The views in this article reflect the personal views of the authors and not those of the institutions with which they are affiliated. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Ninth Gulf Research Meeting (GRM), July 31-August 3 2018, which was organized by the Gulf Research Center Cambridge at the University of Cambridge.
Iraqi and Arab Gulf relations noticeably improved after the election of Iraq Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in September 2014 and his government's ability to stop the spread of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, further rapprochement is constrained by historical, social and geo-political factors. Iraq-Gulf relations are dynamic, complex and multifaceted. The three main political components in Iraq — Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds — all have different positions regarding the Arab Gulf states. The same can be said for the Arab Gulf states (members of the Gulf Cooperation Council), with each having a different interest and approach to deepening ties with Iraq. This paper discusses the historical factors shaping the current Iraq-Gulf rapprochement, then analyzes the challenges and opportunities to its development.
RELATIONS SINCE 1981
Iraq was the battleground to stop expansion of the 1979 Iranian Revolution into Arab Gulf states. While Saddam Hussein initiated the war on September 22, 1980, it became apparent to Arab Gulf states by 1981 that Saddam Hussein could not win without their support, especially after Iranian forces occupied Iraqi territory and there was a fear that Iranian forces could move into Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Starting in 1981, Arab Gulf states in the newly established Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) began providing Iraq various forms of financial assistance and logistical and political support and this continued until the war ended in 1988. But GCC states provided financial and logistical support to Iraq for different purposes that differed in magnitude and impact. For example, Saudi Arabia, offered grants that were not expected to be fully repaid and allowed its territory to be used for equipment and weapons shipments. Saudi Arabia also built a pipeline to let Iraqi oil reach the Red Sea, bypassing the pipeline closed by the Syrian government. Kuwait also provided low interest loans and credit to finance the war and opened its borders and ports to Iraq as a logistical hub. Countries like the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait assisted the Iraqi Air Force with radar, for example. This significantly helped Iraq conduct and finance the war.
During the war, Iraq needed Gulf logistical and financial assistance, while Gulf states needed Iraqi military might and man power to confront Iranian expansion. By the end of the war, Gulf governments had provided more than $50 billion in support to Iraq, not including the diplomatic, religious and moral support they provided. However, after the parades and celebrations had ended, Gulf states did not invite Iraq to be a full member of the GCC. Following the war, Iraq went through a recession and did not receive the financial, diplomatic or moral support it felt it deserved for helping secure the Arab Gulf. Gulf reluctance to support Iraq, especially Kuwait's insistence that Iraq fully repay its loans or an Iraqi perception that Kuwait was increasing its oil exports at a time of declining oil prices, enabled the conditions for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Iraq-Gulf relations have not recovered from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This tragic mistake by Saddam Hussein came with many unintended consequences, perhaps the most severe, that almost 30 years later, Iraq still feels rejected by the Arab Gulf. Part of this could be due to the rise of sectarianism in the region and the fact after 2003 the Iraqi government became Shiite-led by Iraqi exiles aligned with Iran. Notwithstanding, the long shadow of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has loomed largest over the Iraq-Gulf relationship.
Iraq's aggression against Kuwait in 1990 was reciprocated in 2003 when the US-led coalition invaded Iraq with the diplomatic and logistical support of the GCC. While publically Arab Gulf states remained impartial to the invasion and encouraged a diplomatic solution, US troops invaded Iraq from bases in GCC countries, most notably from Kuwait. In fact, in December 2003 at the 24th session of the GCC Supreme Council in Kuwait, the council expressed its satisfaction with a new policy of the US administration towards Iraq, planning to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis, which implicitly recognized and supported the role of the US occupation. However, as an old adage says "be careful what you wish for," because the new Iraqi government, which GCC countries helped precipitate through its pressure on the US to hand over authority to, was unacceptable to the Gulf states because of its clear ties to Iran.
