Kawa Jabary and Anil Hira
Mr. Jabary and Dr. Hira are in the Department of Political Science at Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, Canada.
The controversy surrounding the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 will continue for years to come, not only over its justification but also over its outcomes. The idealistic hope emanating from the "Arab Spring" is just one more page added to the story. But one chapter has surprisingly received short shrift thus far: the successful development of a strong Kurdish region. Though U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden's suggestion of breaking up Iraq into three parts was summarily dismissed, in effect the Kurds have received de facto autonomy.1 The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has been an island of stability in comparison with the rest of strife-torn Iraq, where Sunni and Shia continue their conflict. Not only is such a turn of events miraculous from the point of view of offering the long-time Kurdish guerrilla group a chance to govern part of their region; it also allows for relative stability and the development of its abundant oil reserves. Thus, Kurdistan potentially offers a prosperous and stable development model for the rest of the region.
In this article, we discuss the main threat to this possible future, namely structural weaknesses in Kurdish governance, which remains deeply divided and incompetent. We consciously avoid a detailed history. Instead, the discussion is divided into three main areas to expose the problem. We begin with a brief discussion of the central historical dynamic of Kurdish politics: the interaction of its two main political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). We then turn to the influence of regional actors upon Kurdish development and the related roadblocks to getting the economy on track. We close with some thoughts about how the KRG might begin to move forward and reach its vast potential.
ORIGINS OF THE PARTIES
Kurdish nationalism as a political movement in Iraq arguably started in the late 1940s.2 It has been continually marked by competition among the key political figures who dominate the KDP and the PUK, both of which have deep roots in Kurdish regions and patrimonial networks based on tribal loyalties. While feelings of nationalism within Kurdistan run very strong, the disagreements among its charismatic leaders prevent channeling it productively towards a long-term consensus around development goals.
The KDP historically has been recognized for representing the Barzani tribe, a community located in the Badenan region in the northern territories of Iraqi Kurdistan. Unlike the KDP, the PUK has not been the political wing of one single tribe, but has depended on tribal loyalties. Its leader, Jalal Talabani, is from the Talabani tribe, one of the largest in Kurdistan; most of the high-profile members of the PUK represent a tribe.
The leader of the KDP is Masud Barzani. His deputy, a nephew, is Nechirvan Barzani, the prime minister of the Kurdistan region. Several other Barzanis also hold prominent positions in the KDP: Masroor, the eldest son of Masud, is the head of the KDP's secret agency; Adham, a cousin of Masud, is a member of the central committee. The tribe's influence over the KDP has historical roots, going back to its inception.
Mustafa Barzani, Masud's father, along with other political figures, formed the KDP in 1947. In that year, due to the revolt of his brother Sheik Ahmad against the government of Iraq, "Barzani had little option but to fight his way out of Iraq and seek sanctuary in the USSR."3 Leadership of the KDP fell to Ibrahim Ahmad, who was popular among students and the intellectual elite in Iraq but had very little support from rural areas. When General Qassem removed the monarchy and established the Republic of Iraq in 1958, he legalized political freedom and invited Barzani to return to Iraq. However, when Barzani arrived, he was displeased with the socialist orientation that the KDP had developed under the leadership of Ahmad. Qassem was in turn annoyed by the support the communists and the KDP were jointly enjoying in Iraq and attempted to limit their political freedom.
In 1963, the Arab Socialist Baath Party overthrew Qassem in a bloody coup. However, Barzani was able to distance the KDP from this political upheaval and remain nonaligned. During negotiations between Barzani and the Baath regime in 1963, Iraq's new president, Abdul Salam Arrif, ignored Ahmad and signed a treaty with Barzani to crush the Iraqi Communist Party, which had a good relationship with Ahmad. The agreement also divided the central committee of the KDP, putting Barzani and his followers on one side, and Ibrahim Ahmad and his son-in-law Jalal Talabani on the other.4 In protest, Ahmad and his followers left the party, blaming Barzani for acting against its principles.5
The departure of these intellectual members from the party gave Barzani a chance to gain full control over the KDP. However, after the Baath crushed the leftist groups and forced them into exile, it turned its attention towards its Kurdish ally, the KDP.6 In 1968, Ahmad Hassan Al-Baker replaced Arrif as president of Iraq and offered Barzani a deal to solve the Kurdish question. However, he didn't include the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, control over which has been the main demand of the Kurds.7 In 1971, the KDP rejected the deal, and Barzani was left with no choice but to return to the mountains of Kurdistan to resume his revolution.
