Relations between Syria and Iraq are described as some of the "most perplexing" in Arab politics.1 No two other Arab countries match their consistent level of rivalry and hostility. Enmity has always been a constant feature of Syrian-Iraqi relations — and it only partially ended with the demise of the Baath regime in Baghdad following the 2003 war. This article investigates the Iran-Iraq War period (1980-88) and analyzes the factors that determined the conflict between Syria and Iraq. The war occurred when their hostility was at its peak, following the collapse of unity negotiations in 1979. From the early stages of the war, it was clear that Syria was backing Iran against its fellow Arab country. This hostility was interspersed by brief periods when Iraq attempted — ultimately unsuccessfully — to achieve rapprochement with Syria. As the war was ending in 1988, Iraq, in revenge, supported the anti-Syrian Lebanese factions for no strategic purpose, just to irritate Syria.
Mufti2 and Kienle3 argue that the struggle for pan-Arab leadership and the geopolitical realities of the two countries were consistent drivers of the rivalry between the two nations. This article, however, argues that lasting conflict was caused by the lack of democratic government. Most of the Arab political elites perceived democracy as passé; East European authoritarianism — civilian or military — was in vogue. Thus, there was little hope that second-wave democracy, which began in Portugal in 1974, would democratize the region. Syria and Iraq entered into a new historical stage when Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) and Hafez al-Assad (1979-2000) were in power. Their ascent added a personal factor to Syrian-Iraqi relations. Both wanted to turn their countries into strong regional players. They believed that one-man rule and an authoritarian system of government with limited pluralism would achieve their vision. While Hussein used the power of the party to consolidate his power, Assad utilized the Syrian military. Like his predecessor, Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr (1968-79), Hussein managed to keep the military away from the regime. He portrayed himself as the man of the party, the comrade. The military was kept professional. Nevertheless, he organized Jihaz Haneen, which became the intelligence agency. Assad, on the other hand, turned the party into a military institution; the civilian wing of the party became powerless. He also established paramilitary organizations, such as the defense companies Saraya al-Difa led by his brother, Rifat al-Assad, to protect his regime. Eventually, both presidents gained complete control over their respective parties. They never attempted to abolish them; they still needed their seal of approval.
THE THEORETICAL DEBATE
Various approaches have been developed to explain the impact of leaders' impact on foreign policy of states. Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, in their theory of complex realism,4 argue that the personalities of MENA leaders have had a significant impact on foreign policy. They argue that, regardless of situational factors and the perceptions of facts and information, "In regimes in which power is personalised and concentrated, and especially in times of fluidity and crisis," the leader's predispositions "can make an enormous difference."5 Indeed, in authoritarian regimes, the leader controls the process of decision making regardless of the degree of legitimacy of the regime.6 As Zartman argues, "Foreign policy is a reflection of the whims and caprices of the man at the top."7 It is true that MENA leaders take decisions under certain social circumstances and within an institutionalized context, but because most of the regimes in the region are not pluralistic and lack an institutionalized foreign policy, the personality of the leader matters.8 One could argue that it is difficult to analyze the foreign policy of Egypt in the 1960s without reference to the personal character of Gamal Abdul Nasser (1956–70) or to analyze Libya's foreign policy without referring to the personality of Muammar Qadhafi (1969–2011) and the philosophy laid out in his Green Book. In a similar vein, Presidents Assad and Hussein in the 1980s and the 1990s had an absolute monopoly over the processes of decision making.
The cases of Presidents Hussein and Assad illustrate how leaders' personal characters matter in authoritarian regimes. Ehteshami and Hinnebusch argue that the two had different personal predispositions; therefore, Syria and Iraq had different foreign-policy agendas, and the countries were never able to achieve peaceful relations. Nevertheless, this article argues that the two rulers had similar personalities. Both belonged to the minority sect in their countries, were more or less the same age, and had "rural lower-class roots, an iniquitous socio- political environment, and the influence of Arab nationalism."9 Both sought power "in compensation for their modest origins,"10 competing over their pan-Arab credentials to gain domestic and regional legitimacy. Most important, both presidents were inclined to use force and terror against their foes, adopting a conflictual leadership style to secure their regimes. This was also a determining factor in the animosity between their countries. A leadership style is often produced "from those behaviors that were useful in securing the leader's first political success; these actions become reinforced across time as the leader relies on them to achieve the second, third, and so forth successes."11 Thus, power and mistrust were the key tools that secured their rule. They ended up being the sole decision makers in their countries. Therefore, Syria and Iraq had similar conflictual foreign policies, with minor differences determined by domestic dynamics and geopolitical realities.