Arab Gulf states then faced a critical juncture when the US agreed to withdraw its forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. On December 18, 2011 a GCC Supreme Council summit was held in Riyadh, in which its final statement expressed a GCC fear of a security vacuum in the region due to the full withdrawal of US troops in Iraq. The final communique, though, did nothing more than call on Iraqi political parties to work towards a unified, secure and prosperous Iraq and hoped that Iraq would consider the fraternal ties between it and GCC states during the Arab Spring, when Iraq expressed solidarity with Bahraini protesters. The GCC states' strategy in Iraq after 2003 was based on a hope that someone else (the US and the UN) would fix the country to their liking, without having to make firm commitments to the new Iraq. On the other hand, Arab Gulf states' rivals Iran and Turkey seized the opportunity to invest political capital in the new Iraqi government and shape it to fit their interests.
In June 2014 after the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS or Daesh) occupied Mosul, Arab Gulf states quickly called for security coordination between their countries to protect them from further ISIS expansion. However, Arab Gulf states did not do more than issue communiques calling on the Iraqi government to act in a certain way. When Iraq's Shiite establishment was quick to mobilize forces to confront ISIS expansion, and Iran saw this as an opportunity to deepen its security roots in the country, the GCC countries awakened to the fact they could not wait for Iraq to reform itself before they improved relations. If they did, the main forces defending them from the spread of ISIS would be Iraqi Shiite militias supported by Iran.
The election of Haider al-Abadi as Prime Minister in September 2014 was an opportunity for Arab Gulf states to change course with Iraq. Abadi said the right things to make the Gulf believe he was different than the previous prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki. Abadi claimed his government was one of national unity, representing all political spectrums. He claimed Iraq's foreign policy toward the neighboring countries, especially Gulf Arab states, needed to change. Abadi pursued rapprochement and promised to discuss all outstanding issues between Iraq and its Gulf region. As the visits between Iraqi and Gulf officials increased, the relations between the two sides improved. Relations also improved as Iraqi armed forces re-constituted themselves in a short time span, from 2014 to 2016, and managed to regain Iraq's territories lost to ISIS. Denying ISIS a haven in Iraq is a strategic interest for GCC countries, and if Iraq can show it is capable of preventing the re-emergence of ISIS, Arab Gulf states will have more of an incentive to meaningfully engage.
Iraq arguably stopped Iranian expansion into the Arab Gulf with the Iran-Iraq War and stopped ISIS expansion into the Arab Gulf after 2014. While the Iran-Iraq War and the expansion of ISIS could have been self-inflicted wounds due to poor political leadership, Iraq has paid a price that has benefitted Arab Gulf security. Despite this, Iraq still feels neglected by the Arab Gulf and hopes a new rapprochement will come with an acknowledgement of the importance of Iraq in their security. However, there are three main challenges facing rapprochement: the Iran-Saudi rivalry, Sunni-Shia relations and outstanding border disputes.
The Iran-Saudi Rivalry
Since 2003 Iraq's political parties have relied on regional patrons for their success and survival. Iran is not the only regional patron of Iraq's political parties, as many assume, despite being the regional sponsor and incubator for the Dawa Party, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), three of the most dominate political parties in Iraq after 2003. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have also been prominent patrons of significant parties: Kurdish (the KDP), Sunni Arab (Iraqiyaa), and Sunni Islamist (the Iraqi Islamic Party). Even after the 2018 parliamentary elections, the major political parties governing Iraq cannot make strategic decisions without the consent of their regional patrons. This patronage system holds Iraqi political development hostage to regional rivalries, most prominent of which is the Iran-Saudi rivalry. This proxy relationship enabled the sectarian violence witnessed from 2006-2007, and the rise of sectarian militias and ISIS. The Iran-Saudi rivalry impacts Iraqi Kurdish relations with Baghdad, Sunni Arab relations with Baghdad, Najaf's relationship with Sunni Arabs and the demographic make-up and political loyalties of the Iraqi Security Forces. If Iraq's major political parties continue to rely on regional patrons and the Iran-Saudi rivalry is not resolved, Iraq will not be able to clearly articulate and prioritize its national interest and adopt an independent and strong foreign policy. Regional patrons help prevent Iraq from resolving outstanding national issues such as Baghdad's relations with the KRG, maintaining apolitical Iraqi Security Forces and reforming an inflated Iraqi bureaucracy that relies on a quota system that fosters corruption and wastes national resources.