For a short time, Barzani was able to continue his resistance because of support that he received from Iran. However, in 1975, President Al-Baker signed a treaty with Iran to settle border disputes and in return asked Iran to end its support for the Kurdish rebellion. This agreement enabled the Iraqi army to degrade the KDP's guerrilla presence and force Barzani to leave the mountains of Kurdistan and seek refuge in Iran.8 The retreat of the KDP as a fighting force was a golden opportunity for the party's former political bureau, particularly Jalal Talabani, to gain the initiative as political leaders. Talabani, with a group of colleagues, established their own political party, the PUK, in 1975.9 Through this new party, they began to challenge the KDP.
SADDAM'S REVENGE
Most of the major problems of Kurdish politics are associated with the rivalry between the PUK and the KDP. This rivalry was present even during those worst days, when the Iraqi regime launched brutal attacks against the Kurds in Iraq. As alluded to above, "Barzani's decision to abandon the struggle [against the Iraqi regime] after his defeat in 1975, and Talabani's ability to make use of this division to start a new party, the PUK, to carry on the struggle for Kurdish autonomy,"10 was the start of a deepening split. The two parties not only became opponents; they attacked each other on a daily basis. In addition, in order to prove itself as the main opposition force in the mountains of Kurdistan, the PUK found itself simultaneously fighting the KDP, Iran and the Iraqi army. These PUK operations, particularly against the KDP and Iran, were a relief to the army, allowing it to focus more on the war with Iran along its southern borders. Saddam offered a ceasefire and reconciliation with the PUK in 1983.
After a few months, the PUK realized that Saddam was playing for time and giving nothing to the Kurds. In 1984, the PUK broke the ceasefire and intensified its attacks against the Iraqi army. In addition, for the first time, the PUK made peace with the KDP under the leadership of Masud Barzani, who had inherited the leadership of the KDP after the death of his father. Talabani and Barzani also formed a coalition, the Kurdistan National Front (KNF), in 1986.11 With help from Iran, the PUK and KDP jointly attacked the city of Hallabja and forced the Iraqi army to withdraw. In revenge, the army famously attacked the city with chemical weapons, killing more than 5,000 Kurdish civilians. In 1988, after the war with Iran ended, Saddam turned his attention to the Kurds, in particular the prohibited areas around the cities of Sulaymania, Kirkuk, Kalar and Khanaqeen. In this attack, Saddam captured thousands of Kurds, most of whom wound up buried in mass graves.12 This campaign destroyed the foundations of both the KDP and the PUK, remnants of which resettled in Iran in 1989. These tragic events could have led to the laying of a new unified political foundation for Kurdish politics, but this was not to be the case.
EMERGENCE OF THE KRG
From the start of the Kurdish uprising in 1991, following the Gulf War, people attacked Baath government offices on a daily basis. Given its own challenges related to the UN sanctions program, the regime effectively withdrew from the Kurdish cities, and a coalition called the Kurdistan National Front (KNF) took control over the region. However, the political differences between the KDP and PUK have negatively affected the performance of the KNF. Even though the PUK and the KDP agreed to form a decentralized Kurdish Regional Government, they both remain loyal to their parties and their "politburos," developing separate revenue streams shared through patronage networks to ensure loyalty. For instance, the KDP collects 85 percent of its revenues, estimated at $750 million annually, from taxation and customs generated by illegal trade at the Iraqi Kurdish-Turkish border. The PUK, in turn, developed the Sulaymania cigarette factory, which between 1991 and 1997 increased production from 1,200 to 144,000 packs a day.13 Neither party returns these revenues to the KRG. Moreover, through other avenues, such as the sale of heavy construction equipment and the imposition of tariffs, the parties have profited from their control of the KRG.
The situation degenerated into civil war in April 1994. At the beginning of the conflict, the PUK was able to force the KDP out of the city of Erbil, but the victory did not last long. In 1996, with help from the Iraqi army, the KDP was able to defeat the PUK and push it out of Erbil into Sulaymania, thus cementing the regional centers of power for each party. Along with the PUK, other small political parties, such as the Islamic Movement in Kurdistan and the Socialist Democratic Party, also left the city of Erbil and joined the PUK in Sulaymania. After this conflict, both parties established their own cabinets of ministers, one in Erbil under the KDP, the other in Sulaymania under the PUK.14
The détente lasted until 1998. Later, in the wake of the U.S. invasion, the KDP and PUK finally agreed to mix their cabinets and create a single government. Nevertheless, in the process of creating it, the KDP insisted on controlling the positions of prime minster and president. Since Jalal Talabani was interested in becoming the president of Iraq, he agreed to give the KDP the positions they required. In the 2005 Iraqi federal election, the KDP and PUK participated together as one list, mixed their cabinets, and created a new government under the leadership of Nechirvan Barzani, the grandson of Mustafa, with his deputy from the PUK. After dividing up the important positions, the KDP received the presidency of Kurdistan and agreed to present Jalal Talabani as their candidate for the sovereign post in the Iraqi federal government.15 Even though the KRG cabinet was now mixed, the PUK and the KDP continued to pursue their separate party interests.
