Ora Szekely
Dr. Szekely is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts.
The transformation undergone by Hezbollah between the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990 and the July 2006 War with Israel was a profound one. In the late 1980s, Hezbollah was a radical militant group prone to flamboyant tactics and viewed with distrust even by many Shiites. It had been unable to hold territory in South Lebanon even against its main Lebanese rival, much less the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). But in July 2006, Hezbollah proved that it could withstand an assault by the strongest conventional military in the Middle East, denying the IDF its stated objective of driving the organization from South Lebanon. It even forced an Israeli withdrawal from territory the IDF had already captured. And perhaps more important, whereas Hezbollah's military activity in the 1980s cost it dearly in terms of public support, the July War itself, despite high casualties, had a very different effect. While this transformation is sometimes attributed to an increase in financial assets or military hardware, this explanation is ultimately unconvincing. I argue instead that, as with militant movements in other contexts, it was the strategies that Hezbollah used to acquire resources in the first place, rather than those resources themselves, that changed between 1990 and 2006.
Hezbollah's evolution speaks to a larger question in the literature on nonstate actors, both in the Middle East and elsewhere: Why do some nonstate military groups survive attempts to uproot them from particular pieces of territory while others do not? And what lessons do organizations learn from earlier confrontations that enable them to better survive later ones? In much of the general literature on the topic, variables such as initial access to material endowments like natural or financial resources are used to explain a host of outcomes, from groups' emergence to their behavior to their chances of victory. Other explanations emphasize identity-based "social endowments" that a militant group is assumed to inherently possess. Yet, when the material and social endowments of different militias are similar, as they often are when multiple groups are fighting on the same territory or claiming to represent the same constituency, they cannot account for the variation.
Moreover, explanations rooted in a static understanding of identity as an asset that organizations "have," rather than "make," ignore the role played by militant movements like Hezbollah in shaping group identity and establishing its boundaries. In either case, deterministic explanations rooted in structural endowments, whether material or social, that are present only at the beginning of an organization's evolution, cannot account for change over time. To fully understand the variation in the outcomes of counterinsurgent campaigns against similarly armed nonstate actors, we need to take a step backward in the causal chain to examine how these resources were acquired in the first place.
To explore this dynamic, this paper will compare Hezbollah's resource-acquisition strategies during its earlier years and during the period leading up to the July War. During the Lebanese civil war, the movement's coercive behavior and its narrow and highly ideological framing of its political identity limited its ability both to resist its adversaries' attempts to push it out of South Lebanon and to recover afterward. Following the civil war, however, it developed a strategy based on a much broader marketing approach, a vastly expanded network of social services, and greatly reduced use of coercion. These changes meant that by 2006, the movement was far more effective against the IDF than it had been in earlier years and was able to survive the IDF assault during the July War.
STRUCTURAL ARGUMENTS
Structural explanations for the behavior of nonstate actors tend to focus on conditions in the surrounding environment over which the organizations themselves have little control. Much of the social-movement literature identifies access to material resources as the primary determinant of whether and when a group is able to mobilize.1 This theme is echoed in the "greed and grievance" literature on civil war, notably in work by Collier and Hoeffler. It suggests that the onset of conflict is most influenced by its financial and military feasibility, rather than by political grievance. Under this logic, the outbreak of war is constrained only by the resources available to fuel it.2 In a similar vein within the civil-war literature, Weinstein postulates that initial material and social endowments determine both what sorts of fighters a movement is likely to be able to recruit and how they will behave.3
But this logic leaves some questions unanswered. In practice, militant movements with similar initial material endowments often behave quite differently. Nor does every movement endowed with material wealth use it to hire mercenary fighters. Some, like Hezbollah, may rather invest in mechanisms and strategies for recruiting committed fighters rather than mercenaries, or otherwise expanding their appeal within their potential constituencies. Static characterizations of social endowments are similarly problematic; these explanations treat "identity" as a constant and unchanging feature of the political landscape and a non-negotiable characteristic over which militant movements have little control, rather than as a socially, historically or politically contingent phenomenon. Framing these identities as logically prior to and independent from the organizations that use them for mobilization and recruitment fails to take into account the role of militant movements themselves in strategically framing and assigning identities to begin with. Hezbollah, for one, has certainly done so.
In sum, while the structural logic is not always inaccurate in and of itself, it begins the causal chain too late in the process. What it takes for independent variables are actually intervening variables. Truly "starting at the beginning" means examining the ways in which these material and nonmaterial resources are produced or acquired in the first place.
EXPLAINING SURVIVAL
For the purposes of this analysis, "survival" is defined as "retaining the capacity to operate against enemy forces from or within the desired territory." Survival has two practical components; the ability to resist a major military attack as it unfolds, and the ability to recover afterwards.4
In order to survive or even be at all effective, nonstate military actors require a variety of resources, both material (funding, fighters, weapons) and nonmaterial (intelligence, legitimacy, training). Most nonstate actors, including Hezbollah, acquire most of them externally. This generally means obtaining resources from the local civilian population5 or a patron state.6 In either case, nonstate actors have three broad strategic options: coercion, service provision and marketing. While most movements use a mixture of all three, one is usually dominant. While coercion may be the easiest means of acquiring resources from civilians and service provision easiest with regard to sponsor states, it is the assiduous marketing of the group's mission and ideals that produces the most durable relationships with both civilians and sponsor states. Therefore, it is the most reliable path to material and nonmaterial resources.