The Sunni-Shia Conflict
The Iran-Saudi rivalry feeds Sunni-Shia relations. In Iraq, sectarian loyalties have become more prominent than nationalist ones partly due to the regional patronage of the main political parties. Moreover, the ISIS occupation of a third of Iraqi territory was enabled by and further exacerbated sectarian tensions. It can be argued that that Arab Gulf states primarily view Iraq through a sectarian lens, with many of their citizens calling Iraqi Shiites rafidha (rejecters of the faith) and accusing them of being the fifth column of Iran. Viewing Iraq through a sectarian lens will limit pursuing greater geo-political interests. The Arab Gulf states still fail to understand the nuance of Arab Shiites. An example is a common misunderstanding about the religious rivalry between Qom in Iran and Najaf in Iraq. The rivalry is based on who and what city is most capable of leading the Shia world. Najaf is the spiritual capital of Shiism. It houses the tomb of Caliph Ali, cousin of the Prophet Mohammed, whom Shiites venerate and from whom they trace their spiritual heritage. On the other hand, Qom is a Persian city near Tehran and has only recently become a center of Shiite scholarship. Qom was where Ayatollah Khomeini preached against the Shah and the United States before being exiled in 1965 (going to Najaf, where he stayed for 14 years). Since the Iranian Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Qom has competed with Najaf to be the spiritual capital of Shiism. There is no dispute over the religious significance of Najaf. It is indisputably the heart of Shiism. But Qom competes to be the mind of Shiism, claiming its religious scholarship is superior to and more advanced than the religious scholarship in Najaf. One of the main areas of contention is over Khomeini's concept of walayat al-faqih which is the basis of the governance structure of the Islamic Republic, where clerics have the final say in strategic matters. Whereas in Najaf clerics have a tradition of non-intervention in political matters and have historically tried to distance themselves from showing any political bias. Najaf clerics largely disagree with the application of walayat al-faqih. Most of Iraq's Shiites are oriented toward Najaf, not Qom. Being an Arab city and with its Arab heritage, Arab Shiites in the Gulf are also oriented toward Najaf, not Qom. This nuance is lost on many Sunnis in the Gulf in a similar way that the different variations of Sunni Salafis are lost on many Shiites. Shiite tend to equate Salafits to violent radical jihadists, which is an inaccurate generalization. These sectarian misunderstandings feed mutual distrust and Iraq's neighbors play off these fears to gain support for their policies in Iraq.
Borders and the Search for Naval Outlets
One of the main reasons Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 was the accusation that Kuwait was slant drilling into Iraq's massive Rumaila oil field near the Iraq-Kuwait border. Moreover, Iraq accused Kuwait of limiting Iraq's access to the Arabian Gulf through the small waterway Khor Abdullah, which divides Iraq and Kuwait. Khor Abdullah is Iraq's only deep-water access to the Arabian Gulf and heavily relies on it for exports and imports. Iraq has complained about this contentious border for decades and it is only recently that Iraq and Kuwait have begun to resolve these border disputes. In August 2018, Iraq and Kuwait announced they planned to jointly develop shared oil fields along their border and Iraq would build a gas line into Kuwait. However, access to the sea through Khor Abdullah is still contentious. Iraqi governments have signed and reaffirmed agreements with Kuwait over Khor Abdullah (in 2008 and 2013), but many Iraqis believe Iraq did this out of weakness and have pressured the Iraqi government to negotiate a better deal. The important Iraqi oil-producing and electricity-lacking city, Basra, has long put pressure on the Iraqi government to do more to pressure Kuwait to not limit Basra's access to the sea, through not building the Mubarak al-Kabir port on the island of Bubiyan, accusing Kuwait of taking oil out of fields in Iraqi territory, and hurting Iraqi pride that "little" Kuwait is bullying Iraq. Without a doubt, Iraq-Kuwait relations have significantly improved since 2003, with Kuwait supporting Iraqi initiatives to gain regional and international recognition, and supporting Iraq's reconstruction. However, the outstanding border dispute with Kuwait will prevent Iraqis from overcoming a prevalent perception that GCC countries do not want to grant Iraq free access to the sea because doing so would help Iraq achieve its potential as a regional power.