THE QUESTION OF KIRKUK
When the Iraqi constitution was rewritten and ratified through a referendum in 2005, many people hoped that the KRG would be able to guarantee the rights of the Kurds in the new Iraqi constitution and solve the problem of disputed territories. To a limited extent, the PUK and KDP were able to change the old political system in Iraq to a "federal government" (Article One), which also gave the Kurds further autonomy. The KDP and PUK were able to include the Kurdish language along with Arabic as one of two official languages in the new Iraqi constitution.16 Moreover, the issues of disputed territories, power relations and natural resources between Baghdad and Erbil were to be resolved according to Article 140 no later than December 2007. Not surprisingly, there are enormous issues of continuing dispute between the KRG and the Iraqi government. According to Michael Gunter, "These contested powers include the ownership of natural resources (mainly oil) and the control of the revenues flowing from them, the role of the KRG army, or Peshmergas [the former guerrillas of the PUK and KDP] and the final status of Kirkuk."17
The Iraqi government has been able to avoid honoring these articles and agreements because the KRG has lacked a unifying strategy. For instance, after more than eight years of disagreement over these disputed territories, the KDP and PUK have not been able to convince the minority groups within Kurdistan, mostly the Turkmen and the Sunni Arabs, that living within the Kurdistan border would benefit them. For a long time, the PUK and KDP ignored these groups but distributed land and money among their party members. In addition, according to Visser and Stansfield, "With the Kurdish leadership [KDP and PUK] demanding the inclusion of Kirkuk into Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and insisting upon not only its modern Kurdish character, but its more ancient Kurdish origins, the Kurds found themselves an implacable foe in the form of the Turkmens [and Arabs] of Kirkuk."18 The PUK and KDP have not been able to convince these two groups to accept a new identity for the city as part of a multi-ethnic and modern Kurdistan region. The KRG could have more easily incorporated the city into the Kurdistan region by presenting a legitimate leadership for the city and treating Arabs, Turkmens, Christians and Kurds equally.
GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS
In the last two decades, Iraqi Kurdistan has been at the center of a whirlwind of contestation between the KRG and regional actors. Ongoing tensions between the KDP and PUK therefore have to be understood in the context of the continual meddling and mediation of the regional actors,19 including Iran, Turkey and a host of others who wield influence through development assistance. The general dynamic is of the KRG accepting outside influence in return for economic favors. The KRG's response to the agendas and aid of these actors has largely been short-term in nature.
Sharing a border, the Kurds did not have many options but to build a good relationship with Iran, a natural ally in their war against Saddam. The relationship is complicated by the fact that Iranian Kurds have also been fighting for autonomy in their region. Through tacit complicity, the PUK and KDP have not only built a strong relationship with Iran; they also have allowed it to operate freely in the Kurdistan region. For example, the Islamic Republic was able to establish intelligence offices under the name of Qarargay Ramadan in major Kurdish cities.20 According to Sheri Lazier, through these offices, Iran carried out the assassinations of more than 300 Iranian Kurdish political activists who had taken shelter in Iraqi Kurdistan.21 The PUK and KDP have never publically complained about these crimes.
Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has pursued three goals in Kurdistan: to challenge the United States in Iraq, to make Kurdistan more dependent on Iran economically, and to monitor Iranian Kurdish activists in the Kurdistan region. The well-known disputes between the United States and Iran are beyond the scope of this paper, but some are important to note. According to Liven Magazine, 30-40 percent of Kurdistan's goods — fruits, vegetables and building materials — are imported from Iran, involving more than 150 Iranian companies.22 Iran has been using these companies to ensure that Kurdistan's markets remain dependent on Iran's products and goods. It has also used this economic relationship to advance its political interests. For example, whenever Iranian Kurdish political parties push for autonomy, Iran closes its borders to pressure the KRG to dissuade Iranian Kurds from pursuing such dreams. Using the Kurds to fight each other has been an effective way for Iran to reduce the number of its own dissidents.23
Turkey's antagonistic role towards autonomy is defined by its ongoing war with the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party), yet it has been able to influence the KRG. This started when Turkey was invited to intervene as a peacekeeper in the Kurdistan region in 1995 to stop the civil war between the KDP and the PUK. Even though Turkey's troops withdrew in 2006, they left behind many agencies and organizations to protect Turkey's interests in Kurdistan. Like Iran, Turkey has pushed Iraqi Kurds to refrain from stepping closer to full independence from Iraq. With the cooperation of the KRG, Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (MIT) has established many small organizations and units, such as Ouzel Tim, Jit Tim, Oyak, the Turkish Red Crescent and even some press agencies, to influence the situation in the Kurdistan region. These Turkish agencies all have the same purposes: to fight Iraqi bases of support for the PKK, to prevent the Kurds from expanding their autonomy, and to protect the Turkmen ethnic groups in the Kurdistan region.