Scholars of personality studies agree on several circumstances in which the influence of leaders becomes a significant factor in shaping the foreign policy of their states. The first condition is the nature of the position the leader occupies.12 Presidents Hussein and Assad were at the top of the political pyramid, with positions not only ceremonial or executive, but political, giving them domination over decision making. Any decision taken by Iraq or Syria during the time of these two strongmen was ultimately personal. Therefore, it is fruitless to explain the foreign-policy decisions of Syria and Iraq under their rule without referring to their personalities.
War and political crises are the second condition in which a leader's impact on foreign-policy making increases.13 Because it is often hard to get information about the crisis quickly, decision makers act using their native abilities and experiences.14 Assad and Hussein made a particularly significant impact on foreign policy during the Iran-Iraq War.
The third condition on which a leader's foreign-policy role depends is his interest in foreign-policy issues.15 For example, President Donald Trump focuses far more on foreign-policy issues than his predecessor, President Barak Obama (2009-16), who handed much of the U.S. foreign-policy agenda to his vice president, Joe Biden, and his assistant and speechwriter, Ben Rhodes.16 Presidents Hussein and Assad were both interested in foreign policy. It provided them with internal legitimacy, through utilization of pan-Arabism. Both kept the process of decision making in their own hands and bolstered the legitimacy of their regimes internally by acting as promoters of pan-Arabism.
The fourth condition is the relative level of development of the state's foreign-policy organization. Hermann argues that the more established the foreign-policy body is, the less influential the leaders are in shaping policy.17 In developing states, foreign policy is not highly institutionalized, and leaders have space to be influential.18 Because the process of state formation is still going on, foreign policy in Syria and Iraq was not to any significant extent institutionalized, and they lack stable foreign policies. This allowed both presidents to significantly influence the shape of foreign policy.
The fifth condition is the way in which leaders ascend. Hermann argues that leaders who come to power in chaotic situations such as coups d'état and revolutions usually dominate foreign policy. They often enjoy a honeymoon period immediately after these dramatic events, allowing them total control.19 Both Hussein and Assad came to power through relatively bloodless coups. President Assad managed to remove President Nureddin al-Atassi quietly in 1970. Similarly, President Hussein calmly removed President Bakr from power in 1979.
The sixth observation concerns charisma. A charismatic leader manages the domestic and foreign policies of the state and is expected to solve problems. His values and beliefs become the values and beliefs of his followers.20 The publics in Iraq and Syria called them father, leader and struggler against imperialism. Their photos, posters and statues were in every single town. Infrastructure projects, streets and hospitals were named after them. President Hussein surrounded himself with the illusion of being the victorious president, the comrade who faced the yellow storm from the east — Iran — and imperialism — the infidel state and great Satan, the United States, in 1991. To a certain extent, the two were quite popular, and they managed to manipulate public opinion through a well-controlled media into thinking they were indispensable.
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
The behavior of Presidents Hussein and Assad during the Iran-Iraq War illustrates the degree of overlap in their leadership styles. This article argues that geopolitics and domestic factors were the subjects of Syrian-Iraqi conflict, not the causes. Instead, the root of the conflict was the conflictual leadership style of the presidents, which ensured sustained Syro-Iraqi hostility. Both sought leadership of the Baath party, and even leadership of the Arab world through subversion and war.
On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. The Syrian regime did not play an immediately active part in the war; President Assad refused to meet the Iranian envoy in September 1980 to discuss it. However, it became clear to President Hussein that Syria had been backing Iran from the start. So, in October 1980, Iraq cut diplomatic relations with Syria, accusing it of supplying arms and sending 2,000 military experts to Iran.21 It continued to support Islamists inside Syria, mainly the Islamic Front, established in Damascus in October-November 1980. While suppressing the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq, the Iraqi regime backed the "military wing" of the Syrian branch of the party. In retaliation, a month later, President Assad supported the Iraqi opposition groups that established the Democratic National Patriotic Front (DNPF) and the National Democratic Front (NDF), both of which include two Kurdish parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Assad, in the meantime, was supressing his own Kurds in the north of the country.