This leads to the question of how to overcome the constraints of an Iraq-Gulf rapprochement. This is through, first, increasing cooperation on common security and counter-terrorism threats, second, deepening economic ties, and third, promoting social ties to foster tolerance, understanding and mutual respect.
OVERCOMING CONSTRAINTS
Iraq and Arab Gulf states share common security interests. The rapid spread of ISIS in 2014, the Iranian nuclear weapons program, GCC efforts to build its own regional security structure and the potential drawdown of US military presence in the Gulf region all present opportunities for Iraq-Gulf rapprochement. Increased intelligence sharing between Iraq and Saudi Arabia since 2017 has been a significant development. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states need information about ISIS fighters who might return to their countries. Iraq also needs Gulf cooperation in helping stem the flow of fighters and resources coming from their countries into Iraq, as well as Gulf cooperation in persuading youth not to become radicalized. These are clear overlapping interests. The more the Iraqi government de-politicizes the Iraqi Security Forces and increases the capacity of the Iraqi Army to prevent ISIS from re-emerging, the more Gulf countries will increase military cooperation with Iraq. Counter-terrorism cooperation is an easy win-win for Iraq-Gulf relations because Iraq is largely allowed to seek the alliances it deems fit to secure itself. This is illustrated in how the Iraqi government balances its security relationships with the United States and Iran, which are bitter enemies.
There is political consensus in Baghdad (other than a limited few politicians) that Iraq does not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. The bolder Iran gets in its regional ambitions, the more vulnerable Iraq feels because of its being in the middle of the Iran-Saudi rivalry and being their battle ground for a proxy war. Additionally, the re-introduction of U.S. sanctions against Iran to re-negotiate the Iran nuclear deal will create challenges for Iraq. Black-market activity will increase, as well as Iranian pressure on the Iraqi government to be an outlet for selling its oil. The United States is an important strategic partner for Iraq and it cannot risk the benefits of this relationship with the gains it could have from being an outlet for Iranian exports. Despite the challenges of the re-introduction of sanctions, building a nuclear-weapons free Gulf region is in Iraq's interest and GCC countries could leverage this interest in future negotiations with Iran if it is patient and does not pressure Iraq to abandon its relationship with Iran.
Despite the many political differences between Iraq and the GCC countries, all share and value the security relationship they have with the United States. However, U.S. strategic interests in the region are changing. With the shale oil boom in the United States, Middle Eastern oil is becoming less important to Washington and the threat of terrorism is becoming more prominent. Iraq-GCC cooperation on counter-terrorism would be greatly valued by the US and could be a bargaining chip to keep a U.S. security presence in the region. As GCC countries work to build a regional security alliance to rival the geo-political weight of Iran and Turkey, developing a strong security relationship with Iraq would be significant added value to the alliance. Not that Iraq is required to be a member of the alliance, as this might be unrealistic due to Iraq's relations with Iran. However, Iraq is confident it could be a stabilizing partner in a future security structure of a Gulf region that is less reliant on U.S. fighting power. Iraq has a sizable professional army with significant combat experience that GCC countries do not have.