Instead of resisting Turkey's intervention in its internal affairs, the KRG has not only provided help, it has also has fought side by side with the Turkish army against the PKK. According to Gunter, the Iraqi Kurds launched a major attack in 1992 against the PKK in order to retain Turkey's support; however, the outbreak of the civil war between the KDP and PUK gave the PKK an opportunity to survive.24 Under pressure from Turkey, Jalal Talabani pushed the PKK to stop its partisan attacks against the Turkish army. The PUK allied itself with Turkey by eliminating PKK activists. In addition, the Turkish army with 35,000 troops crossed the border of Kurdistan in 1995, hoping to destroy the PKK; however, the KDP and PUK only "partially cooperated with the Turks."25
The Turkish government has also been challenging the Kurds to not include Kirkuk city in their province. The Turkish government has officially rejected this and has created a political body, the Turkmen Front, to challenge this particular demand. The KRG's responses have been very weak. The KRG never used the vulnerability of Turkish economic interests, as we discuss below, to eliminate Turkey's interference in internal issues in the disputed territories, particularly Kirkuk.
Other actors also have direct stakes in the future of Kurdistan, as well as the same type of patronage relations with the KDP and PUK. In 1996, the oil-for-food program officially ended, but aid from international agencies kept flowing into the Kurdistan region.26 Moreover, "from 1991 to 1996, Kurdistan received approximately two-thirds of the total U.S. aid to Iraq, or over $1 billion in goods and services."27 According to the official website of the KRG, "U.S. companies and their partners have already planned more than $600 million in commercial investments in the Kurdistan Region in sectors as diverse as education, housing and industrial goods."28 Furthermore, 78 percent of the British Overseas Development Administration aid to Iraq went to Kurdistan, as did 65 percent of total UN funds. UN aid and service revenues to Kurdistan increased from $1 billion to approximately $10 billion in 1997. In addition, despite corruption and delay in delivery, by 2003, the United Nations had spent an additional $4.1 to $6.1 billion in Kurdistan. Moreover, "UNOPS [United Nations Office for Project Services] has been the second-largest implementer of projects for the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (ITF), running 43 projects with a total budget value of $238 million for the Fund."29 However, Michael Rubin points out that much of the cash and funds transferred to the KRG now appear to be missing.30 Instead of spending these funds to develop the region, some high-ranking political leaders in the KDP and the PUK "apparently transferred funds from the international payments into personal bank accounts [or invested the money] ... in companies in China, hotels in the United Arab Emirates, and stocks in American companies."31
Furthermore, when Nechirvan Barzani stepped down as prime minster, he reportedly mentioned that the KRG had $4 billion in the bank, but few people know where the money went. It seems that, except for some high-ranking leaders in both the PUK and KDP, no one else knows about these funds.
South Korea is an important overlooked external actor that has helped the KRG. The involvement of the South Korean government in the Kurdistan region goes back to its army's participation in the U.S. war against Iraq in 2003. South Korea put troops in Erbil from 2004 until 2008 as their contribution to the war against Saddam. However, once the city was free of war and insurgency, the Korean army mostly delivered infrastructure development and civilian help to the Kurdish region. Besides their army, the International Cooperation Agency from South Korea (KOICA) has helped the KRG in various development projects.32 It spent $62 million on building schools, hydro-power plants, training centers, hospitals, water resources and a sewage system and another $52 million to improve the capacity of government buildings, buy heavy construction vehicles and build laboratories.