Mistrust and suspicion of others were the hallmarks of the two presidents; both focused on loyalty. As sultanistic regimes (a term used by Weber), the two gained loyalty by reward and fear, focusing on family and tribal ties. One could argue that Assad and Hussein were paranoid; their mutual suspicion was clearly profound. Hussein used to call Assad the "yellow snake." On several occasions, he mentioned that Assad conspired against him and wanted the Iraqi regime to disappear. Similarly, Assad never trusted Hussein and considered him an extreme threat to his regime.22 He called Hussein the "hatchet man" of Iraq and mentioned once that during the unity negotiations of 1979, he was irritated by Hussein's unpleasant treatment, which he considered "inappropriate for receiving and hosting heads of state."23 This hatred increased during the war.24
Both leaders were also deeply cynical about the regional order. Iraq was at war with Iran, and Syrian tensions with Israel in Lebanon were growing. For Assad, a rapprochement with Iraq would have meant the end of the alliance with Iran — their shared enemy was one of the elements of their alliance — and it would have undermined Syria's position vis-à-vis Israel. Any Syrian settlement with Iraq would have been expensive, upsetting the strategic alliance with Iran. President Assad was not ready to take such a high risk, as he believed Iraq's aim was to dominate Syria. Thus, the war offered him not only a strategic alliance with Iran but also the opportunity to weaken the Iraqi army. In addition, there was a differing ideological perception. Assad often compared his party's revolutionary approach to what he called the "jihadi approach" of the Iranian revolution.25 The delay in direct cooperation with Iran might also have been due to Syrian-Soviet relations. Soviet-Iranian relations had deteriorated after the revolution, when the Communist party in Iran faced repression from the Islamic regime. Syria avoided angering Russia by establishing an immediate alliance with Iran; they had both just signed a treaty of amity and cooperation in October 1980, which guaranteed the Soviet state's protection of Syria. Hussein could have considered Israel his rear guard against Syria, but pan-Arabism prevented the development of such a scenario. This ideological stance was a persistent foreign-policy constraint. Besides, the legitimacy of the Baathist regimes in both Iraq and Syria was based on commitment to pan-Arabism and opposition to the state of Israel.
This does not mean the two presidents were dogmatic. In fact, both demonstrated some degree of pragmatism, especially in the first two years of the war. For instance, despite Syria's support for Iran, President Hussein did not cut off all relations with Syria. This allowed Iraq to transfer its oil through the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline from the early days of the war. At the same time, he persistently backed the Islamists in Syria until President Assad crushed the rebellion at Hama in 1982. In addition, at the Tunis summit of May 1981, Hussein used the Syrian SAM crisis in Lebanon to discredit President Assad's pan-Arabism. He accused the latter of exploiting the PLO and the Palestinian cause in Lebanon to achieve peace with Israel. However, when Israel destroyed the SAM missiles in June 1982 in the Beqaa Valley, Iraq opposed the Israeli action, stating that it would not tolerate an Israeli attack against Syria — posturing pan-Arabism and possibly exploiting Syria's weakness.
For his part, President Assad was not an impulsive man;26 his passive "wait and see" strategy was perhaps an attempt to buy time. He also kept the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline open from the Syrian side in the first two years of the war to support his country's deteriorating economy. At the same time, it was reported that Syria was providing military assistance to Iran27 and had offered support to the Iraqi opposition in Damascus. In addition, the Iraqi opposition radio, the Voice of Iraq, was based in Damascus and played a major role in mobilizing the opposition to President Hussein's regime. Thus, Assad's actions matched his rhetoric, demonstrating a balanced "push it to the limit" approach. Once Assad realized Iran's strong position in the war, he blocked the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline, deliberately timing this action with Iran's offensive operation in Dezful Shush. A few days after this Iranian action, Syria signed an agreement with Iran for the supply of 8.7 million tons of crude oil: "2.7 million were to be part of a barter arrangement, and the rest [paid for] mostly in cash."28 Assad did not formally support Iran until he had made sure that Iran "could hold off an Iraqi victory."29
Power seemed to have ultimately determined the approaches of both Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad. When they were weak, they used cooperation; when they were strong, they tended to use a more aggressive strategy. The two did not employ unbending strategies in dealing with world politics. They accommodated external threats with available resources. This game continued between the two regimes throughout the war. Moreover, in the second half of 1982, Iraq became vulnerable both at the front line against Iran and at the regional level. Iran began to drive Iraqi troops out of its territories and started offensive operations. In July 1982, Iran launched "Operation Ramadan" to capture Basra, the third largest city in Iraq. Once he realized his miscalculation in initiating the war, President Hussein declared that the Iraqi army would withdraw from all Iranian territories. He announced a ceasefire as the first step in forming a united front with Syria and Iran to confront Israel. But the Iranian response was harsh; "The road to Jerusalem, al-Quds, passes through Karbala... War, war until victory."30 The Iraqi army, however, continued its withdrawal from Iranian territories, hoping Iran would change its attitude.