STRATEGIC OPTIONS
Coercion
States sometimes find themselves the unwilling providers of aid to nonstate groups. The most common form of coercion occurs when a weak state is unable to prevent the use of its territory as a base of operations. Because of the value of specific pieces of territory, militant groups may be less willing to take "no" for an answer.7 Even so, the alienation of the unwilling host government can ultimately prove costly. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), for instance, discovered this in Jordan, where its coercive behavior alienated the government and, more important, the military, consolidating support for King Hussein's regime.
Civilians can, of course, also be targets of coercion, including the looting of crops, vehicles and valuables, the appropriation of homes and land, and the levying of "taxes" at checkpoints or businesses. In its more extreme forms, it involves kidnapping civilians for ransom or using torture, murder and rape to subdue a population. But, though coercion can be a useful short-term strategy for acquiring material resources from civilians, it tends to alienate those being coerced. It is also likely to damage a group's long-term chances of acquiring nonmaterial resources8 and may even drive potential constituents into the arms of the opposition.9
Service Provision
Nonstate military actors can also acquire resources by offering something that the sponsoring state or civilian constituency wants. Often a state wants a military proxy that would allow it to extend its reach while avoiding the costs of war.10 Service provision provides access to a wider range of resources than coercion. States sponsoring military proxies are particularly likely to offer military aid, supplies and training. They may also offer nonmaterial support such as political advocacy, though sponsoring states are sometimes loath to acknowledge their clients openly.
However, even the most lucrative proxy relationships can carry significant costs, forcing a militant movement to give up some autonomy or shifting the organization's priorities towards those of its sponsor.11 Factionalism within the sponsor regime or uneven sponsorship of factions within the client organization can create schisms that weaken its ability to coordinate and make decisions. And, of course, would-be sponsors often have several potential clients and can therefore abandon one abruptly.
Service provision can also be used to secure resources from the civilian population.12 There is obviously not a perfect relationship between service use and recruitment. Some people may use a group's services because they already sympathize with the organization or, conversely, use services without changing their minds about the movement's project. On the other hand, though, successful provision and administration of social services can demonstrate that members of a militant movement are not only good soldiers, but competent bureaucrats as well.13 Even those who do not support the organization's political project can come to support its ambition to govern after observing its managerial competence.14 Hamas's social services in the West Bank and Gaza are an excellent example of this dynamic, as are Hezbollah's. Whereas provision of services to sponsoring states tends to produce mostly material resources, serving civilians tends to generate nonmaterial resources. A population that is significantly poorer than a militant group may have little beyond food and shelter to offer, which may not be particularly important to an organization with the capacity to build hospitals and pave roads.15
Marketing
Finally, nonstate actors have a third option: to deliberately shape how potential constituents and/or sponsors see themselves and their interests in relation to the movement, and the movement in relation to the broader political landscape. Appeals aimed at the civilian population tend to be ethnic or ideological and are most successful when they produce not only a strong normative attachment to a cause, but also a belief that the movement in question is the legitimate representative of that cause.
Marketing strategies aimed at sponsoring states also include appeals to ethno-communal sympathy, a common political orientation, and the legitimacy that support for the group can confer based on its ethnic or political prestige. In this sense, marketing approaches directed at states are related to those directed at the civilians who confer such prestige. If the nonstate actor can position itself as an arbiter of communal or ideological legitimacy, it will be able to exert an influence entirely disproportionate to its military power.
Marketing strategies are more likely than either coercion or service provision to produce durable material and nonmaterial support from both sponsoring states and civilians. A state that is invested in the group's success, whether out of genuine sympathy or because it relies on it for domestic or regional legitimacy, will be more likely to provide both material and political support. This is one significant distinction between wooing a sponsoring state with the promise of prestige versus service as a military proxy: military action is essentially fungible, while legitimacy is more closely tied to a particular group. At the domestic level, successful marketing can provide durable access to nonmaterial resources such as political legitimacy and local information. But because it also stands to appeal to more wealthy community members, who do not need social services, it also provides greater access to material assets.
On the other hand, ineffective marketing can backfire badly. A movement that frames itself in a way that does not resonate with or, worse yet, alarms the public or potential sponsors, stands to lose access to any gains. And movements that frame themselves too narrowly may find themselves appealing to an unsustainably small constituency.
There is a degree of overlap among the above strategies. Provision of social services can closely resemble coercion if there is the threat that services may be withdrawn, or as a form of marketing if they are particularly well run. Coercion of one group of civilians can be intended as a kind of threatening "negative marketing" to others. Military proxy relationships may develop more smoothly if the parties share an ideology. Though these strategies are not mutually exclusive, they do form a general framework for understanding militant behavior.
HYPOTHESES
To summarize, all nonstate actors in all contexts require certain material and nonmaterial resources. They have a choice of strategies to acquire these resources, and this choice ultimately shapes their chances of survival:
(1) Nonstate actors who use coercion against states and/or civilians will receive only short-term material resources and few, if any, nonmaterial resources.
(2) Nonstate actors who provide services to states and/or civilians in exchange for support will receive some material and nonmaterial resources.
(3) Nonstate actors who market themselves to states and/or civilians will receive durable access to both material and nonmaterial support.
These hypotheses will be evaluated by comparing Hezbollah's far less successful early years during the Lebanese civil war with its much more effective performance during the July War. Within-case comparison of the same movement during different periods makes it possible to hold constant a number of other possible variables — the primary adversary (the IDF), potential secondary adversaries (Lebanese militias) and the area in which conflict primarily took place (southern Lebanon). It also holds constant the potential external sponsors (Iran and Syria) and local constituents (the Shiite and non-Shiite sectors of the Lebanese public) from whom Hezbollah could potentially acquire resources. Looking at Hezbollah's behavior during two different periods therefore makes it feasible to test specifically for the impact of changes in the strategy through which it sought to acquire resources. Different strategies directed at the same state or audience at different times clearly produced different results. This comparison is based in part on field research conducted in Lebanon in spring 2009 and summer 2012, including both attendance at Hezbollah political events and interviews with the movement's political allies and adversaries (as well as members of other militant movements), using a snowball sampling approach.
