. Some of the key findings of this research point to institutional features that demonstrate no preference for religion or politics over other ideologies, particularly in programmatic work; an approach to institutional work that advocates incrementalism, moderation, order and stability; a philosophical and practical desire for productivity and professionalism that shuns radical change and emphasizes community development and civic restoration over political violence; and no evidence of any formal attempt to impose an Islamic model of political, social, legal or religious behavior, or to create an alternative Islamic or Islamist conception of society.

While there can be no doubt that, since its inception, Hamas has engaged in violence and armed struggle and has been the primary force behind the horrific suicide bombings inside Israel, Levitt's presentation reduces this increasingly complex and sophisticated organization to an insular, one-dimensional and seemingly mindless entity dedicated solely to violence, terrorism and Israel's destruction. To fully understand the current political stature of Hamas, it is necessary to closely examine the dramatic transitions that have occurred within the organization itself, among Palestinians with respect to their society, and in Palestine's relationship with Israel.

From the point of view of Hamas, Palestine is an Arab and Islamic land that fell to colonial control with the demise of the Ottoman Empire. The establishment of the State of Israel is viewed as a way to perpetuate colonial authority over the Muslim homeland and is therefore illegitimate. As victims of colonialism, Hamas argues that Palestinians have the right to resist and struggle to regain their homeland and freedom, viewing this as a local and nationalist struggle. Now, almost two decades after its birth, Hamas has grown in size and popularity. While changes have not been made to its frame of reference or objectives, its political discourse has become more refined and streamlined, particularly with regard to its relations with local groups, political factions, other religious communities and other nations.

Unfortunately, Matthew Levitt's book does not address the critical evolutionary processes — particularly with regard to its organizational structure and political, social and economic role in Palestinian society — that have characterized the Palestinian Islamist movement and Hamas's rise to power. The ability of Hamas to reinterpret itself over time through processes of radicalization, de-radicalization, de-militarization and re-radicalization is a pronounced and common theme in its historical evolution. Levitt neglects to address the significance behind this commitment to reinterpretation. His analysis aims simply to demonize Hamas, and he discounts the critical connections between changing patterns of protest and structures of society, competing visions of a Palestinian social and political order, and contesting Islamic and secular definitions of meaning and legitimacy. The synergy among these forces has characterized the history and growth of Palestinian Islamism.

Israel's military occupation, which has long been the defining context for Palestinian life, is almost absent from Levitt's book. Hamas's popularity and growing empowerment derive from its role as a resistance organization, fighting against an occupation that is now 40 years old. Israel's steady expropriation, fragmentation and division of Palestinian lands; settlement construction and expansion; closure restrictions and destruction of the Palestinian economy are not part of Levitt's discussion, nor is the right of the Palestinians to resist these measures. In those few instances where the occupation is mentioned, it is couched in terms that acknowledge Palestinian hardship — a reality exploited by Hamas — but justified as a response to terrorism. In the absence of any serious examination of Israel's occupation, Levitt's portrayal of the rise of Hamas is completely detached from the context within which it was produced and shaped.

Despite evidence to the contrary, the organization is also described as a movement incapable of transformation, ignoring the improvements in Hamas's political discourse regarding political compromise with the State of Israel and resolution of the conflict. During the period of the Oslo peace process, for example, some dramatic changes occurred within Hamas. The organization was moving away from the extreme and a position of confrontation towards one that was more centrist and moderate. This shift was characterized by a reorientation in policy and strategic emphasis from political/military action to social works and community development. Accompanying this shift was a redefinition of the nature of the Palestinian struggle, which was no longer for political or military power per se but for defining new social arrangements and appropriate cultural and institutional models that would meet social needs without resort to violence. Similarly, the Islamist movement was not advancing a policy of isolation but was calling for greater accommodation and cooperation with both domestic and international actors.