These funds have not been distributed among the Kurdish cities equally. According to a KOICA report, its spending in Kurdistan has exceeded $112 million, of which Erbil has received 67 percent, Sulaymania 24.2 percent and Duhok only 8.6 percent.33 The unequal distribution of South Korea's funds among these three cities can be associated with the division between the KDP and PUK. The KDP is the dominant power in Erbil, where the South Korean troops stayed. The KOICA has also provided scholarship programs that the KRG has awarded to individuals who are associated with or members of the PUK or the KDP. Therefore, even though some of the South Korean aid went to developing the infrastructure of the region, a good portion of it went to the KDP and, to a lesser extent, the PUK.
ECONOMIC POTENTIAL UNTAPPED
Under the leadership of the KRG, the Kurdish region has witnessed economic development in some areas. According to the Kurdistan Board of Investment, this growth started in 2007. Probably because Kurdistan is a region, not a nation, this is the only source of economic data we have found. The government budget in 2010 was estimated at $9.6 billion. The real GDP growth rate for 2009 was estimated at a healthy 4.3 percent (as opposed to 1.5 percent for the world). However, GDP per capita was only $4,500, up from $3,200 in 2007, but still putting the region effectively at 117th in country rankings.
In addition, the KRG has helped the local economy to develop 1,376 private industries in Kurdistan.34 The regional partners involved in these economic activities are Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, the United States, Jordan, China and the United Arab Emirates, according to the KRG Board of Investment in 2010. We can conclude that this region has achieved a great deal of economic progress.
However, this economic growth has only occurred in a few areas. Looking at the number of licenses issued by the KRG for projects in different sectors of the province's economy up to 2008, we see that this growth is temporary and vulnerable. There is no balance among the sectors in the process of this economic boom. The areas of construction (34 percent) and, to a lesser extent, metals (20 percent) and food (15 percent) have received the highest numbers of licenses, indicating that there are more activities in these fields than the others.35
Dependency on Oil and Gas
For a long time, the KRG has depended heavily on aid provided by the regional actors. However, with increasing recognition of the extent of its hydrocarbon deposits, it has rapidly shifted its attention towards oil and gas. Over 41 companies are now investing in the oil and gas fields, and it has signed 37 contracts with them.36 According to the minister of natural resources, Ashty Hawramy, on October 19, 2009, the KRG received approximately $5 billion as a gift from these contracts.37 According to the rival party, Goran, although Kurdistan has the capacity to produce 45 billion barrels of oil a day, it now produces just 200,000. All these fields are under the direct control of the KDP and PUK, but not the KRG.38 From 2001 to 2009, the KRG helped fund 1,376 private industrial projects that employed over 14,184 workers, at a cost of over 500 billion Iraqi dinars. Baghdad has been accusing the KDP and PUK of collecting "250 million a month from the benefits of the oil being exported to Iran,"39 but not returning the money to the Iraqi federal government.
The KRG has focused its attention on gas, announcing that a 461-million-square-foot site for building the Kurdistan Gas City has been designed for development with Gas Cities LLC, "a joint venture being established by Crescent Petroleum and Dana Gas."40 The Kurdish Gas City includes industrial, residential and commercial components at an estimated cost of over $3 billion.41 Dana Gas, under its chairman, Sheikh Ahmed bin Sultan Al Qasimi of the UAE, is "the first regional private-sector natural-gas company in the Middle East."42It has also launched a pipeline project of 180 km connecting the Khor Mor gas field to the cities of Sulaymania and Erbil to supply electricity stations and civilian demands for gas. However, it seems that the only people who have control over these important sectors are Hawramy, the minister of natural resources, and the KDP presidential deputy, Nechirvan Barzani, but not the KRG. Hawramy informed Kurdish parliament members that Barzani decided to open a bank account with HSBC in which he deposited all the money generated from oil and gas.43 The KRG and the federal government are now fighting over the revenues from these contracts and who should pay off the companies.44
Agriculture
Kurdistan's soil is very fertile and suitable for growing vegetables, fruits and wheat. During the 1980s, Iraqi Kurdistan produced a third of Iraq's wheat.45 Almost 74.6 percent of the land in Kurdistan is suitable for agriculture; there is abundant cropland in plains and forests in mountain areas, plus natural range land and orchards. Nevertheless, the agricultural sector has been damaged considerably by negligent policies. Under the KRG, "the current average agricultural labor force is approximately 12.8 percent, with high regional variations, rising to more than 19.4 percent in Sulaymania Governorate, compared to only 6.6 percent in Erbil Governorate."46 Despite this increase, "the value of agricultural imports jumped to $1.37 billion in 1997 from $922 million a year earlier — an increase of nearly 49 percent; [furthermore] in 2007, 65 percent of the Kurdistan Region's food was imported, and 35 percent was produced domestically."47
As in other areas, the KRG has padded payrolls for patronage purposes without improving governance. For instance, the "KRG Ministry of Agriculture has 13,320 employees; by contrast, the California Department of Food and Agriculture has 1,892, and the Arizona Department of Agriculture has approximately 320."48 Despite the high number of employees, the Kurdish region still depends on Iran and Turkey for its food supply.