HEZBOLLAH AND THE CIVIL WAR
In its early years, Hezbollah was a very different and far less effective organization than the one it would become in the 1990s and 2000s. During the years of the Lebanese civil war (from 1982, when Hezbollah was arguably founded, to the war's end in 1989), one of the movement's most important goals was to maintain a military presence in southern Lebanon in order to attack Israeli targets there.16 But, by 1989, Hezbollah was isolated politically and had been all but pushed out of the south, as much because of domestic political competition as conflict with the IDF.
Hezbollah's poor performance during this period was strongly shaped by the strategies through which it approached its foreign sponsors and civilian constituents. In its dealings with civilians, its dominant strategy choice was coercion, with the exception of the Shiite community, with whom it engaged in limited service provision and some rather narrow marketing. With regard to foreign sponsors, while Hezbollah's relationship with Iran during this period was close and lucrative, its relationship with Syria was often quite hostile. Overall, the movement's approach to both Lebanese civilians and the Syrians ultimately outweighed any benefit it derived from its chief sponsor, Iran.
Foreign Relations
Hezbollah was first established during the summer and fall of 1982 by disaffected members of Amal, unemployed Shiites who were former Fatah fighters, and members of other militias.17 The first reports of its actions began appearing in 1983, following the bombings of the American embassy and marine barracks and the French paratrooper barracks in Beirut, and in 1985, the movement issued the Open Letter officially announcing its existence.
During this period, Hezbollah's choices of external sponsors were limited to Iran and Syria.18 From its inception, its most important foreign relationship was with Iran, based on both a shared ethno-communal identity and a shared ideology. The post-revolutionary regime in Iran had actively sought a client in Lebanon but found the quasi-leftist Amal to be an awkward fit.19 Hezbollah proved a far better match, at least in part because many of its founders and the leaders of the Iranian revolution had been students together in Najaf, Iraq. This led to their respective political ideologies developing along similar lines, and to close personal ties in some cases.
This relationship provided Hezbollah with substantial material and nonmaterial resources throughout the 1980s, including training by the Iranian revolutionary guards,20 weapons21 and, most important, funding. In the years immediately following the Iranian revolution, this was at times as high as $5 million to $10 million a month,22 used to support Hezbollah's military operations and to lay the groundwork for its social-service, media and public-relations institutions,23 though these were far less extensive in the 1980s than they would later become.
Of course, this relationship was not without its difficulties. Hezbollah's Iranian sponsorship did generate suspicion among other Lebanese parties. Moreover, conflict within the Iranian regime sometimes translated to conflict among those factions' allies within Hezbollah. After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, President Hashemi Rafsanjani, part of a less pro-Hezbollah faction, significantly reduced its funding.24 But, overall, Hezbollah's relationship with Iran was, and remains, both positive and lucrative.
In contrast, Hezbollah's early relationship with Syria was often troubled. Its radical fundamentalist ideology was at times alarming to the Syrian regime, which prized stability and control above all else in its dealings with Lebanon, and much preferred the pragmatic communal secularism of its primary Shiite client, Amal. Both Hezbollah's goals (the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon) and its more flamboyant tactics (especially the kidnapping of foreigners and hijacking of airplanes) were cause for concern and, at times, embarrassment in Damascus.
This was, on balance, extremely costly. True, during those times when the relationship was amicable, Syria allowed Hezbollah to use the town of Baalbek as a base and provided it with training and even arms. Syria also facilitated the flow of weapons from Iran into Lebanon, and allowed both parties to use the Iranian embassy in Damascus for coordination.25 But, ultimately, Syria and Hezbollah's divergent interests and Hezbollah's approach toward Syria led to open conflict. Clashes first occurred in the Bekaa Valley in May 1984, when the Syrians moved to contain Hezbollah.26 Despite Syrian requests to the Iranians to restrain their client, tensions increased over the next two years as Syria attempted to constrain Hezbollah, culminating in the massacre of 18 Hezbollah fighters in their West Beirut barracks.27 In 1986, casualties were generated on both sides, and two Syrian officers were taken captive when Syrian forces attempted to rescue hostages being held at Hezbollah's barracks in Baalbek.28
Hezbollah's conflict with Syria also translated into tension with Amal. What began as jostling for control of southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut escalated into the seizure of Hezbollah weapons by Amal fighters29 and even exchanges of fire.30 With the kidnapping of U.S. Army Colonel William Higgins in 1988, open warfare erupted in which Syria backed Amal. By April, though Hezbollah was able to establish a presence in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Amal had managed to expel Hezbollah from the south.31
Domestic Policy
If Hezbollah relied on a more belligerent posture and narrower framing of its own identity in relation to its external sponsors in the 1980s than it would later on, this was doubly true of its approach to the Lebanese public. Hezbollah's early approach to the Shiite community was in some ways a less developed version of the approach it would take in later years, including both service provision and the promotion of its ideology. Backed by Iranian funding, Hezbollah began providing social services, including health and education,32 to the Shiite refugees fleeing to Beirut to escape the ongoing violence in southern Lebanon. Toward the end of the decade, it established al-Emdad to provide relief to those harmed by the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon; Jihad al Binaa, its in-house construction company; and the Islamic Health Committee. While these services were less developed than they would become in the 1990s, they still helped to build Hezbollah's relationship with the Shiite community.