President Assad backed (politically) Iran's offensive operations against Iraqi forces. Ultimately, Iranian troops succeeded in crossing the border, penetrating nearly 14.5 miles into Iraqi Kurdistan. Assad was accused of putting his personal interests ahead of his country's. Yet, for him, the alliance with Iran was a strategic partnership. It kept the Iraqi army in check, it strengthened his position in Lebanon, and, finally, his regime gained cash from Iran, "including a grant of $200 million to help" finance the conflict against Israel.31 The Syrian position in Lebanon in 1983 was robust because of the addition of Soviet weaponry. Another factor strengthening his position in Lebanon could be the lack of enough Israeli and U.S. troops to drive the Syrian army out of the country.32 Most important, the United States did not push to the limit against the Syrian regime. Syria had signed a "treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union," so any further push against the Syrian regime would have had severe consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations.33 Assad felt confident enough not to have to attempt a rapprochement with the Iraqis.
President Assad was accused of violating pan-Arab principles by supporting the Iranian offensive. He justified his stand by highlighting Iran's significant role in the Arab-Israel conflict and blaming Iraq for weakening the Arab position against Israel. In fact, Assad used to call Imam Khomeini "a Baathist with a turban."34 In support of his position, Assad stated in a speech in 1982: "When Islamic revolutionary Iran raised the slogan of brotherhood with the Arabs, when Iran raised the slogan of struggle against [U.S.] imperialism, when Iran did all this and said: I am with you, Arabs, in your war against your enemy because your cause is mine. At that time, the hangman of Iraq invaded Iran."
As the Iranian forces' position changed from defensive to offensive, Hussein sought to extend the war into the Gulf region and damage the international oil trade. He hoped that the GCC countries and the superpowers would then intervene to stop the war. He also hoped that the GCC would stop supporting the Syrian regime in Lebanon, which might have constrained Assad and eventually pushed him to cooperate with Iraq and isolate Iran. He also adopted active diplomacy to persuade Syria to open the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline and accepted the offer of the king of Saudi Arabia to meet Assad, who refused the opportunity. The president of the UAE also attempted to bring the two countries to the negotiating table; Syria rejected all these political openings. When Hussein realized that the Iranians would continue to fight, he became willing to compromise with the Syrians.
The Iraqi regime at that time had already become Assad's "card" to gain cash from outside to support Syria's economy. The Syrian foreign minister told his Iraqi counterpart at the UN General Assembly in September 1983 that Assad was considering opening the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline. In fact, Assad never wanted to, but it was a cunning move to sign new oil contracts with Iran. For Assad, opening the pipeline would have meant the certain loss of Iran as an ally against his number one enemy, Israel. Therefore, he kept his "balanced" strategy unaltered, since it had secured his position against Iraq and Israel. President Hussein became aware of these games. Indeed, when President Assad called for unity with Iraq in September 1986, he rejected the call. He was sceptical about Syrian intentions and afraid to be wrong-footed after the previous reconciliation attempts. He did not believe that Syrian intentions were genuine, but rather that the Assad regime had repeatedly used them to obtain oil deals from Iran.
In the last three years of the war, the Iraqi army was able to conduct some successful operations against Iran. This success gave President Hussein confidence. Thus, it was his turn not to respond to Assad's calls. Moreover, for the first time since spring 1982, Iraq launched an offensive attack on the central front (Qasr-e-Shirin) between January 28 and early February 1985. President Hussein had already received American and European loans and military assistance. This relative success, however, did not alter relations between Syria and Iraq. President Hussein's confidence increased. In addition, his regional position was stronger than in the second phase of the war. The spread of the conflict into the Gulf in the mid-1980s strengthened his regime, especially after the Iranian occupation of the city of al-Faw in 1986. This Iranian action put Syria in an embarrassing position in the Arab world by disproving Syria's past assurances to the Arab states of Iran's lack of interest in occupying Iraq or any other Arab territory. Iraq expected Syria to stop supporting Iran after the occupation of al-Faw. Syria, along with Libya, however, maintained its anti-Iraq position. Assad's support for Iran "embittered Iraqi officials, who repeatedly reminded Damascus of its promises as well as the fact that Iraqi forces had come to Syria's rescue when it was in a critical military situation in the 1973 Yom Kippur war."35