Construction
Unlike agriculture, as noted above, the construction sector in Kurdistan has expanded rapidly in the last decade. According to Denise Natali, while 95 percent of the construction work in Erbil went to Turkish companies, 85 percent in Sulaymania is operated by Iranian companies.49 Natali also mentions that, true to form, the boom in this sector has only benefited a small elite who have "become millionaires overnight."50 For example, to improve the electricity supply, the KRG created a fund of $116 million to repair the two power plants. This renovation, along with the portable generators of private companies, provides Kurdish cities around 15 hours of electricity daily. The KRG is still buying electricity from Turkey and Iran and depends on the central government and portable generators for its power.51
According to Michael Rubin, even this development does not benefit the region, because of the increasing price of property.52 This point is important because most properties require a high down payment, beyond the means of ordinary citizens in Kurdistan. As a result, most properties are sold to a small, rich elite.
CIVIL SERVICE AND CORRUPTION
At the heart of these issues is the problem of governance. Until 2003, approximately 80 percent of the people who worked in the public sector were members of the KDP and PUK or associated with the other allied political groups. Most of these party administrators in the civil services were political appointees. The Kurdish Regional Reform Commission (KRRC ) published a highly critical report in 2012 that has gained attention. According to this report, the KRG is experiencing poor governing performance in its civil service, corruption, partisan loyalty in government institutions, and weak agendas for developing the nation. The report also mentions many other outstanding problems with the Iraqi federal government over territorial disputes and who should manage natural resources, specifically oil, in the areas under the KRG's control. Beyond this report, many Kurdish cities have recently experienced demonstrations and protests against the KRG's governing performance. In order to shed more light on governance problems, Kawa Jabary conducted interviews with 45 employees from low-, middle- and high-level positions in the two most important ministries of the KRG, the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MHESR) and the Ministry of Planning (MOP), during summer 2012.
According to a MOP report, the KOICA allocated $80 million in 2004 to improve education, health, electricity, water and sewage, transportation, university language centers, advanced laboratories, hospital emergency rooms, and hydropower generation. The KOICA also held training courses in various areas for government employees in the Kurdistan region. The MOP also has established the Kurdistan Institute for Public Administration "to support the improvement… and provide modern training and development, consultancy and research to public service so that public servants may make the best use of resources and more effectively serve citizens."53 The MOP and the INGOs have run 1,018 courses, by our calculations, from 2010 to 2012. However, fully 88 percent of these were in Erbil and another 5 percent in Duhok, the centers of KDP power, while just 7 percent were in Sulaymania, where the PUK is dominant. Similarly, from 2007 to 2008, only 27 percent of the 129 courses run by JICA (Japan) and only 23 percent of the 13 courses by KOICA were in Sulaymania.54 This is problematic; it suggests that partisanship, not need, is driving training decisions.
Other agencies such as USAID and the UNDP have also provided advice and help to promote infrastructure reform, respect for the rule of law and transparency, and to implement programs that educate and inspire the public managers to change their mindsets for better commitment to implementation.55
Despite all these courses and training programs, according to most of our interviewees from the mid- and lower-level positions, the courses have not been effective for several reasons. First of all, the process of selecting the public servants to participate in these programs is flawed. Officials in the KRG's institutions show little enthusiasm for sending targeted employees to attend these programs. Many interviewees also mentioned that favoritism in selecting the employees has created another major challenge. High-ranking officials send ordinary employees to local training courses, but reward their friends or family members with scholarships for study abroad. Some of these individuals have traveled to many countries several times just because they are related to general directors or high-ranking officials, according to one of our interviewees.
Another issue is the shortage of trainers with updated knowledge of public policy. As an observer, Jabary participated in three sessions of two different types of training workshops in the MOP in August 2012 in Erbil. He noticed that the subjects and materials covered were either irrelevant to KRG needs or outdated. This lack of current knowledge has undermined these training courses, some of our interviewees informed us, in two ways. First, some public managers and high-ranking officials do not send their employees to participate because they do not have any faith or interest in the programs. Second, if a public manager from a different city sends an employee to a training course in Erbil, they have to bear the cost.