However, given the competition it faced from Amal for the political allegiance of the Shiite public, Hezbollah still had to make a case for its own political program. Through a network of mosques and community centers, as well as its newspaper, Al Ahd, the movement began promoting its religious message (and its goal of an Islamic revolution in Lebanon), and publicizing its work to improve the position of Lebanon's Shiites and its record of combat against the IDF.33 But Hezbollah also behaved coercively in some Shiite areas. In Baalbek, the movement not only followed the Lebanese militias' accepted practice of establishing roadblocks;34 it also banned alcohol, the wearing of makeup, loud music, and singing and dancing in mixed groups.35 Whether or not the public agreed with these new policies, they were certainly not consulted about their implementation.
If its approach to the Shiite community in the 1980s was mixed, so was the community's response. The asset Hezbollah most needed from the Shiite public during this period was its acquiescence to its political and especially military activity in Shiite areas. In this, it was far more successful in Beirut than in the south; by 1986, the Dahiyeh had become the movement's base of operations. On the other hand, Hezbollah's radical approach and tactics remained suspect to some Shiites, particularly those who were already Amal supporters. But, perhaps most significant, Hezbollah attacks on Israeli targets continued to bring further suffering to the already battered south, where the movement failed to win the level of support it had acquired in Beirut. This laid the groundwork for the difficulties it would later face against Amal.
In contrast, Hezbollah's approach to Lebanese outside the Shiite community during this period was characterized primarily by coercion. Its attempts to market its program more broadly were hampered by its narrow framing as a Shiite Islamic movement and its rejection of the Lebanese state. Though the moderates in the party stated repeatedly that they wished to see the Lebanese public choose an Islamic system voluntarily, others, including Secretary-General Abbas Mousawi, made more radical statements: "As Muslims, we don't believe in the existence of a separate country called Lebanon"; and "We are ready to overthrow the regime in Lebanon in order to establish a just regime. Whoever rules over Lebanon must adhere to the laws of Islam."36
More damaging still was Hezbollah's use of violence to extend its control over the Bekaa, the south and parts of Beirut. In the winter of 1984, Hezbollah leaflets begin to appear in (predominantly Sunni) West Beirut warning residents not to keep alcohol in their houses or buy American cars, and demanding that women wear chadors.37 These were not idle threats; during the festival of Ashura in 1984, several bars and nightclubs in West Beirut were attacked. Both the Sunni political leadership and ordinary residents denounced these actions; one man interviewed by The Washington Post said plainly, "We had a free life before…. Now the Shiites are here and they think differently. They give orders, especially Hezbollah, about drinking and dressing and other things. We're Moslem too, but we don't like anyone giving us orders."38 In sum, Hezbollah's strategic choices at this stage meant that it had few political allies and little legitimacy outside the Shiite community.
Outcome
This state of affairs eventually proved detrimental to Hezbollah's primary mission: its conflict with the IDF and its Lebanese proxy, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). Hezbollah did launch a number of highly successful attacks on Israeli forces in the south. But by 1989, the organization had, at least for the time being, been unable to achieve what was (given its self-proclaimed status as the Islamic resistance in Lebanon) arguably its most central goal: maintaining a base of operations in the south against Israel. This outcome owes more to its deteriorating relations with Syria and its client Amal than to any particular success on the part of the IDF, demonstrating the powerful role that Hezbollah's foreign and domestic relationships played in shaping its chances for military success.
Fighting had erupted, mostly in Beirut, between Amal and Hezbollah as early as 1984.39 By 1987, tensions were rising in the south as well. That summer, Amal members broke up a Hezbollah demonstration in Tyre,40 and in spring 1988, open fighting erupted. Hezbollah, aided by the PLO, took up positions in Sidon, while Syria moved against its strongholds in Beirut and provided Amal with logistical assistance in the south.41 By January, the conflict had escalated to open warfare.42 Amal declared it would continue until it had "purged" the area of Hezbollah fighters, whom it called "renegades."43 And, indeed, by the time a ceasefire was signed, Hezbollah had been forced to retreat from most of its positions in the south and to recognize Amal's authority in the area.44 In other words, by the end of the civil war, because of its contentious relationships with both Syria and with other Lebanese, Hezbollah had lost the ability to pursue, much less achieve, its primary goal: the expulsion of IDF troops from Lebanese territory.
HEZBOLLAH AND THE JULY WAR
By the time the July War began almost 30 years later, on July 12, 2006, Hezbollah had become a drastically different organization, one capable of denying the Israeli military its objectives in Lebanon. At that time, Israel's stated goal was the rescue of two Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah. However, statements by Israeli leaders suggest that the scope of the mission evolved to include Hezbollah's disarmament,45 the removal of its capacity to launch attacks against northern Israel,46 and even its removal from Lebanon entirely47 (though a more conservative assessment would be that Israel hoped to constrain Hezbollah by turning the other Lebanese communities against it48). Ultimately, none of the above goals were accomplished. Hezbollah retained both its military position and its political influence, and the bodies of the two captured soldiers were not returned until 2008. This substantial improvement in the organization's performance is the result of changes in Hezbollah's approach to both civilians in Lebanon and its foreign sponsors in the region.
Hezbollah's self-reinvention began with the end of the civil war in 1990, when it embarked upon a process of self-reinvention as an explicitly Lebanese and political, rather than Shiite and military, organization. In its foreign relations, the organization made peace with the Syrians and (for the most part) successfully maintained its relationship with Iran following the death of Khomeini in 1989. By 2006, it had developed strong relations with its external sponsors, through both marketing and service provision, and had established a solid norm of support among at least part of the Lebanese public, making it a far more resilient and effective organization than it had been in its early years. From its foreign sponsors, it had received significant material support, and from its domestic constituency, essential nonmaterial support, allowing it to both resist the initial Israeli attack and recover its position after the war.