Since Hamas's victory in the January 2006 legislative elections, there has been a further evolution in its political thinking — as evidenced in some of its key political documents — characterized by a strong emphasis on state-building and programmatic work, greater refinement with regard to its position on a two-state solution and the role of resistance, and a progressive de-emphasis on religion. (See Khaled Hroub, "A 'New Hamas' Through Its New Documents," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 34 (4) (Summer 2006)). These are absent from Levitt's discussion. Levitt also overlooks questions that are vital to any analysis of Hamas, especially at present. To name just a few, what were Hamas's ideological, philosophical and structural boundaries? How and why were they reset and expanded? What is the role of religion as opposed to politics in Islamist thought and practice, particularly in the public sphere? Are religion and politics truly unified? Can Hamas reconcile faith and ideology with a demand for a place in the political system?

Levitt's book has many serious flaws and merits a detailed critique that extends well beyond the scope of this review. His is not a work of analysis or scholarship, to say the least, and despite certain points that are interesting and accurate, anyone wishing to gain a substantive, reasoned and critical understanding of Hamas would do well to look elsewhere.

Academic Freedom after September 11, edited by Beshara Doumani. Zone Books, 2006. 250 pages. \$21.95.

Eve M. Troutt Powell, history department, University of Pennsylvania

"Palestine," "Judea and Samaria," "Palestinians," "War of 1948," War of "Independence," "October War," "Ramadan War," "Yom Kippur War": a professor's choice to publicly utter any of these words can set off figurative bombs in lecture halls and seminar rooms across American university campuses. A name can signal the taking of sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict; and now university lectures, like the conflicts themselves, are fodder for articles, commentaries and perhaps Congressional intervention.

In the essays of this persuasive collection, *Academic Freedom after September 11*, the situation looks threatening and grim. The authors cite an increasing number of cases where Middle East studies faculty, most in departments of history or political science, have faced intense scrutiny, not only for their written work but also for how they lecture. Even the languages indigenous to the conflicts in the Middle East are now subject to examination by Congress. If HR 3077 is passed, members may decide to limit federal funding for university centers for teaching languages like Arabic if, after consideration by an oversight board, these centers appear to train students to view U.S. foreign policy too critically. The authors of these essays argue that academic freedom has never been challenged so systematically or with such political power.

Edited by Beshara Doumani, these six essays are the product of a conference held at the University of California at Berkeley in 2004. They are well written, well chosen and gracefully woven together in this volume. In part one, "Contending Visions," essays by Robert Post, Judith Butler and Philippa Strum explore (and debate) the legal, historical and philosophical background of the construction of academic freedom. In part two, "Praxis," essays by Kathleen Frydl, Amy Newhall and Joel Beinin examine the effects of challenges to academic freedom in the field of Middle Eastern studies. What links all of these sections is the recognition that such political confrontations occur at a dramatic confluence of historical events — the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the events of September 11, 2001, and the war in Iraq — added to the profound changes to the ways in which universities seek and get funding, whether from federal agencies or private philanthropies.

In his introductory essay, Doumani writes that what makes the post-9/11 environment so distinctive is that it coincides with the emergence of the United States as sole superpower, on the one hand, and the political triumph of evangelically based political conservatism, on the other. These forces, when combined with the greater influence of private and corporate donorship on American universities, have contributed to a political climate in which “there is no field more radioactive than that of Middle East studies, and nothing more frowned upon than expressions of support for Palestinian studies” (p. 31). It is not only the history of the Palestinians that suffers. As presented in this essay, President Bush’s promotion of the War on Terror has relied on “a virulently anti-intellectual stand that insists that the enemy cannot be understood through the conventional interpretative concepts and units of analysis that the academy generates.” This has created a situation, at least in the eyes of the government, in which “the expertise of area specialists in particular and most scholars in the humanities and social sciences in general are made irrelevant” (p. 17). Academic specialists in Middle Eastern studies are blamed for not having predicted the events of 9/11, yet there continues to be a shortage of qualified and informed experts. As Doumani writes, “Such a shortage, of course, is one reason why the crisis occurred in the first place” (p. 23).