Jordan remained Iraq's main economic outlet to the world for oil and goods (tankers transferred nearly 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) of Iraqi oil to the global market). The Iraqi regime had full access to the port at Aqaba. The historian Maddy-Weitzman wrote that during his summer vacation visits to Eilat, he witnessed three ships entering the port on the Israeli side while, on the Jordanian side, 25 or more ships were waiting to unload because of all the goods going to Iraq.36 Egypt, on the other hand, offered matériel, arms and support for Iraq's position in the war internationally and regionally. It was also reported that during the war the Iraqis recruited Egyptian workers. Egypt wanted to break its isolation from the Arab world after the peace accord with Israel. The Iraqi regime was pragmatic enough not to link rapprochement with Egypt to the 1979 peace agreement; it needed Arab support and turned a blind eye to the pact. Although most of the tanks bought from Egypt were not usable, Hussein refused to terminate the contract, as he wanted to normalize Iraqi-Egyptian relations. Iraq succeeded in exporting one million bpd through Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Oil exports reached 1.5 million bpd when the second pipeline with Turkey was opened. Iraq's position in the war was also improved when it signed a deal with the United States to buy 55 Bell helicopters and received satellite images of Iranian troop locations.37
President Hussein thus decreased his cooperation in the third phase of the war, and President Assad somewhat increased them. This again proves how power determined the two presidents' foreign policy approaches. Nevertheless, the two remained passive in their cooperative efforts. After the Iranian occupation of al-Faw, efforts to restore relations stalled. While President Assad insisted on reactivating the Joint National Action of 1978, President Hussein disagreed, banning any agreement with Syria unless it cut relations with Iran. Following that, in February 1986, the director-general of the Iraqi security services, Ali Hassan al-Majid, the president's brother, accused Syria of conducting espionage activities inside Iraq, including support for Syrian-trained Iranian groups, to carry out sabotage activities, and of sponsoring another group to collect information about the Iraq-Saudi pipeline. In March 1986, a massive explosion occurred in Damascus, caused by a bomb connected to a refrigerator truck. The attack left several dead and nearly 200 injured. Syria accused Iraq of carrying out the attack, then blamed Israel, and then Iraq again.38 Several other attacks occurred in Damascus and Aleppo, causing the death of nearly 150 people and injuring 150 more. The Iraqi-backed Muslim Brotherhood was accused of carrying them out.39
President Assad was relatively weak at the regional level during the third phase of the war. Thus he sought to open channels with the Iraqis. The continuation of Iran's offensive to capture Basra embarrassed him in the Arab world and undermined the reasons for his anti-Iraq stand. Second, the PLO-Jordan rapprochement that took place in 1985 constrained Syria's pan-Arab claims and increased those of Jordan. This issue isolated Syria in the Arab sphere. One can argue that some Syrians rejected President Assad's pro-Iran position, but the brutality of his regime in dealing with opposition and the legacy of the Hama massacre of 1982 made it extremely dangerous to oppose the government's policies; one could not survive in the opposition.40 Therefore, pro-Iraq voices were mute; no one dared to challenge Assad's anti-Iraq stand. Third, the pro-Syrian Amal movement besieged the Palestinian camps in Beirut. This soured Syria's relations with Libya and brought Egypt back into the Arab fold again. Fourth, an Iraq-Jordan-Egypt axis was established to confront the Libya-Iran-Syria axis that was already facing some challenges. Fifth, Syria's inability to pay its debts for Iranian oil, and the clashes between Syrian troops and Hizballah militants increased tension between Tehran and Damascus. Thus, the country suffered economically. Iran's attitude hardened after the Iraqi attack on Kharg Island, putting more pressure on a country that had been ravaged by war and economic sanctions since the 1979 revolution.41 The Syrians had already set up meetings with their Iraqi counterpart. Having nothing to lose, the latter accepted to meet this time. However, the Iranian oil saved Assad again from having to compromise with Hussein. Indeed, in May-June 1985, Iran resumed oil shipments to Syria immediately after Syria had cancelled a meeting with Iraqi officials. In August 1985, Iran granted Syria a discount of 6 million tons of oil.
As mentioned, President Assad maintained his backing for Iran, using its support for the Palestinian cause as the rationale to gain cash from the GCC countries. President Hussein, on the other hand, continued to claim that Iraq was the solid bulwark for the Arab world against Iran — "the Yellow Danger," as he called it.42 Both regimes ended up accusing each other of working against the interests of the Arab world and looked for opportunities for mutual damage.43 Assad continued to block the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline, and Iraq tried to convince Syria to reopen this strategic asset, but all its attempts failed.