Domestic Politics
With the end of the civil war in 1990, Hezbollah's mode of interaction with the Lebanese public — Shiite and otherwise — underwent a profound transformation. In recent years, the organization has marketed itself and its political mission to an ever wider-audience. In the Shiite community, in particular, Hezbollah enjoyed almost unchallenged support, which it gained through a combination of religious, communal and political marketing, as well as the provision of social services.
After much internal debate and consultation with Iran, Hezbollah's leadership convened a 12-man committee in 1992 to decide on the issue of electoral participation. The committee voted in favor by a 10-2 margin. This decision proved wildly popular with Shiite civilians and allowed Hezbollah to reframe itself as a political movement representing the interests of the Shiite community.49 Its growing reputation for scrupulous honesty and piety lent the organization a moral authority that Amal lacked. Its reputation was further enhanced by its record of resistance against the Israeli occupation of the "security belt" in southern Lebanon and by the credit Hezbollah claimed for the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. Hezbollah has also grown increasingly adept at communicating its message and publicizing its accomplishments; the establishment of the Al Manar satellite channel in the early 1990s provided an important platform, in addition to its existing radio stations and its newspaper.
Another means of outreach to the civilian population is Hezbollah's substantial social-service network. By the middle of the 1990s, Hezbollah had come to resemble a state within a state in the heavily Shiite areas of the Dahiyeh, the Bekaa Valley and the south. The organization builds and administers schools, hospitals and other welfare organizations, and provides local law enforcement and infrastructure maintenance, some of the latter through its in-house construction company, Jihad al Binaa.50 All of these services are connected and administered through a central bureaucracy, which has in and of itself increased the organization's reputation for competence, fairness and honesty. And, indeed, these tactics have produced a strong norm of support for Hezbollah in the Shiite community. Informal conversations with Hezbollah supporters at rallies suggest that, in addition to the practical protection provided by "the resistance" and the personal religious commitments of movement supporters, the loyalty to the organization expressed by friends and family members also exerts a strong influence. Though Amal provides an alternative, it does not enjoy the same support, suggesting that these sentiments are not purely communal, but connected specifically to Hezbollah.
Perhaps surprisingly, by 2006, support (or at least grudging respect) for Hezbollah was not limited to the Shiite community. This is partly due to its social-service network; anecdotal evidence suggests that its services are both used and admired by non-Shiites and even Palestinians. (This is particularly noteworthy given the antipathy between the Shiite and Palestinian communities following the PLO-Amal War of the Camps in the late 1980s.) But it is also due, at least in part, to Hezbollah's deliberate attempts to market itself to non-Shiite Lebanese as a Lebanese resistance organization, going so far as to remove religious material from polling stations in mixed areas and rebranding its newspaper to more closely resemble those of other Lebanese political parties. In the late 1990s, Hezbollah even changed the slogan on its flags from al thawra al Islamiya fi Lubnan, "the Islamic revolution in Lebanon," to al muqawama al Islamiya fi Lubnan, "the Islamic resistance in Lebanon."51 This rhetoric perhaps became more convincing after Hezbollah refrained from reprisals against Christians in the south after the IDF withdrawal in 2000.52 As much as any Lebanese political party, and perhaps more deftly than most, Hezbollah has learned to tailor its message to its audience. This is a marked departure from the rigid ideology that colored its interactions with Christian, Sunni and even Shiite civilians in the 1980s.
Support from both Shiite and non-Shiite Lebanese helped the organization perform well in the elections of 1992, 2000 and 2004, though this was, of course, facilitated by the Syrian occupation.53 Civilians also likely provided information and safe haven to fighters in the south both before and during the July War. And it was at least partly Hezbollah's influence in the Shiite community that made the Lebanese army's heavily Maronite officer corps leery of using force to disarm the movement after 2000,54 given the large number of Shiite soldiers in the enlisted ranks and the sectarian schisms that divided the army during the civil war.55
But perhaps most important was the resilience the organization's improved domestic position afforded it in the aftermath of the conflict. In the 1980s, Israeli reprisals for Hezbollah attacks generated resentment in southern Lebanon and contributed to the movement's loss of its positions in the area by 1989. In contrast, even in the face of far heavier casualties during the July War (over 1,200 in a month), support for the movement remained high in Shiite areas. The organization was able to recover politically in Lebanon, largely as a result of the reputation and relationships it had built up before the conflict, and emerge from the war with its prestige and influence intact, if not actually enhanced.
Foreign Relations
If Hezbollah's domestic relationships looked different in 2006 than they did in 1989, its foreign relationships were quite different as well. In some ways, Hezbollah's relationship with Iran during this period was much as it had been in the 1980s: a client-patron relationship based on a shared ideology and communal identity, though its funding was cut sharply in 1989, with the political ascendance after Khomeini's death of the more pragmatic Hashemi Rafsanjani.56 But, overall, the relationship remained close, and Hezbollah's approach to its patron remained similar in most ways to that of earlier years.