In the first essay, Robert Post looks at the first articulation of academic freedom: the “1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure,” published by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). This declaration expressed a reevaluation of the employment relationship between universities and professors, based on concerns that universities might fire professors at will for unpopular views. As Post notes, this declaration of academic freedom did not assert First Amendment rights for individuals, and that is its great strength. The 1915 Declaration ties “the protection of academic freedom to the production of a social good that the public actually requires.” But Post adds that such support would evaporate if “academic freedom were re-conceptualized as an individual right authorizing faculty to research and publish as they personally see fit” (p. 72). What further protects this construction of academic freedom is the assurance that “faculty within the university are free to engage in the professionally competent forms of inquiry and teaching that are necessary for the realization of the social purposes of the university” (p. 64).

Post, like all of the authors in this collection, protests the International Studies in Higher Education Act of 2003 (ISHEA) and its proposal that the secretary of education have discretion over allocations of Title VI funding for foreign-language and area-studies centers. ISHEA would also create an advisory board that would evaluate programming funded by Title VI. One of its supporters, Congressman Howard Berman (D-CA), contended that ISHEA would “help redress a problem which is a great concern of mine, namely the lack of balance, and indeed the anti-American bias that pervades Title VI-funded Middle East Studies programs in particular” (p. 89). For Post, the danger here is that “ISHEA uses an overtly political standard to override norms of professional competence and relevance” and thereby infringes on academic freedom (pp. 90-91).

This is a significant essay, full of insights into the history of academic freedom. But what seems missing is an understanding of the unfortunate effects of the marginalization of area studies (in general) and Middle Eastern studies (in particular) that simply would not occur if these fields were considered central to any American university. Area studies are by their very name marginalized. How many in Congress have taken such courses? How many other professors in universities have taken courses on the Middle East? I have heard specialists in American studies muse out loud that specialists in East Asian or Middle Eastern studies never really get to deal with the vast resources of documentation with which specialists in American history must be conversant! (I invited this colleague to join me in the National Archives of Egypt, but he demurred.)

If one cannot assume that university colleagues even acknowledge the important contributions made in Middle Eastern studies, then Post's assertion of the power of professional norms seems vulnerable. His line of thinking raises questions for Judith Butler, who responds directly to Post in her essay, faulting him for not historicizing his arguments about academic norms. While agreeing that academic freedom should not be viewed as an individual freedom, she asserts that the conditions in which professional norms are formed have changed a great deal since 1915. Butler points out that the restrictions on grant funding proposed in ISHEA have already been self-imposed by influential major foundations like Ford and Rockefeller. This has already had, she asserts, a "strong influence on what will and will not be considered legitimate academic work" (p. 109).

As in the essays of Post and Butler, Philippa Strum also investigates how the idea of academic freedom developed in the United States, but she pays closer attention to the judicial rationale for the constitutional protection of academic freedom. While looking at what distinguishes scholars' speech from the speech of other Americans, she wonders, in particular, about the rights to academic freedom of students. As she argues, the law had remained remarkably unclear about them as well as about the distinctions that could be made between faculties at private or public institutions, or scholars who work outside universities. Unlike Post and Butler, Strum considers academic freedom to be an individual right, but the lack of clarity in the law has rendered the academy vulnerable. As she writes, "The scholarly community's failure to articulate the right to academic freedom as individual, with the institutional right understood as a necessary derivative of the individual right, has left the Supreme Court and the law of academic freedom, as currently defined, in the position of not being certain whether academic freedom belongs to the faculty or to the university" (p. 158).

Kathleen Frydl's essay opens part two of *Academic Freedom since 9/11* with an exploration of how understandings of academic freedom have changed on American campuses, especially when confronted with the privatization of universities. Who, she asks, will "exercise sovereignty" over the research university, and according to what logic? As she writes, "This — and not speech outside the classroom — is the front line of academic freedom" (p. 179). This essay, like many of the others, raises concerns over the impotence of academics' assertion of their intellectual freedom, especially in an environment like Columbia University, where student complaints or funders' stipulations seem to be changing the very mission of the university. Those who attack scholars of Middle East studies at Columbia seem to care little about this, or, as Frydl says, "The contempt for the academy of a Kurtz or a Pipes is plain for all to see" (p. 197).