The danger of a wider war in the Gulf created anxiety among the GCC countries. Several Arab states put considerable pressure on Assad to come to terms with Hussein. In May 1986, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, along with Jordan and Algeria (because of its neutrality in the war), attempted to bring the Syrians and Iraqis to the negotiating table.44 King Hussein visited Damascus and Baghdad two or three times in May of that year. The Iraqis endorsed the move and showed readiness to make peace with Syria. Such a rapprochement would have isolated Iran from the rest of the Arab world and delegitimized Iran's cause, perhaps turning the conflict into an Arab-Iranian war. This scenario would have led to greater Arab support for Iraq, both militarily and financially. In addition, it would have opened the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline, increasing Iraq's oil-exporting capacity and eliminating the need for multiple export routes.45
During the meetings, the Syrians insisted on reactivating the Joint National Action agreement of 1979. The action called for political, military, economic and cultural union. The Syrians argued that this would stop the war,46 possibly because of the economic benefits to be gained. It was finally agreed that a meeting would take place between Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa and his counterpart, Tariq Aziz, on June 13, 1986. However, Syria cancelled the meeting when it received the first Iranian oil shipments in months. Soon afterward, Iranian Foreign Minister Muhammad Ali Besharati met President Assad in Damascus and assured him that the Syria-Iran alliance was a strategic one.47
On July 31, 1986, clashes took place between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi police officers in the Muslim holy city of Mecca. This was followed by attacks on the Saudi and Kuwaiti embassies in Tehran. As a result, Saudi Arabia called for an Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Summit. Iran was blamed for supporting terrorism and subversion inside Saudi Arabia. President Hussein tried to use this event to delegitimize Iran in the Islamic world. He condemned the attack: "Even when the Iranian rulers say they have a religion, it is not the Islamic one."48 President Assad attempted to contain the crisis and expressed his regret to King Fahd. At the same time, he avoided any public statement concerning Iran, and sent Farouk al-Sharaa to Tehran to discuss the crisis with Iranian officials.
Following the OIC Summit, two emergency ministerial Arab summits took place at the Arab League headquarters in Tunis. At the first, in August 1987, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait proposed a resolution to cut Arab diplomatic ties with Tehran. Syria, Libya, Algeria, the UAE and Oman opposed it, with Farouk al-Sharaa stating that such an act would establish a foreign presence in the region.49 The summit ended with no unified Arab action taken against Iran. This created anxiety in Saudi Arabia, revealed in Radio Riyadh's comment: "The goal of Arab unity, for which the Arab League was founded, is merely a dream...."50 However, it was decided to leave the emergency session open and resume the summit in September, to decide about the future of Arab-Iran relations. To please the Saudis, President Hussein ordered the bombing of Iranian oil facilities. Eventually, on September 20, the foreign ministers met again at the Arab League headquarters in Tunis. This coincided with the Iranian attack on Saudi tankers in the Gulf. The final communique of the meeting called for an Arab summit in Amman in November 1987 to examine the Iran-Iraq War and its threat to the Gulf region.
AL-JAFR MEETING
King Hussein tried to organize a meeting between Saddam Hussein and Hafez Assad. The latter finally agreed, "for the sake of the host."51 On April 27, 1987, on his way home from Moscow, he met the Iraqi president at a remote desert air base at al-Jafr, located in southern Jordan. Along with the two presidents, King Hussein and Crown Prince Abdallah of Saudi Arabia were present but did not participate in the discussion.52 The meeting lasted for five to 13 hours.53 This was the second face-to-face meeting between the two presidents since the failure of the 1979 rapprochement; they had met briefly on the sidelines of the Fez II Summit in September 1983. After a long discussion with no witnesses, the two presidents decided on a six-point program: a cessation of all hostile propaganda; a meeting between the two prime ministers or senior officials; a discussion between oil and interior ministers; an exchange of political prisoners, and another meeting between the heads of state at the next Arab summit (Baram, unpublished work). Among other issues discussed were the reopening of the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline, closed since 1982; the water level of the Euphrates River,54 and mutual cessation of support for each other's enemies.55
As a grace note, Syria blocked the Iraqi opposition conference in Damascus that was supposed to take place during this time. Another meeting took place at the ministerial level between Farouk al-Sharaa and Tariq Aziz in Moscow in June. However, the scenario of the 1986 agreement was once again raised for discussion. Syria demanded the reactivation of the Joint National Action of 1978, but Iraq was sceptical about it and requested that Syria first "adopt a neutral position" in the war.56 But, President Hussein was not ready for any form of unity with Syria. Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia participated with Jordan to try to bring Syria and Iraq together to end this mutual hostility. Nevertheless, the issues discussed between the two presidents, and between Farouk al-Sharaa and Tariq Aziz, were not pursued seriously because of the passive-cooperative diplomacy both utilized, and the negotiations failed. As a result, the two states returned to their original positions. Syria continued backing the Iraqi opposition inside its borders and Iran in the war. Iran and Syria signed an agreement allowing the latter to receive 260,000 tons of crude oil as part of the contract signed in 1986 under Syria's debt repayment conditions. In May, a second agreement was signed, whereby Syria would receive one million tons of crude oil, 25 percent at a discount.57 Following that, on July 28, a Syrian MiG-21 jet violated Iraqi airspace and was shot down by anti-aircraft.58 Shortly afterward, the Iraqis sent a memorandum to the secretary general of the Arab League condemning Syrian violation of its air sovereignty. The Syrians, for their part, criticized the downing of the jet, arguing that the pilot had mistakenly entered Iraqi airspace.59
THE AMMAN SUMMIT
Arab leaders met in Amman on November 8-11, 1987, mainly to discuss the Iran-Iraq War. President Assad reluctantly agreed to take part, partially to preserve his regime's internal legitimacy. Secondly, the Iranian operation to capture Basra put the legitimacy of the pan-Arab Baath regime under threat. Syria continuously argued that its support for Iran was based on its commitment to confront and end the Israeli "occupation of Palestine." Thus, President Assad was "aware that Syria's Arab nationalist credentials would be severely damaged by complicity in the fall of an Arab city to Iran." Therefore, he "warned Iran that the alliance would be in jeopardy if it persisted in its assault on Basra."60
Another reason for Assad's participation in the Amman summit could have been Syria's need for an Arab alliance to support an Arab-Iranian rapprochement.61 The Iranian threat to the Gulf states and the Mecca crisis provided strong reasons for Arabs to reconsider the future of Arab-Iran relations. Syria was well aware of this fact and made sure that it could influence the outcome of the summit in a way that would protect its alliance with Iran. The summit decided
To condemn and reject the continuation of Iran's occupation of Arab territory in Iraq given the fact that this constitutes flagrant aggression against the sovereignty of an Arab League member state and an encroachment on its territorial safety.