A far more dramatic change occurred in Hezbollah's relationship with Syria. During the civil war, Hezbollah's political program and tactics alarmed the Syrians, who focused their patronage on the more moderate Amal. But with Hezbollah's engagement in the Lebanese political system at the end of the civil war and its acceptance of the Taif Agreement (and Syrian hegemony in Lebanon), the organization became far more appealing as a client and military proxy. Moreover, in the early 1990s, as Jordan and the Palestinians negotiated agreements with Israel, Syria became increasingly concerned that it would be left with few means of pressuring the Israelis at the negotiating table for the return of the Golan Heights. Hezbollah's attacks on IDF forces in south Lebanon and its rocket attacks on Israel itself were very useful in this regard. Hezbollah also became an important political proxy for Syria within Lebanon itself, working closely with Syria's puppet president, Emile Lahoud. In 2005, it was Hezbollah that led the (unsuccessful) counterprotests against demonstrations calling for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. After the Syrians were forced to withdraw in 2005, Hezbollah became a still more important avenue through which Syria could assert its preferences in Lebanon.
Hezbollah's relationships with its external sponsors proved in many ways very lucrative. Syria not only provided political backing for Hezbollah during its occupation of Lebanon; it also long served as the main conduit for supplies from Iran. Significantly, during the July War, both Syria and Iran ensured that Hezbollah was well supplied.57 This stands in stark contrast with Syria's treatment of the PLO during the Israeli invasion of 1982, when it cut off access to PLO weapons stores in Damascus.58 Iran in particular also provided significant financial support, used both to bolster its arsenal and maintain its substantial social-service network. By the mid-1990s, the Iranian government had even set up offices in Beirut for the direct payment of Hezbollah staff salaries.59
However, given Hezbollah's improved domestic position, its external relationships now, ironically, carried a cost it had not incurred when the organization had little to lose in terms of domestic reputation. Many in the Christian community, particularly the followers of parties that were suppressed during the Syrian occupation, view the Hezbollah-Syria alliance with distrust — though this has not stopped the Tayyar al Watani al Hurr, Michel Aoun's political party, which was banned under the Syrian occupation, from forming an alliance with Hezbollah. This is also true of Hezbollah's relationship with Iran, viewed with suspicion by both the Christian and Sunni political leadership.60 In this sense, then, the material benefits of the Iranian relationship are tempered by the political disadvantages, evidence that lucrative external sponsorship was solely responsible for the movement's success in 2006.
Outcome
Nevertheless, the material resources Hezbollah acquired from its foreign sponsors and the political assets it was able to develop proved highly beneficial in 2006. After 34 days, Israel withdrew from Lebanon without having recovered its captured soldiers, disarmed Hezbollah or removed it from Lebanon. Hezbollah lost over 500 fighters, and a great deal of its arsenal was damaged or destroyed.61 Its leadership and overall structure, however, remained intact. Today, the organization maintains its influence in the south, offers guided tours of former Hezbollah military positions,62 and has opened a large "resistance tourism" site called Mleeta. Ultimately, the major victory in 2006 was not that Hezbollah defeated the IDF, but rather that it was able to survive the IDF's attempt to bring about its defeat, and to thrive in the aftermath of the war.
The movement's success in the July War cannot be attributed to force of arms alone. In 2006, despite the weapons provided by Iran, the military gap between Hezbollah and the IDF was still enormous. The IDF initially deployed 10,000 soldiers to Hezbollah's 2,000-3,000; by the end of the war, those numbers had risen to 30,000 and (at most) 10,000, respectively. Though it did have a stockpile of anti-tank and anti-ship missiles, as well as artillery, light weapons and several Iranian-made unmanned aerial drones, it possessed nothing to counter the power of the Israeli Air Force. And, while Hezbollah's missiles were useful for strikes against targets in Israel, they were not ideal for waging a ground war.63
What is particularly striking, however, is the contrast between the July War and Hezbollah's performance in the late 1980s against much more favorable odds. Hezbollah was also well armed and funded by Iran in the late 1980s, but this was not sufficient to guarantee its ability to achieve its objectives against Amal or the IDF itself, which did not withdraw from Lebanon until 2000. Hezbollah's ability to survive the July War was rather the product of the relationships it had built domestically and regionally. These endowed it not only with the ability to resist the Israeli onslaught militarily, but also with the resilience to emerge from the war with its political position in Lebanon intact.
TABLE 1.
Hezbollah (1989) vs. Hezbollah (2006)
|
The Civil War |
The July War |
Military Strength |
Unknown number of soldiers; small arms, RPGs, surface-to-surface missiles, suicide attacks, car bombs |
~3,000 "Katyusha" rockets, wire guided missiles, anti-tank and anti-ship missiles, small arms |
Adversary |
1,000-2000 IDF forces + SLA fighters, tanks and APCs, artillery, air power |
10,000-30,000 IDF forces, tanks and APCs, naval blockade, |
Context |
South Lebanon |
South Lebanon |
Strategy- Civilians |
Coercion, minimal service |
Marketing and service provision, some coercion |
Strategy- Sponsors |
Iran: Service provision and |
Iran and Syria: Service provision and marketing |
Outcome |
Failure |
Survival |
TABLE 2.
Hezbollah Capacity vs. PLO Capacity
Conflict |
Party |
Fighters |
Arms |
Outcome |
1982 |
PLO |
15,000 |
85 tanks, 100 anti-tank guns, 150-200 artillery, anti-aircraft |
Defeat |
IDF |
75,000 |
1,240 tanks and 1,520 APCs, air force |
||
July War |
Hezbollah |
3,000 |
"Katyusha" rockets, long- and medium-range missiles, anti-tank and anti-ship missiles, small arms. |
Survival |
IDF |
10,000-30,000 |
Tanks and APCs, air force, naval blockade. |
CONCLUSION
The best explanation for the change in Hezbollah's effectiveness over time lies in the strategies through which it acquired its material and political resources, rather than merely the resources themselves. As a narrow militant movement with a radical political platform and limited constituency, Hezbollah was unable to acquire much political clout, relative either to Amal or in the broader Lebanese political context. Moreover, its overtly revolutionary project and its use of destabilizing tactics such as kidnapping alarmed the Syrians, placing Hezbollah in an adversarial position to the most powerful military force in Lebanon.