This essay ends on a troubling note, however, and here I will quote it at some length:

Those who seek to fundamentally alter important decisions of national life must understand that they have benefited from the system they now seek to change, and therefore their changes must speak to future generations and not simply the perceived needs of the present. If changes such as the proposed HR 3077 keep coming, and they will, academics who expect to defend values important to them simply and exclusively under the banner of freedom from state control will not have to wait long before their voices are rendered irrelevant. This rhetoric has no strengths against carrots, and it is also hypocritical. The knight who flies those colors also rides a mount and uses armor indirectly or directly provided by the state, and he must be prepared to disrobe and dismount if he wishes to join the battle (p. 199).

The last sentence is powerful and evocative, but I found it unclear: Before whom is this gauntlet being thrown? Is Frydl saying that those of us who have benefited from federal or state

funding in our research, language training and teaching need to remove ourselves from such dependencies before we join the battle and decry proposed challenges to what can and cannot be said or discussed in the classroom?

The title of Amy Newhall's essay, "The Unraveling of the Devil's Bargain: The History and Politics of Language Acquisition," goes far in explaining what Frydl's challenge to area-studies academics means. In this essay, the clearest of all the collection, Newhall describes the conundrum: "The situation is further complicated when those critical individuals or their institutions receive federal grants, particularly where there is great government demand for linguistic expertise" (p. 204). Who is biting the hand that feeds him?

It was fear of the Soviet launching of Sputnik in 1957 that galvanized Congressional creation and support for language training in the less-commonly-taught languages (LCTLs) — which encompass all of the languages taught in Middle East-related language centers. Thus, "with the perception of linguistic competence as a national-security issue came the mission of achieving it as a federal responsibility" (p. 206). Very important institutions were born of this situation, institutions that touch upon the professional lives of almost all involved in Middle East studies in American universities, like Title VI and the Fulbright-Hays Program. This close connection between federal funding, issues of national security and area studies in U.S. universities has, as Newhall notes, always tarnished the credibility of American researchers in the eyes of Middle Eastern governments. In Egypt today, for example, "it is now almost impossible to obtain research permits to pursue twentieth-century history, religious movements, and women's minority and civil society issues" (p. 217). Academia danced with the devil, then, and showed its own involvement in this lack of trust, "since it was content in earlier times to use these same arguments of national security to justify continued funding." As Newhall continues, "Now the devil's bargain is unraveling, to the detriment of both the government's interest in excellent and productive language programs and academia's interest in funding for free and wide-ranging research and innovation" (p. 227). This should be assigned reading for every member of the Middle East Studies Association of North America.

The final essay in this compilation is Joel Beinin's "The New McCarthyism: Policing Thought about the Middle East." Here Beinin identifies certain public intellectuals, think tanks and neoconservative groups that protest indignantly against certain Middle East centers as the "American Likud" — an American version of the more hawkish major Israeli political party. According to Beinin, the most visible and vocal of these American Likudists are Daniel Pipes and Martin Kramer, who have, after years of trying, managed to gain the ears and hearts of powerful members of the Bush administration.

This, in certain ways, makes the present intellectual environment worse for academics than during the days of McCarthyism. During the Cold War, as Beinin discusses, "The U.S. government had no choice but to rely on research universities as the primary source of expertise on the Soviet Union and the regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America that were contested during the Cold War" (p. 242). Most academics, according to Beinin, acquiesced in the institutional structure of the Cold War, but protests and opposition against government foreign policy grew substantially during the Vietnam War, during the Reagan Administration in reaction to its policies in Latin America, and during the culture wars. Think tanks arose "funded by right-wing and corporate sources designed to constitute alternative sources of knowledge unconstrained by the standards of peer review, tolerance for dissent, and academic freedom" (p. 242). Academic specialists, no longer the government's sole source of information about the Middle East, find themselves the targets of Kramer and Pipes, of the administration, and of the pro-Likud factions in the United States.