To show complete solidarity with Iraq and stand alongside it in its legitimate defence of its territory and sovereignty.
To express the Arab countries' readiness to implement their obligations toward Iraq and among themselves by the Arab League Charter and the Treaty of Joint Defense, and Economic Cooperation among Arab League states.
To support Security Council Resolution 598 and fully back efforts to implement it in its entirety in a manner leading to the resolution of all aspects of the dispute.62
At the summit, Hussein and Assad met again, this time in the presence of King Hussein and seven other Arab leaders. After a "frank and direct" exchange of views they reached an agreement, the full details of which were not disclosed.63 In addition to the Syrian endorsement of the summit's resolution, this created the impression that a rapprochement was, indeed, on its way. However, the Syrians seem to have been playing another game against Iraq. Immediately following the summit, the Syrian foreign ministry assured Iran that nothing had changed and that the old flame was still burning. Foreign Minister al-Sharaa declared that Syria was surprised by the text read out at the concluding session of the summit because it had omitted the Syrian reservation. Syria, he declared, did not support the resolution that condemned Iran. "Iran," al-Sharaa declared, "was a victim of [Iraqi] aggression" and is by no means "an enemy of the Arabs." An official spokesperson for the ministry added, "Syria has emphasised [...] its strong relations with ...Iran... [and] its desire for this relationship to continue in a steady manner. Syria considers its ties with Iran to be a powerful asset for Syria, the Arab nations and Iran."64
In late December, Deputy President Abdul Halim Khaddam and Foreign Minister al-Sharaa of Syria embarked on a mediation effort in the Gulf. Syrian sources leaked to the Arab press that this mediation was intended to convince Iran to stop all preparations for its next military offensive and to agree to a ceasefire.65 However, Hussein soon learned that Assad's mediation was not aimed at putting an end to the war but at improving relations between the GCC countries and Iran. In return for their efforts to get the rich Gulf states off the Iranian hook, Assad could hope for generous financial rewards. Iraq went on the offensive. President Hussein sent a high-level delegation to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to warn them against collaborating with Syria.66 The Syrian response was no less aggressive. The al-Baath newspaper wrote that Iraq had betrayed the Palestinian cause and that this and other controversial issues were the main causes of disagreement between Damascus and Baghdad.67
Iran also launched Karbala Operation 1/2/3/4/5/6, which referred to the battle among Muslim factions in 680 AD that sent waves of soldiers to capture Basra and detach it from the rest of Iraq. However, the operation failed. By February 1988, Iran was unable to recruit the soldiers required for major new offensives in the south. Also, the general mood on the Iranian side of the southern front was sheer gloom. "At that point, Iraq stood to lose nothing by reverting to the pre-al-Jafr pattern of relations with Damascus: it had all the proof it wanted that Damascus remained on Iran's side even when Baghdad was most accommodating, and the Gulf Arabs most generous."68
The spread of the fighting to the Gulf region eventually led Iran to end the eight-year war. In July 1988, the United States Navy mistakenly shot down an Iranian plane (Flight 655) en route from Tehran to Dubai, causing the death of all 290 passengers. Afterwards, Ayatollah Khomeini made the decision to cease hostilities with Iraq and apply UNSCR 589.
1 Amatzia Baram, "Ideology and Power Politics in Syrian-Iraqi Relations," in Syria under Assad, eds. Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv (St Martin's, 1986): 125- 139.