But in the 1990s, when Hezbollah moderated its message and reframed itself as a national resistance movement, it was able to repair its relationship with the Syrians and ultimately build a powerful political coalition, ensuring its ability to withstand both domestic and regional political and military shocks. In Lebanon, Hezbollah's use of service provision and assiduous ethno-communal, ideological and nationalist marketing has managed to produce a solid norm of support within the Shiite community, while its attempts to frame itself as a Lebanese national resistance movement and its choice to refrain from overtly coercive tactics in the south after 2000 have at the very least impressed some non-Shiite Lebanese. One member of the Tayyar interviewed went so far as to compare them to Buddhist monks.64 These relationships meant that Hezbollah had the political resilience to survive the aftermath of the July War domestically. It did not suffer a backlash within the Shiite community, as it did in 1989, and opinion was divided in other quarters, preventing the emergence of a unified anti-Hezbollah opposition.
The simple possession of material assets cannot explain the variation in Hezbollah's military effectiveness during the different periods of its history. Despite receiving far more money in the 1980s than after Khomeini's death in 1989, Hezbollah was far less effective during the earlier period than it would become later on, after it shifted from a strategy based on coercion to one based more on marketing and service provision.
Moreover, Hezbollah was also better able to survive its confrontation with the IDF in 2006 than other nonstate adversaries of the Israeli military that faced a smaller disadvantage. The case of the PLO's defeat by the IDF in 1982 is particularly striking, given that the military gap between Hezbollah and the IDF in 2006 was arguably greater, as the table above indicates.
Comparison with the PLO is informative, not only because it demonstrates that relative military force is not the sole determinant of which nonstate actors will survive, but because it also suggests that the choices a nonstate actor makes in its approach to state sponsors and local constituents are important. The PLO fared badly in 1982, in part because of its poor relationship with Syria, which did little to defend its former client in the face of the Israeli advance and even prevented weapons and supplies from reaching it, but also because of its alienation of the civilian population of the south by its coercive behavior. When the IDF arrived in southern Lebanon, the communities there offered little by way of resistance in support of the PLO:
...I remember a year before the invasion, in 1981, they [the PLO] bombed Saida with heavy artillery,…and when the Israeli invasion happened we expected Saida to fight, defending the Palestinians — why? Why should they fight when that happened?65
The powerful role that nonstate actors' resource-acquisition strategies play in their success in using those resources has a number of interesting policy implications. For insurgent movements, this would seem to suggest that coercion is a poor strategy; it alienates civilians and potential domestic allies and lowers the group's resistance to counterinsurgent efforts, even when it is otherwise well-armed and well-funded. This also suggests that marketing, when done properly, can be a powerful tool in shaping a movement's potential constituency. If done poorly, however, it stands to do the opposite and can isolate the movement both domestically and regionally. On the other hand, for counterinsurgent forces, a well-armed adversary that has acquired its arms by force may be a less formidable foe than one whose resources have been acquired through service provision or marketing.
Ultimately, Hezbollah's trajectory indicates that the steps a movement takes to acquire resources in the first place can determine how useful they will be once acquired. The strategy through which a nonstate military actor acquires resources also has a powerful effect on its ability to both resist militarily and recover politically from confrontations with its counterinsurgent adversaries.
A question remains, however, as to whether Hezbollah will demonstrate the same military and political resilience after its next major confrontation with Israel. Since 2006, it has at times seemed to revert to a more coercive approach to Lebanese politics, particularly during the summer of 2008, when it (or at least its allies) briefly occupied West Beirut. This has been further complicated by the escalating civil war in Syria, which has raised political tensions in Lebanon as well. How the organization negotiates these developments, and their effect on its domestic and foreign relations, will have a significant impact on its prospects for the future.
1 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977): 1212-41; and Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Paradigm Publishers, 2007).
2 See, for instance, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," The Center for the Study of African Economies Working Paper Series, Working Paper 160 (2002).
3 Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
4 It is easier to measure than "victory," which tends to favor the nonstate actor; militant groups often have "wider goalposts" than their military adversaries.
5 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers (Greenhill Books, 1896); United States Army and Marine Corps, United States Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 (University of Chicago Press, 2007); and Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence.
6 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Office of Transnational Issues, National Security Research Division, RAND Corporation, 2001); Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946-2004," Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 5 (2005): 623–35; and Idean Salehyan, "No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict," The Journal of Politics 70, no. 1 (2008): 54–66.
7 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Salehyan, "No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict"; Idean Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics (Cornell University Press, 2009); and Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival : The PLO in Lebanon (Westview Press ; Pinter Publishers, 1990).
8 Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, Trans. by J.P. Morray, with an introduction by I.F. Stone (Vintage Books, 1961); United States Army and Marine Corps, United States Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: US Army Field Manual No. 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5; and Chalmers Johnson, "Civilian Loyalties and Guerilla Conflict," World Politics 14, no. 4 (1962): 649.
9 Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War," American Journal of Political Science 52, no. 2 (2008): 436-55.
10 Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism; Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements; and Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics.
11 Many PLO members interviewed cited this as a consistent issue in their relations with the Arab states.
12 Shawn Teresa Flanigan, "Charity as Resistance: Connections Between Charity, Contentious Politics, and Terror," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 7 (2006): 641–655; Janine Clark, Islam, Charity and Activism: Middle Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen (Indiana University Press, 2004).