This essay brings us full circle, back to the issue of normative professional standards within academia that Robert Post saw as a protective force. Beinin sees the fight as more political than

academic, but he ends the book hopefully. No investigation of a Middle East program or professor has proven the substantial bias claimed by critics, and the current debacle in Iraq is certainly demonstrating the futility of the neoconservatives' predictions made about easy "success" and "democracy." History may well prove many of the historians right.

Cities of God and Nationalism: Mecca, Jerusalem, and Rome as Contested World Cities, by Khaldoun Samman, Boulder & London: Paradigm Publishers, 2006. Index, 249 pages. \$72, hardcover.

Ghada Hashem Talhami, D.K. Pearsons professor of politics, Lake Forest College

In this unusual study, a comparison is made between the impact of universal religions and modern nationalisms on three of the world's greatest spiritual centers: Mecca, Jerusalem and Rome. Nationalism per se did not transform these cities, but its introduction as a modernizing phenomenon changed the lives of their communities drastically. Cities that existed until this time as demographic, cultural and religious amalgams eventually were subjected to powerful nationalist forces that reversed their rich pasts and brought them under the control of a single ethno-religious group. The repression of antiquated religious traditions is often accomplished under the pretext of targeting religious and cultural accommodation. Indeed, whenever the integration of sacred space into the modern world has been attempted, it has always been accompanied by violence. These cities shared the expression of universal religious aspirations of the "civilizational imagined communities" and boasted a more inclusive system than what is envisioned by modern secularists. Still, they found themselves caught in the contradictory concepts of nation and civilization. The very notion of identity, space and belief began to function differently when these cities proceeded to adapt to modernity. A pilgrimage to one of these cities in the past resulted in experiencing feelings that were more powerful than those generated by a visit to a national center. These cities functioned as transnational centers and nurtured transnational communities.

In some cases, a modern ideology attempted to resolve the conflicted tension between civilizational and national "imagined communities," to borrow Benedict Anderson's famous phrase. Zionism, for instance, based its notion of recapturing Jerusalem on a near-successful synthesis of religion and nationalism. This was largely achieved through emphasizing the particularistic elements of its patriarchal religion. Zionism does not accept the inherent contradictions in its ideology and insists on maintaining claims of legitimacy for its vision of Jerusalem as a world city and an emblem of a contemporary sacred world as well as a national capital. This contrasts with the Palestinian movement and its Muslim and Christian communities, both of which, universally extended, have been unable to bridge the gap between Jerusalem as a spiritual center and a modern national capital. In the core of these communities' beliefs, Jerusalem is simply the property of the *umma* or the *oikoumene*.

What led to the new discourse favoring the nationalization of spiritual centers is a secular view that credits religion with a predisposition towards intolerance and violence. This view has been expressed in studies of the Islamic resurgence such as Benjamin Barber's *Jihad vs. McWorld*, Bernard Lewis's *The Roots of Muslim Rage*, Roger Scruton's *The West and the Rest*, Robert Spencer's *Islam Unveiled* and Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations*. All of these ignore the visible role of self-described Zionist ideology in inflicting a narrow form of religious nationalism on the spiritual heritage of Jerusalem.

This study, written by a sociologist, attempts to correct the viewpoint that regards the spiritual past of these cities with disfavor by exposing their rich history of collective struggle with moder-

nity. Often buried under the debris of national symbols, this struggle failed in some cases and partially succeeded in others. But nowhere was the conflict clearer than in the case of Jerusalem, which suffered further erosion of its sacred space with each succeeding hegemonic faith. The author begins with the imposition of Hellenistic rule, which used the local population's definition of impurity and uncleanness against the very people who invented it by impressing upon new converts the necessity of avoiding any Jewish contamination, including Palestine itself. Due largely to the influence of the Apostle Paul, a Hellenized Jew, the holy city of Jerusalem became insignificant to the Christian imagination. The Christianized cities of Antioch, Corinth, Galatia and Rome rose in significance. Basing his reading of this history largely on the work of Karen Armstrong, the author explains the changes resulting from Paul's understanding of the resurrection of Jesus as "a revolutionary moment that theologically nullified those laws which were applicable only to Jews...."