The two Arab Gulf states with the deepest ties to Iraq are Kuwait and the UAE. This is largely due to the economic activity they have initiated with Iraq, whether through energy cooperation, foreign direct investment, consumer exports or reconstruction of Sunni areas destroyed in the fight against ISIS. Relations with Kuwait have improved dramatically since 2003, even though Kuwait still insists Iraq must repay the costs of the Iraqi invasion, which limits the Iraqi government budget. On the other hand, the UAE is Iraq's largest trade partner from the Arab world, and the overall largest investor in Iraq. Many Iraqi families have first or second homes in the UAE. Despite the respectable level of economic ties between GCC countries like Kuwait and the UAE, Iraq seeks to significantly increase those ties. Iraq's most immediate economic need is donations and funding to reconstruct Sunni areas destroyed by the fight against ISIS. Iraqi officials estimate it will need $88 billion to accomplish this, and were disappointed when that number only reached $30 billion at the donor conference in Kuwait in February 2018. However, Kuwait's assistance in July 2018 to help fill an electricity shortage in southern Iraq from Iran cutting its supply, as well as Saudi promises to also assist in increasing electricity supply are hopeful signs to Iraqis that the Gulf wants to improve relations with them.
Social and cultural exchange is the last area of opportunity to develop the relationship. It is worth noting that Iraq is a Gulf country. It has a tribal and religious culture similar to other Arab Gulf states. One of the major differences between Iraq and Arab Gulf countries is political structure, not social structure. Iraq is a republic and the GCC countries are monarchies or sheikhdoms. It has been argued that Yemen and Iraq were excluded from the GCC in 1981 largely because they are both republics. However, differences in political structures with similar social structures can provide opportunities for constructive dialogue. Gulf countries are experimenting with developing and empowering elected parliaments, while many in Iraq seek to emulate the stability Gulf countries have enjoyed by learning how to create a certain civic tribalism where the constructive aspects of a tribal society are used to increase national solidarity and bring political stability. There is a significant movement in Gulf countries to improve their international reputations as modern, tolerant and pluralistic societies. Ensuring Iraqi Shiites feel welcome and accepted in the Arab world, rather than quickly suspecting them of being agents of Iran, would be a way to demonstrate Arab Gulf tolerance and acceptance of pluralism. Arab Gulf countries are not to blame for the rise in sectarianism in the region. However, there is much they could do to help extinguish its flames, starting with increased dialogue and the protection of religious minorities. Iraq's religious minorities, in particular the Yazidis and Christians, have also blamed Gulf countries for the violence and extremism they've experienced by the hands of ISIS members, many of whom were GCC citizens. They did not see Gulf states doing much to protect them when ISIS expelled them from their areas. On the other hand, Iran was much more active in trying to protect Iraq's religious minorities during this dark time. More Arab Gulf outreach to areas affected by ISIS is needed to enable rapprochement. The 2018 announcement of the UAE to rebuild the Great Mosque of al-Nuri is likely to be a positive gesture to Iraq, that it cares about its cultural heritage. Doing similar gestures to Iraq's other minorities, such as the Yazidis and Christians, could go a long way in generating goodwill for Gulf countries and repairing destructive stereotypes that perpetuate mistrust and suspicion.
CONCLUSION
Iraq and Arab Gulf states are experiencing a new chapter in their dynamic and complex history. Geo-political forces are shifting in the region, with the increased involvement of emerging powers such as Russia and China and decreased involvement of the United States. Geopolitical changes and conflicts that have shaped Iraq-Gulf relations for the last 50 years will continue: the withdrawal of UK forces in 1971, the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the Iranian infiltration in Iraq, and the ISIS invasion of Iraq's Arab Sunni territories. There will be future shifts and conflicts that shape the Iraq-Gulf relationship. However, the misunderstandings that have led to more conflict do not have to repeat themselves.
Iraq is not an independent state and will continue to have a weak foreign policy if its political elite continue to perpetuate the patron-client relationship they have had with regional countries, particularly Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. However, since 2003 Iran has invested more in Iraq than its other neighbors and this has created an imbalance that many in Iraq are trying to re-adjust through a rapprochement with Arab Gulf countries. The abandonment and sense of ostracism that Iraq has felt from Arab Gulf countries since 1990 can be reversed through a patient and sustained rapprochement with Iraq. Iran will work against this rapprochement. However, there are areas of common interest that provide Iraq and Gulf countries an opportunity to deepen their ties where Iran has less capability of thwarting. These are through security and counterterrorism cooperation, deepening economic ties and promoting common social ties that foster tolerance, understanding and mutual respect.
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