13 As noted by members of the Change and Reform parliamentary bloc, the electoral list on which Hamas runs its candidates, in interviews with the author (Anonymous (a) and (b), 2009).
14 As noted by members of the Change and Reform parliamentary bloc, the electoral list on which Hamas runs its candidates, in interviews with the author.
15 David Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency Redux," Survival 48, no. 4 (2006): 111-30.
16 Based on the public statements of its leaders, Hezbollah's goals during this period were 1) the expulsion of all foreigners from Lebanon, 2) the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon, and 3) the liberation of Jerusalem through the destruction of Israel. See "Hezbollah Vows to Expel U.S., Eradicate Israel," Beirut Voice of Lebanon, March 13, 1985.
17 Eitan Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God, from Revolution to Institutionalization (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 61-63.
18 Of the states involved in Lebanon at the time, most already had proxies or were backing Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war.
19 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hezbollah : Politics and Religion (Pluto Press, 2002); and A.W Samii, "A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the Hezbollah-Iran-Syria Relationship," Middle East Journal 62, no. 1 (2008): 32–53.
20 Samii, "A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands," 44-45.
21 "More Missiles Brought to Beirut Suburbs," Beirut Voice of Lebanon, December 1, 1983.
22 Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (Columbia University Press, 1997), 150.
23 Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God, 181.
24 Magnus Ranstorp, "Hezbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision- Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions," Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 3 (Autumn 1994): 321.
25 Samii,"A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands," 38-39.
26 "VOL: Syrians Encircle Hezbollah Gunmen in Ba'labakk," Beirut Voice of Lebanon, 1984.
27 Nora Boustany, "Syrian Troops Said to Kill 18 In Hezbollah's Beirut Militia," Washington Post, February 25, 1987.
28 Samii, "A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands," 39.
29 "Amal Seizes 'Hundreds' of Hezbollah's Rifles," Beirut Voice of Lebanon, June 30, 1985.
30 "Fighting Resumes," Paris AFP, April 28, 1980.
31 Samii, "A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands," 40.
32 Jaber, Hezbollah : Born with a Vengeance, 150.
33 Azani, Hezbollah : The Story of the Party of God, 63-64.
34 "Hezbollah Gunmen Occupy Houses," Beirut Voice of Lebanon, January 22, 1984.
35 Donna Abu Nasr, "Shiites Bring Islamic Fundamentalism to Lebanon's Ancient Baalbek," Associated Press, December 13, 1998.
36 Azani, Hezbollah : The Story of the Party of God, 143-44.
37 "Hezballah Leaflets in Beirut," Beirut Voice of Lebanon, January 28, 1984.
38 Bradley Graham, "Islamic Fundamentalism Rises; West Beirut Dons the Chador," Washington Post, n.d.
39 "VOL: Syrians Encircle Hezbollah Gunmen in Ba'labakk."
40 "Amal Reportedly Confronts Hizballah Demonstration," (Clandestine) Radio Free Lebanon, July 29, 1987.
41 "Syrians Assist Amal," Beirut Voice of Lebanon, April 7, 1988.
42 "'Critical' Situation in Southern Lebanon Noted," (Tehran, 1988).
43 "Amal To 'Wipe Out' Hizballah," (Clandestine) Radio Free Lebanon, January 10, 1989.
44 "Hizballah Official on Recognizing Amal Authority," Paris AFP, January 27, 1989.
45 Prime Minister Ehud Olmert gave three conditions for the cessation of hostilities: the return of the two soldiers, the cessation of Hezbollah's rocket attacks, and the full implementation of UN Resolution 1559, calling for the disarmament of Hezbollah. See "Israel Hits Hezbollah Leader's HQ," BBC, July 14, 2006.
46 As stated by Defense Minister Amir Peretz. Sheera Frenkel, "Peretz: Aim Is to See Off Hezbollah," Jerusalem Post, July 14, 2006.
47 As stated by Major General Benny Gantz. David Horovitz, "IDF Has a Lot Left to Achieve," Jerusalem Post, July 14, 2006.
48 An anonymous U.S. official. Cited in Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry, "How Hezbollah Defeated Israel, Part1: Winning the Intelligence War," Asia Times Online, October 12, 2006.
49 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton University Press, 2007), 100.
50 Flanigan, "Charity as Resistance: Connections Between Charity, Contentious Politics, and Terror."
51 Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hezbollah's Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program (Amsterdam University Press, 2002), 171; and Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God, 129.
52 Michel Metni, 2009.
53 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 102.
54 Hezbollah was the only party in Lebanon to remain armed after the end of the civil war; the justification for this was the Israeli presence in the south.
55 Aram Nerguizian and Anthony Cordesman, "The Lebanese Armed Forces: Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon" (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009).
56 Ranstorp, "Hezbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision-Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions," 317.
57 Anthony Cordesman, "Preliminary 'Lessons' of the Israeli-Hezbollah War," Center for Strategic and International Studies (2006).
58 Yazid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1997), 533.
59 Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, 150-57.
60 Albert Kostanian, 2009.
61 Anthony Cordesman, "Preliminary 'Lessons' of the Israeli-Hezbollah War," Center for Strategic and International Studies (2006), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060817_isr_hez_lessons.pdf.
62 "Jihadist Tours in South Lebanon's 'Hezbollahland'," Al Arabiyah, May 8, 2010.
63 Cordesman, "Preliminary 'Lessons' of the Israeli-Hezbollah War."
64 Michel Metni, 2009.
65 Oraib Rantawi, 2009.
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