The Muslim revolution has similarly succeeded in universalizing Mecca by using the impact of the new trade routes on the tribal and clan worlds of that city to interject its own brand of universalism into its spirit. Under the old, pre-trade solidarity system, bonds of ancestral proximity to family, clan and finally tribe were stronger than other ties. Islam rose as this system collapsed under the weight of the new economic reality, where the expansion of trade caused diverse social groups to become more useful than the clans, dislodging the older tribal institutions of Mecca. Beginning with his Constitution of Medina, Muhammad made an effort to end tribal strife and replace it with a universal loyalty to the Islamic *umma* (nation). According to some scholars, Muhammad devised unusual techniques to transcend pre-Islamic divisions. The ritual of prayer, for example, removed the link between the believer and his tribe by making all Muslims perform a series of identical physical actions at regular daily intervals. Thus, the *umma* was placed above the tribe. Muhammad then, according to the author, succeeded in "de-centering" Jerusalem by relocating the center of Islamic holiness to Arabia and ushering in the new monotheistic branch. Yet, after the Arab conquest of Jerusalem, Muslims tried to revive the monotheistic tradition of the city by building their shrine on top of the rock marking the center of the Jewish temple.

Samman's discussion of the consolidation of Christianity at Rome following the conflict with Byzantium is both competent and very instructive. Emperor Constantine, we are told, began to advance his credentials as the representative of Christianity by convening, in 452, the Council of Calcedon, which proclaimed that Constantinople was on a par with Rome. The papacy soon became a territorial power, claiming according to the "Petrine Doctrine" that its primacy derived from the powers that Christ himself assigned to St. Peter. Samman writes that "the Papacy rested its case upon an indisputable notion that Rome was the first see, 'indeed, an apostolic see.'" The existence of St. Peter's tomb in Rome inspired the belief that a visceral link tied the church to heaven. Christianity in the late Middle Ages, therefore, was represented by a transnational identity. The church was placed above nations and was expressed through the institution of the papacy. Mecca experienced a similar transformation when, after the relocation of the center of temporal power north, the city remained the center of pilgrimage, a place for the spiritual sustenance of the far-flung Muslim empire. Saladin, however, reinforced the spirituality and universalism of Jerusalem by reintroducing eastern Christianity and Judaism following its recapture from the crusaders.

The coming of modernity did not augur well for these cities. Rome's brush with nationalism actually preceded modernity: during the fourteenth century, the curia were relocated to Avignon as an act of domination by the French monarchy. The Reformation also challenged Rome by denying its sanctity. Luther claimed that a faithful Christian was one who hears the voice of God, not one who observes the church's imagery. Rome was viewed as unworthy of a place in God's kingdom. After the rise of Italian nationalism and attacks on the Papal States in the nineteenth century, the domain of Pope Pius IX shrank from 17,000 square miles to a few acres in the heart of the city. The

pope, nevertheless, rejected a German offer to seek asylum in the Benedictine monastery in Fulda since he was moved by the memory of Avignon.

Mecca, on the other hand, lost its status as a result of the decline of its temporal patron, the Ottoman Empire. With the elimination of the institution of the caliphate at the hands of Ataturk, the Islamic world lost its institutional unity, although Mecca continued to gain in international stature. But Arab nationalism after World War I severed the Arab Islamic identity from the two holy Arabian cities. Arab nationalists wanted Mecca to remain central to their vision of the future, but only as a national symbol of the pre-Islamic age. The new colonial powers that wanted to manipulate the caliphate by anointing Sherif Hussein of Mecca as the latest caliph contributed greatly to Mecca's loss of sanctity. The Wahhabis also took it upon themselves to purify Mecca of its Shia associations.