In spite of the reform efforts, "The KRG has become the largest employer in the region, providing monthly stipends to an estimated 1.5 million people in the public sector."56 However, due to a lack of information, and despite asking officials in both the MOP and the MHESR, it is not clear where all these employees are posted. It seems that mass recruitment in the public sector is still conducted through the prime minister's office once a year; and decisions are mostly made based on who need jobs, not on the skills that the KRG's ministries need. Our conclusion here rests on personal interviews as well as the fact that there are no job descriptions for positions within the KRG's institutions. Because of this system of mass recruitment, the government has become so big that any transaction in public institutions has to go through many channels and faces a great deal of delay. Until 2010, multiple interviewees told us that individuals found out about public positions through personal connections or a relative working in government offices.
There are signs of recognition of the problem. For instance, according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (2012), more than 50,000 new employees were recruited in 2011, and close to 20,000 in 2012. When Jabary asked some of these new employees about the process of their recruitment, they said that they heard about the positions in the public media and then applied. They had to send in CVs and later were called for an interview. However, interviewees from the mid- and lower-levels, who have been working more than two years in the public sector, said that, even though the KRG has been recruiting its employees through resumés and an interview process, many people are still appointed to public positions due to their relationships with the high-ranking officials, regardless of their merit. For example, the office of the KRG's prime minister has apparently engaged in nepotism. On October 8, 2012, through an official document the prime minister's office ordered recruitment of new employees without consulting or following the procedures or the legislation established by the KRG.
To obtain a better understanding of these issues, Jabary asked several questions of of MHESR and MOP employees related to governing capacity, as reflected in the following table.57 We agreed to withhold their names so that they could answer freely. The table includes only those employees who provided a yes or no answer. Those who were not sure or did not respond are not included in some answers.
Table 1. Employee Responses on MOP Recruitment Process
Employee Rank |
Is There |
Do They Identify Needed Skills? |
Do They |
Do They Have Merit or Skill Assessment Programs? |
Do They |
|||||
Yes |
No |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
No |
|
High Level |
12 |
3 |
3 |
12 |
3 |
11 |
0 |
13 |
4 |
10 |
Middle Level |
14 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
3 |
12 |
0 |
14 |
3 |
12 |
Lower Level |
15 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
12 |
0 |
15 |
3 |
12 |
Total |
41 |
4 |
4 |
38 |
9 |
35 |
0 |
42 |
10 |
32 |
The responses in the table show a pattern: while the top employees' answers were mostly positive, the lower and middle employees were more negative. Their answers reinforce the problematic findings of the KRRC report. Furthermore, Rubin points out, "Party officials have told political bureaucrats that they will lose their jobs if they do not support Barzani and Talabani."58 The PUK and the KDP have been able to retain their members through bribery and distributing jobs in the public sector.
CONCLUSION
We should not lose sight of the fact that Kurdish development in the context of Iraq's travails has produced a relatively stable and secure environment. However, continued progress is impeded by the central fact of rivalry between the PUK and the PDK, whose entente has created peace on the basis of a divided and ineffective government that is a vehicle for patronage rather than collective and public interests. Outside powers have exploited this division to grab a share of the resources of the region, with little planning to convert them into bases for long-term economic development. Essentially, political leaders from both parties have "used the Kurdish citizens' own funds for personal gain,"59 with only those loyal to either machine able to secure gifts. As Rubin puts it, the leaders in these two parties "have become drunk with power and disdainful of public accountability."60 To overcome these problems, the PUK and the KDP would need to respect and empower the KRG and its institutions. They can make money legitimately while growing the economy through effective governance that ensures the creation of a stable and prosperous economic foundation. In order to achieve that goal, both the KRG and outside donors should focus on developing the human resources that can lead to improved capacity and governance throughout Kurdish institutions. In the end, however, breaking up the political logjam is the only way Kurdistan can move forward.
1 Denise Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq (Syracuse University Press, 2010), 103.
2 Gareth R. V. Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy (Routledge Curzon, 2003), 66.
3 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, 66.
4 Ibid, 70-71.
5 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (3rd Edition, I.B. Tauris, 2007), 317.
6 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton University Press, 1978), 390-400.
7 Kerim Yildiz and Tom Blass, Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future (Kurdish Human Rights Project, 2003), 35-42.
8 Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 70-79.
9 McDowall, The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review, 338.
10 Ibid, 22.
11 Nader Entessar, Kurdish Politics in the Middle East (Lexington, Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), 97- 100.
12 Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World (Norton, 1994), 6-8.
13 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, 40- 45.
14 McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds.
15 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State.
16 Bill Park, Turkey's Policy Towards Northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectives (Routledge, 2005), 30.