2 Malik Mufti, Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq (Cornell University Press, 1996).
3 Eberhard Kienle, Ba'ath v. Ba'ath: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq, 1968-1989 (Tauris, 1990).
4 Anoush Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch, "Complex Realism," in International Relations of the Middle East, ed. Louis Fawcett (Oxford University Press, 2016): 239- 258 .
5 Ibid., 229.
6 Margret Hermann, "When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy," in In Search of Global Patterns, ed. James Rosenau (The Free Press, 1976), 326-332; and Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, "Complex Realism."
7 Bahgat Korany, Alaa Bin Hilal, and Karen Abul Kheir, The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization (American University in Cairo Press, 2010): 26.
8 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, "Complex Realism."
9 Frank Brown, Syria and Iraq: Relations and Prospects (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 1984): 3-4.
10 Ibid.
11 Margret Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis," in The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders with Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, ed. Jerrold Post (University of Michigan Press, 2005): 181.
12 Jerrold Post, The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton (University of Michigan Press, 2003).
13 Hermann, "When Leader," 330.
14 Ibid., 331.
15 Ibid.
16 Thomas Ricks, "A Stunning Profile of Ben Rhodes, the Asshole Who Is the President's Foreign Policy Guru," Foreign Policy (2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/28/a-stunning-profile-of-ben-rhodes-t…; and James Traub, "The Biden Doctrine: How the Vice President Is Shaping President Obama's Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy (2012), https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/10/the-biden-doctrine/.
17 Hermann, "When Leader," 330.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Kienle, "Ba'th," 159.
22 Abdul Halim Khaddam, The Syro-Iranian Alliance in the Region (Cairo, Dar al-Sharq, 2010).
23 Ghassan Imam, "Assad-Saddam: A Personal Hatred Relationship," al-Sharq al-Awsat (2003), http://archive.aawsat.com/leader.asp?article=185530&issueno=9016#.W31_g….
24 William Rugh, telephone interview, July 6, 2016.
25 Ghassan Imam, "Assad-Saddam."
26 Patrick Seale and Maureen McConville, Assad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (University of California Press, 1990), 169.
27 Kienle, "Ba'th," 159.
28 Dayan Centre, Middle East Contemporary Survey: 1982-83 (Tel Aviv, 1983): 821.
29 Anoushirvan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System (Routledge, 1997): 93.
30 Alam Saleh, Ethnic Identity and the State in Iran (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 55.
31 Rob Johnson, The Iran-Iraq War (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011): 99.
32 Dayan Centre, Middle East Contemporary Survey: 1983-84 (Tel Aviv, 1984): 678.
33 Itmar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 (Cornell University Press, 1985) .
34 Ghassan Imam, "Assad-Saddam."
35 Dayan Centre, Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS): 1986 (Tel Aviv, 1987): 383.
36 Skype interview, August 4, 2015.
37MECS: 1984-85 (Tel Aviv, 1986): 477.
38MECS:1986, 603.
39 Ibid., 99.
40 Maddy-Weitzman, Skype interview, August 4, 2015.
41 Khaddam, "Syro-Iranian," 79-80.
42MECS: 1984-85, 119.
43 Ibid.
44MECS: 1986, 98.
45 Ibid., 99-100.
46 Ibid., 99.
47 Ibid.
48MECS: 1986-87, 126.
49MECS: 1987, 127.
50 Ibid.
51Al-Qabas, June 7, 1986, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report, Near East & South Asia. June 8, 1986, cited in Baram, unpublished work.
52 Baram, telephone interview, May 15, 2016.
53MECS: 1987, 121.
54Al-Qabas.
55 Radio Damascus, August 26, 1987, in FBIS, Daily Report, Near East & South Asia.
56MECS: 1987, 122.
57 Ibid., 123.
58 Ibid., 647.
59MECS: 1986-87, 122.
60 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 96.
61MECS: 1987, 129.
62MECS, 1987, 145.
63 Radio Amman, November 9, 1987, in FBIS, Daily Report, Near East & South Asia, November 10, 1987, cited in Baram, unpublished work.
64 Radio Damascus, November 12, 1987, in FBIS, Daily Report, Near East & South Asia. November 13, 1987, cited in Baram, unpublished work.
65 AP from Manama, quoting the Saudi News Agency, December 31,1987, in FBIS, Daily Report, Near East & South Asia.
66 Radio Baghdad, January 21, 1988, in FBIS, Daily Report, Near East & South Asia; and FBIS, Daily Report, January 22, 1988, 28.
67 al-Ba'th, January 28, 1988, in FBIS, Daily Report, Near East & South Asia.
68 Baram, unpublished work.
Middle East Policy is fully accessible through the Wiley Online Library
Click below to subscribe to the online or print edition of Middle East Policy and gain access to all journal content.