Much of Samman's focus in this study remains on Jerusalem. Under the heading "Modernity and the Unraveling of Jerusalem," he proves that this city endured one of the most violent outbreaks of modern nationalism ever seen. The flood of Jewish immigrants finally destroyed the holy city's ancient and medieval topography that always allowed the Jewish Quarter inclusion, rather than the exclusion, of the European ghettos. Some would claim that illegal Jewish settlements reversed the prototype of the ghetto by isolating and separating Palestinian Arab towns and villages. Samman also illustrates the disdain with which most of the European immigrants regarded the oriental character of the Old City of Jerusalem. This was amply demonstrated in a variety of ways, particularly by the destruction of the entire Moghrabi Quarter in 1967 and the removal of 123 Arab families in order to widen the plaza facing the Wailing Wall. The pressure on the city's Arab population continued. Residents were never permitted to return to their homes in West Jerusalem; in fact, they were transformed into "resident aliens" liable to lose their residency through the rampant practice of bureaucratic cleansing. Triumphant Israeli nationalism also pursued a vigorous effort to enhance the Biblical identity of the city by authorizing extensive archeological work bound to weaken the Arab and Islamic character of the city. Ironically, Israelis were aided in this effort by Christians of the American Zionist variety, who have a stake in unearthing the remains of ancient Jerusalem.

In this thought-provoking study, Samman ably employs the methodology of comparative analysis. Although some studies—such as Paul Knox and Peter Taylor's *World Cities in a World-System* (1995) and Victor Turner's *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (1995)—have already examined the sanctity of space and the modern state, this study is distinguished by its choice of these particular cities and its emphasis on ethnic and sectarian conflict. The author is able to make his case well, largely due to his familiarity with not only historical literature, but also political and sociological theory. He makes a point of demonstrating the applicability of the theories of Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner to his emphasis on the destructive impact of nationalism and the revolving nature of popular identities that often impact sacred space. He is the first scholar, however, to focus on the tragic fortunes of Jerusalem's Arab population in the context of these theories.

Reading this book is an enriching experience that will inform, challenge the imagination, and raise serious questions about the world's responsibility to centers of universal traditions. Although the author's comparatively minimal coverage of Mecca may be justified by the paucity of historical literature describing that city, much could have been made of the Arab and Islamic preference for the separation of administrative and religious centers. Throughout the long centuries of Arab rule, Ramleh was the administrative center of Palestine, and Jeddah and later Riyadh were seats of government. The Arabs also laid great emphasis on the duties of safeguarding their holy cities and managing their religious affairs. The Hashemite Hejazi dynasty, for instance, was delegitimized by the Saudi critique of its neglect of the Haj. This explains the current practice of referring to the Saudi monarch by his spiritual title as Khadim al-Haramain (the Servant of the Two Mosques).

Sea of Faith: Islam and Christianity in the Medieval Mediterranean World, by Stephen O'Shea. Walker & Company, 2006. 411 pages. \$26.95, hardcover.

John Burgess, U.S. Foreign Service (ret.); counselor for public affairs, Riyadh, 2001-2003

For the general reader as well as the specialist, for Westerners as much as Arabs, Stephen O'Shea's *Sea of Faith* is a very good read. O'Shea tells a broad story of Christian and Islamic conflict during the medieval period, organizing it around a handful of battles: Yarmuk (636), Poitiers (732), Manzikert (1071), Hattin (1187), Las Navas de Tolosa (1212), Constantinople (1453) and Malta (1565). More important, he makes a great effort to explain and describe periods of *convivencia* — times when a *modus vivendi* was found in which Christian, Muslim and Jewish populations found a way of living together peacefully and productively, no matter which power was on top.