17 Michael Rubin, "Where's Kurdistan's Missing $4 Billion?," The Kurdistan Tribune, July 3, 2011, 184.
18 Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 145.
19 Ofra Bengio, "Iraqi Kurds: Hour Of Power?," Middle East Quarterly 10, no. 3 (2003): 43.
20 Liven Magazine, "Iran's Secret Agency in Kurdistan" (Kurdish Edition) (Erbil, 2009), September 20, 2011, http://www.lvinpress.com/newdesign/Dreje.aspx?jimare=46.
21 Sheri Lazier, Martyrs, Traitors and Patriots: Kurdistan after the Gulf War (Zed Books Ltd., 1996).
22 Liven Magazine, "Iran's Secret Agency in Kurdistan."
23 David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 236-238.
24 Michael Rubin, "The Kurdish Leaders Are Drunken with Power," The Daily Star, 2009, 120-122.
25 Michael Gunter, "Kurdish Infighting: The PKK-KDP Conflict," in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, Robert Olson, ed. (University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 50-65.
26 United Nations Development Plan, "Drought Impact Assessment, Recovery and Mitigation Framework and Regional Project Design in Kurdistan Region (KR)," (December, 2010), 30-54 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/B03750804A0EB2EC85257830006B6A97-Full_Report.pdf.
27 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, 30-31.
28 Kurdistan Board of Investment. Kurdistan's Economy, February 10, 2012, http://www.kurdistaninvestment.org/economy.html.
29 UNOPS, 2008, Iraq Operation Center, July 2012, http://www.unops.org/english/whatwedo/Locations/Europe/Pages/IraqOperat….
30 Rubin, "Where's Kurdistan's Missing $4 Billion?" 6.
31 Ibid.
32 Kurdistan Regional Government, Council of Ministers, Ministry of Planning, General Directorate of Development Cooperation and Coordination, "A Report of The Republic of South Korea Course from 2004 to the end of 2008," (2009) January 23, 2012, http://www.mop-krg.org/.
33 Ibid.
34 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, 87.
35 Ibid, 88.
36 KRG's Ministry of Natural Resource 2008, "Production Sharing Contracts," (2008), accessed August 15, 2012, http://www.krg.org/p/p.aspx?l=12&r=296&p=1.
37 Gorran, The Change Movement's Finance Critique in Kurdistan National Assembly, "Discovering a Lost Resource," (Kurdish Edition), August 15, 2011, http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/Inter_Report_Detail.aspx?id=621&cat=1&title=1.
38 Ibid.
39 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, 84.
40 KRG-MOP, A Report of The Republic of South Korea Course from 2004 to the End of 2008.
41 Ibid.
42 Oil Review Middle East 2010, "Gas Boost for Kurdistan Region of Iraq," October 20, 2011, http://www.oilreviewmiddleeast.com/exploration-production/gas-boost-for-kurdistan-region-of-iraq.
43 Gorran, The Change Movement, "The Iraqi Kurdistan Land," April, 2011, http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/Inter_Report_Detail.aspx?id=565&cat=1&title=1.
44 Michael Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds (Scarecrow Press, 2004), 183.
45 UNOPS, 2008. Iraq Operation Centre, 2-7.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 USAID, Iraq Economic Recovery Assessment (USAID, February 5, 2009), June 25, 2012, http://egateg.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/Iraq_Economic_Recovery_Assessment.pdf.
49 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, 93.
50 Ibid, 102.
51 KRG-MOP, General Directorate for Development Coordination and Cooperation External Resources Management Unit, 2009, "Report on Donor Contributions to Kurdistan Region," (2009), accessed June 20, 2012, http://www.mop-krg.org.
52 Rubin, "Where's Kurdistan's Missing $4 Billion?" 8.
53 KRG-MOP, "A Brief about the Kurdistan Institute for Public Administration," June 2012, http://www.mop-krg.org/index.jsp?sid=1&id=203&pid=106.
54 Kawa Jabary, The Politics of Low Capacity: The Case of Kurdistan. MA Thesis, Political Science, Simon Fraser University, 2013.
55 USAID, Iraq Economic Recovery Assessment (USAID, February 5, 2009), June 25, 2012, http://www.egateg.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/Iraq_Economic_Recovery_….
56 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, 91.
57 Tables are from Jabary 2013.
58 Rubin, "The Kurdish Leaders Are Drunken with Power," 7.
59 Rubin," Where's Kurdistan's Missing $4 billion?" 8.
60 Rubin, "The Kurdish Leaders Are Drunken with Power," 6.
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