Donald J. Trump's unexpected presidential victory in November 2016 has thrown a curveball into Turkey's difficult relations with the Kurds. What will be the Trump administration's policies toward Turkey and the Kurds? Will the new president continue to support the majority of Kurds in Syria battling ISIS or emphasize a renewal of the NATO alliance with Turkey? Trump's earlier statements that NATO allies should carry more of the organization's financial burdens potentially call into question NATO's future, especially given Trump's avowed admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin. How will the new administration's stated intention to emphasize business affairs affect its relations with Turkey and the Kurds? Will the Trump administration support putative independence for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)?

It is difficult to predict the actions of any new U.S. president, let alone Donald Trump. He has been all over the map with his statements and claims, only to walk many of them back or simply ignore them when inconvenient. Indeed, Trump's relationship with truth and accuracy is tenuous, often brushing off inflammatory remarks as tough-men's, "locker-room" talk or mere "smack."

Nevertheless, through all the rhetorical fog, one can discern certain broad paths that will affect U.S. relations with Turkey and the Kurds. Trump has expressed a liking for both and proclaimed his desire for them to work together. For example, during a talk about the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016, he declared: "I'm a big fan of the Kurdish forces. At the same time, I think we have a potentially — we could have ... potentially — very successful relations with Turkey. And it would be really wonderful if we could put them somehow both together."¹

Of course, Trump comes new to all this, as his confusion in 2015 between Quds and Kurds illustrated. This faux pas occurred when the then presidential candidate was asked what he thought about Qassem Soleimani, the leader of the Quds Force of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps.² Moreover, once Trump learns the nuances of the multidimensional Kurdish issue, how will his fondness be expressed for the different types of Kurds he will have to deal with in Turkey, Syria and Iraq? As pointed out years ago, from the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy, there are "good" Kurds and "bad" ones.³ However, even in the case of the "bad" Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the challenge of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has led the United States to support a PKK ally, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party/Peoples Defense Units/Womens Defense Units (PYD/YPG/YPJ). In Iraq, the United States actually worked with the PKK to help save the Yezidis when ISIS launched its genocidal attack against them in August 2014. Some might suspect that the terrorist label for the PKK eventually might be set aside, as the United States has already declined to use it for the PYD/YPG/YPJ. Despite Trump's seeming ignorance on all these matters, it would be a mistake to dismiss his ability to learn quickly and then implement.

Donald Trump appears to be more favorably disposed toward Turkey than was his predecessor, Barack Obama. If so, he will have to deal with Turkey's three main problems with the United States: (1) ending cooperation with the Syrian Kurdish PYD/YPG/YPJ; (2) extraditing Fethullah Gulen, the Muslim cleric currently living in the United States who Turkey claims, with strong evidence, orchestrated the failed coup of July 15, 2016; and (3) coordinating the war against ISIS.

One hundred days into his administration, Trump has met difficulties in trying to solve all three of these problems. For example, in October 2015, the United States had already attempted to orchestrate a working compromise to the first problem by creating the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — a PYD/YPG/YPJ-led militia also consisting of some Arab and other fighters — in an attempt to assuage Turkish opposition. However, Turkey was not impressed by what was largely a mere name change, especially after Trump apparently decided to continue to support it in the final strikes against ISIS, instead of supporting Turkey and its Syrian-opposition allies.

The new president will probably put a great deal less pressure on Turkey for its perceived human-rights and general domestic problems, and instead emphasize making business deals to aid both countries, possibly at the expense of the Kurds. Such deals might help rejuvenate the ailing Turkish economy. For example, just after his election Trump reminded listeners, "I have a major, major building in Istanbul," and claimed "It's a tremendously successful job. It's called Trump Towers — two towers, instead of one, not the usual one, it's two."⁴