The book packs a lot of disparate history within its covers. From the early spread of Islam to the repurposing of mosques and churches, from the architecture of the Krak des Chevaliers or the Zisa in Palermo to the scholarship of Roger II of Sicily, O'Shea shines light on many of the neglected corners of medieval times. Consistent throughout, though, is his depiction of a flow of history based on contingent politics, often using religion as a motivating force to help achieve very political ends, whether the actors were Christians or Muslims. He notes the way in which Christian rulers would ally themselves with Muslim rulers in fights against other Christians and their own Muslim allies. By the time of the various Crusades, it appears that it was every ruler for himself, with Aleppo battling Damascus, only pausing to take aim, variously, at Egypt or the occupying Latin kings. The role of the Nizaris, moving from their holds in the Jebel Ansariya to kill on order inconvenient rulers — Christian or Muslim — is well detailed without hyperbole. Of particular note is how only a distinct atrocity by one leader or another could serve to unify, for a time, the competing factions. Once the atrocity was avenged, things reverted to their messy norm.

The book offers many helpful reminders that, while history may not repeat itself, it certainly does "rhyme," as Mark Twain is alleged to have noted. The following quote, from Isaac of Étoile, an English Cistercian monk of the twelfth century, is not at all dissimilar — with a word change or two — from what we read today from leaders caviling about those who pervert their own understandings of Islam:

This dreadful new military order that someone has rather pleasantly called the order of the fifth gospel was founded for the purpose of forcing infidels to accept the faith at the point of the sword. Its members consider that they have every right to attack anyone not confessing Christ's name, leaving him destitute, whereas if they themselves are killed while thus unjustly attacking the pagans, they are called martyrs for the faith.... We do not maintain that all they do is wrong, but we do insist that what they are doing can be an occasion of many future evils.

As much as the conflicts, however, O'Shea also focuses on the long periods in which peace of a sort reigned. He writes that for a variety of reasons — physical or financial exhaustion, inconvenient deaths, decadence — war became unpalatable or impossible. Whether in Cordoba and other centers of Andalusia or in the Christian courts of Spain, Sicily or *Outremer*, rulers found that they needed to maintain good relations with the majority population. The Latin powers needed the local population to till the fields and build the castles. Muslim rulers faced the same issues in Andalusia. As a result, East became West and West became East, with each side adopting local practices and,

in some cases, values. This led to periods of great intellectual and artistic achievement, as both learned of and from the other. Even here, though, politics reared one of its uglier heads. Overzealous Europeans newly arrived in the Holy Land complained bitterly about the “*poulains*” who they thought had “gone native.” In a situation familiar to many modern diplomats, those with regional expertise had to defend themselves against their own, whose ideological sense of duty conflicted with the limits of the possible. Things weren’t any better on the Muslim side. Rulers from Spain to eastern Turkey and Iraq were accused by the fervid of being too soft or of out-and-out apostasy for their lack of belligerence.

Sea of Faith also provides a corrective for those whose last run-ins with this time period date back a while. O’Shea notes that the Chanson de Roland, which actually refers to Roland’s rear-guard action against the Basques, was revised to meet a later need for anti-Islamic propaganda. The Cid was typical of his era as an opportunistic warrior for hire, not only a brave Christian defender of the faith.

O’Shea’s earlier books — on the western front during World War I (*Back to Front*), where he sought to find and photograph the locations of various battles, and his look at the crusade against the Albigensians of Languedoc (*The Perfect Heresy*) — are partial models for this work. Scattered throughout are photographs, maps and prints (uncredited) of the periods on which he focuses. The quality of reproduction is not great, but they are adequate, enriching the text and providing context for the reader. Several seem to be his personal photographs of the locations of the battle grounds, often based on a best-guess as the precise locations are lost to us. Others are of the statuary erected over the centuries to commemorate what is often lost to even local memory. The reader gets the sense that O’Shea is doing what he can to ensure that history is not totally forgotten.

Sea of Faith makes great use of contemporary records — Muslim, Christian and Jewish — to tell how the events were seen contemporaneously as well as by later historians. In his extensive endnotes, he expands his theses, providing further quotation and argument. Also included in the end matter is a “who’s who” of the period, a basic timeline and a very useful, 10-page bibliography of sources.

This book provides a great look at a period that is usually neglected in both American and Arab classrooms. It will prove useful at the high school and university levels as an auxiliary text. For the general reader, it shines an exciting, often humorous light on the times.